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THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Paul-Henri Spaak

THE twentieth anniversary of the treaty establishing the Atlantic Alliance is an excellent occasion to make a summing-up of the situation.

In order to understand clearly the events that we are now living through, it is essential to bear in mind the circumstances which have led to their existence.

The first remark that I should like to make is that the policy of blocs, as it exists nowadays, was in no way intended or desired by those who were responsible for Western policy on the eve of the post-war period. Contrary to what has sometimes—and wrongly—been said, the aim of Roosevelt and of Churchill at Yalta was not to divide the world and to reserve for themselves zones of influence. On the contrary, they hoped to maintain the alliance with the USSR concluded when the latter was attacked by Hitler. Nothing in the final communiqué issued at Yalta indicates a desire to share out the world. Everything, on the contrary, indicates the desire to pursue a common policy.

This common policy found its most spectacular realization in the creation of the United Nations. By granting one another the right of veto, the Great Powers condemned themselves to co-operation, since nothing could be done without their unanimous approval.

But the policy of Yalta failed immediately and completely. The final communiqué of the conference was issued on 11 February. On 25 February, in Bucharest, Vyshinski forced the King of Rumania to dismiss his government and to take the first step which was to lead to the setting-up of a communist regime, which was certainly against the wishes of the majority of the population. None of the Yalta provisions was respected by the USSR.

Let us recall here that the USSR was the only country engaged in the war which made important territorial conquests: the three Baltic countries, and parts of Poland, Finland, Rumania and Germany. The USSR, pursuing a policy of combining internal subversion and external military pressure, succeeded in setting up in the Balkans, in Central Europe and in Eastern Europe, governments which were in a minority, but subservient to its policy.

The USSR, by abusing its right to veto, rendered ineffective the United Nations in which so much hope had been placed. The USSR, by refusing to collaborate with the other countries within the framework of the Marshall Plan, destroyed the last illusions of those who had thought it possible to co-operate with her.

AT the beginning of 1948, two Englishmen, Churchill in his Fulton speech and Bevin in his speech in the House of Commons, made perceptive critical analyses of the situation and were instrumental in

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bringing about the radical transformation which took place in the policy of the Western democracies. One month after Bevin's speech, the Treaty of Brussels was signed. Great Britain, France and the three Benelux countries decided to organize their defence against possible aggression on a joint basis and to co-operate in their economic reconversion. On the very day the Treaty was signed President Truman expressed his hope of seeing the United States give its support to the initiative of the five European countries. A year later, on 4 April 1949, the Treaty of Washington was signed. The Atlantic Alliance was born.

What were the aims of the signatories of the Treaty? They were, in short, to halt Soviet expansion in Europe, to maintain peace and to discuss on a basis of equality with the USSR any problem which might arise, such as that of Germany or of Berlin.

I want to stress here that all these objectives have been achieved and that a success of this sort is very rare indeed. Since 1949 no country in Europe has been subjected to the fate which befell the states of Central and Eastern Europe. For 20 years Western Europe has known peace, and, without being too optimistic, it does not seem likely at the present time that this part of the world will experience another conflagration. Western Europe is now a relatively tranquil continent; more peaceful than Africa or Asia, and this is really something absolutely new.

Finally, when, on several occasions, the USSR raised the question of Germany or that of Berlin and put forward unacceptable proposals, thanks to NATO, discussion could take place without one having to fear a military pressure which it would have been difficult to resist.

The Atlantic Alliance, in the course of these 20 years, has thus been an incontestable success. Why then should it be destroyed or even weakened?

I have to confess that I cannot understand those who suggest it, particularly when they assert that they are doing so because of their pacific attitude. Their reactions do not correspond to reality. It is, of course, intellectually possible to envisage systems which would ensure peace more perfectly. General and controlled disarmament would clearly be a good solution. But who believes that it can come about in the near future?

For years the question of disarmament has been discussed. Already before the Second World War a conference was held in Geneva which went on for several years. At the present time, another conference is pursuing this aim. It is not cynical to say that there is little chance of a real basis for disarmament emerging from the discussion.

One can also speak of a European security pact which would render useless the existing alliances. The communist parties launched the idea at Karlove Vary two years ago. They took it up again in the communiqué of the Budapest meeting.

To me the situation appears quite clear. Either the communists, when they speak of European security, envisage negotiations between

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NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or else they envisage bilateral negotiations from which the United States would be excluded. The second hypothesis must be ruled out without hesitation. For the countries of Western Europe to discuss security with the USSR directly and without the support of the United States would be folly. The military power of the United States alone offers the possibility of discussions taking place on an equal footing.

On the other hand, if the communists desire negotiations between the two blocs, negotiations which could lead, for instance, to the signing of a non-aggression pact, it would be well worth while to explore the possibilities. In this, one could perhaps find additional guarantees for the consolidation of peace.

But the leaders of the USSR must not be left with any illusion whatsoever concerning the will of the European countries to remain the allies of the United States. Any policy which would tend to weaken the links binding the Atlantic Alliance appears terribly dangerous to me.

In any case, there can be no question of destroying or even weakening the Alliance without being certain that it can be replaced by a system at least as efficient.

I HAVE to admit that I do not understand the hostility shown by some people towards the Atlantic Alliance. They attempt to justify this hostility by their pacifist ideas. And yet, thanks to NATO, Europe has enjoyed peace for 20 years, and, moreover, I consider that, contrary to communist slogans, the Atlantic Alliance is not an aggressive organization.

I know this is true. I signed the Treaty of Washington in the name of Belgium. I have very often taken my seat at the Atlantic Council. I was, for more than three years, the General Secretary of the Organization. I can declare that never—and there are no exceptions—has a plan of aggression against the communist world, or more particularly against the USSR, ever been envisaged. In all the military conversations of which I have been informed, there has never been any other purpose than to resist possible aggression or, better still, simply to be strong enough to prevent it.

I also deny that the United States has pursued within the Atlantic Alliance an imperialistic policy towards its European partners, or that it has attempted to impose on Europe a policy that she did not want. Such criticisms are totally without foundation. Certainly, the United States plays an important role in the Atlantic Alliance because of its military power, but this force has never been utilized to impose its concepts.

In the geographical framework established by the Treaty of Washington, the policy has been elaborated through negotiations in which each, even the weakest, has been able to defend his ideas.

For me, however, the Atlantic Alliance will be perfected only when

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the European countries have succeeded in integrating their forces, thus becoming a valid partner for the United States. One of the weaknesses of the Atlantic Alliance is the difference in the power of the partners. That is why, in my view, the idea of the Atlantic Alliance and that of a united Europe, far from being contradictory, are complementary. One cannot envisage the Atlantic Alliance's future without at the same time envisaging Europe's future. On this question, I must say that I do not think that Great Britain has always taken a correct view of the situation. On the contrary, I am convinced that she has missed many opportunities. But I am not concerned with passing historical judgments, but more with facing facts so as to solve the problems.

I am convinced that at the present time Britain has the opportunity of correcting the errors of the past and of playing a leading role in the building of Europe. Certainly, in the long run it is equally impossible to conceive of a united Europe without France as it is without Britain. At the time of the emergence of EFTA, the EEC and the Treaty of Rome, we had to resign ourselves to continue on our way without Britain, but we never gave up hope that the day would come when she would join us.

I realize, of course, that for a great country like England, a position of candidate cannot be maintained indefinitely. Nevertheless, I believe that we should continue to have patience and, above all, I consider that whilst awaiting the time when she will enter the Common Market, Great Britain should pursue, within NATO, the idea of the military integration of the European countries and follow, within the WEU, a policy of real collaboration in the field of international politics.

In celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty of Washington, my conclusions can be summarized in this way. Twenty years ago the Alliance was indispensable. It still is today. In Europe any consolidation of peace, any improvement in relations with the USSR can only be made through NATO.

Within NATO itself it would be an immense advantage if a valid European partner for the United States could be constituted. The first stage of this policy should be military integration between certain countries. Great Britain should take the initiative in this policy and pursue it with determination.

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COMMON MARKET AND COMMON IDEOLOGY

John Pinder

FROM 1962, when General de Gaulle set Algeria free and turned his attention towards Europe, to 1969, when the French decided they could do without his leadership, de Gaulle obstructed the process of European integration. So uniquely massive was the obstruction that people hardly bothered to consider what the more ordinary obstacles might be, which would remain when that great one was gone.

This failure to analyse the obstacles to integration has been reinforced by the deterministic notion, widely held as a result of the early success in European integration and given sustenance by some works of political science,[1] that, exceptions such as de Gaulle notwithstanding, the Community would continue to increase its functions and powers by an almost automatic process of 'spillover'. If the process is automatic, then it can be left to evolve without any special analysis of the obstacles or effort of political will.

The Community's long period of stagnation in the face of de Gaulle's hostility, and the prospect that movement would again become possible after he had gone, have, however, stimulated some thinking as to what those who wish to develop the Community will have to do if they are to succeed in their aims. One illuminating study,[2] due for publication towards the end of 1969, considers the weaknesses of the existing institutions and, in consequence, the direction of the reforms that will be needed if the institutions are to become strong enough to do their job. The present article considers the complementary question of what political conditions will have to be fulfilled if the community is to be enlarged and developed into an economic and political union.

IN considering the enlargement of the Communities, the British have been too much inclined to assume that if they apply for membership they have played their main part in the process; that any difficulties will be the product of cross-grained obstructionists; and that skilful negotiation by the diplomats is the right way to overcome them. In fact, there are quite enough real difficulties to make the success of a negotiation very problematic unless there is considerable goodwill on the part of all the main participants; and success therefore depends less on skilful negotiation by the diplomats than on generating the necessary political will.

[1] See for example Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford University Press, 1963).

[2] D. Coombes, *Political Union and Bureaucracy: A Portrait of the Commission of the European Communities* (to be published for PEP by Allen & Unwin, 1969).

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There is no need to describe the difficulties in detail here. The agricultural Common Market, which is so profitable for France, would unless it is drastically reformed be intolerably expensive for Britain; and, given the sensitivity of the farming interests in each country concerned, it will be far from easy to agree upon a drastic reform. Britain's debts and the related troubles of the balance of payments need no advertisement; and the French economic crisis adds a further problem in the same dimension. The European Commission believes the institutions will have to be strengthened if they are to survive an influx of new members; and dark warnings, first by de Gaulle and then by Pompidou, about a need for 'mutations' in the Community have been taken to imply that they believe its institutions would on the contrary be weakened if it is enlarged. These problems are great enough to make enlargement inconvenient for many people.

The addition of Britain and three small countries to the Common Market is not in itself likely to be a sufficient incentive for the members of the Communities to make sure that those problems are overcome. If the British want to join, then, they should seek to provide incentives. One possible way would be to make evident Britain's determination to help develop the Community into an economic union. This would attract the support of many individuals and groups throughout the Community, and in particular of the Commission, which, although it lacks the power to secure British entry, could at least put spokes in the wheel if it is not on Britain's side. But British help in developing economic union is not immediately attractive to the Germans, whose experience has led them to expect that closer economic relations with Britain and France mean yet more Deutsche Marks down the drain; and while some aspects at least of economic union, such as a programme for European technology, would attract the French, it may be doubted whether this would be enough to overcome the reservations that they will probably for some time to come still feel about British entry into the Community.

The trump that the British hold, and might be able to play to the satisfaction of both French and Germans, is in the field of defence and political union. The French are finding it very hard to continue developing their *force de frappe*, caught between the millstones of rising costs and budgetary cuts. To scrap it would be extremely difficult for Pompidou. The alternatives are to go to the Americans or to the British. Obviously, a partnership with the British, with an exchange of existing know-how (mainly of benefit to France) and a sharing of development costs, would be preferred. Could the British trade their co-operation in this for French co-operation in enlarging the Common Market?

The idea is not without problems. For one thing, the present British policy is to forgo further development of nuclear weapons, and to help France develop them would clearly be inconsistent with this. Then there is the danger that, in pleasing the French by forming a

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nuclear alliance with France, the British would annoy the Germans by appearing to relegate them to a position of permanent inferiority. It might be necessary, in order to avoid this, for Britain to agree that the responsibility for nuclear policy should eventually be transferred to a European political community. This would enable the Germans to be on a fully equal footing with the British and the French, without having national nuclear weapons. It would be politically attractive to the Germans because it would make them completely equal partners in a political Europe. But would it be acceptable to the French government, who appear to want to keep their superiority? And would any formula for nuclear sharing by Britain be acceptable to the United States, which passed its know-how to Britain on the understanding that it would not be passed on without American agreement?

The Americans might well agree to this, provided that the Franco-British, and eventually European, nuclear partnership was ensconced within the framework of NATO. But would this be acceptable to France?

These questions are hard to answer: and it is not my purpose to try to answer them, or to say whether it would be right for Britain to try to secure entry into the Common Market in this way. My aim is, rather, to illustrate how much harder it is to generate the political will that is needed for an operation such as British entry into the Communities, when policies and attitudes in such an important field as defence are so divergent.

It may be that British entry can be achieved without any agreement or understanding relating to defence. The balance-of-payments difficulties of both Britain and France may subside; and the Six may reform the Common Agricultural Policy in a way that would be acceptable to Britain. In this case entry will not present any great economic problems and will not require corresponding political incentives. But the chances of trouble-free entry are not so great that one can readily ignore the possibilities that incentives may exist in the sphere of defence, or that the defence policies of one or more of the relevant countries may change enough for some of these possibilities to be realized.

ENTRY into the EEC is a major operation politically because people on both sides of the Channel think it is. But it may be doubted whether, in its present form, the EEC has so much effect, either political or economic, on its member states as to justify all the fuss.

The dismantling of barriers to trade has of course gone very far; but, with the exception of agricultural products, no farther than it has gone in EFTA; and, after the Kennedy round cuts have been completed, not so very much farther than in the industrialized West as a whole.

It may be argued that the EEC's internal market has the great advantage that it is more likely to stay open because this is guaranteed by the Rome Treaty. But it is neither certain that this is so, nor that, if so, it will be such a great advantage to the member countries. For the

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most serious international economic problem of the present time consists not of barriers to trade, but of an inadequate mechanism for adjusting the balance of payments; and there is no evidence that the EEC has made any significant contribution towards solving it.

To the extent that it does guarantee that its internal market will remain open, indeed, the EEC accentuates the problem. For by prohibiting the use of trade or exchange controls and making devaluation very difficult, the EEC reduces still further the number of instruments which governments can use to correct balance-of-payments disequilibria, when these instruments were already inadequate. But of course when there is a conflict between the full-employment policies of a member state and the openness of the market, it is the open market rather than the full employment that has to give, as was shown when the French balance of payments ran into serious trouble following the riots and strikes of May 1968. Since the European countries quite rightly place a very high value on full employment and economic growth, this is the only possible choice when one is faced with the alternatives of massive deflation or some relaxation of the rules of the Common Market.

It has been argued that these French troubles were quite exceptional and that, once their economic consequences have been dealt with, by temporary insulation of the French market and perhaps devaluation of the franc, there will be no further need for such measures within the Community. But what about the huge German surplus, which is due only in small measure to the consequences of the French riots? The German reaction to this so far has been the 'trade-distorting' measure of a four per cent adjustment of border taxes; and the revaluation is likely before the end of the year. It is indeed inherently improbable that the members of the Community will have been able to escape such a widespread economic malady as balance-of-payments disequilibria, without having taken any special measures to do so.

Thus the EEC, as it operates today, is not so different from EFTA, or even from the international trading community. Its rules against the imposition of import or exchange controls by one member against another are stricter than those of the IMF and the GATT; and the difficulties in the way of adjusting exchange rates are greater. But in practice the EEC has no new means of correcting disequilibria, and as long as this is so, the old means will continue to be used from time to time.

Where the EEC differs from EFTA and from the wider trading community is not in its present practice, but in its potential for dealing with balance-of-payments disequilibria, as with other economic problems, in a new way. To see how this can be done, it is useful to consider how the payments between regions in an nation-state are brought into balance. In the days of laisser faire, this was done by deflation in the deficit regions, which was imposed automatically by the monetary and banking systems, regardless of the effects on the region's employment and economic growth. Today, however, it is not accepted that

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unrelieved unemployment and stagnation should be imposed on whole regions. On the contrary, unemployment is relieved by unemployment assistance and by all sorts of Keynesian measures, while regional policy creates new jobs and promotes economic growth. In this way the region's deficit is corrected by flows of official money into the region, and by discrimination in the region's favour in fiscal, transport and public expenditure policies, until such time as the region starts to attract enough private capital and to achieve satisfactory economic growth combined with equilibrium in its balance of payments. Because regional policy is still in its early stages, we cannot yet prove that it will enable a region to reach this point. But we can say that if British regional policies had not mitigated the high levels of unemployment in Scotland the pressures in favour of Scottish independence would have been very great indeed; and it follows that either regional policies will continue until either they have succeeded or the United Kingdom will be courting dismemberment.

By analogy, it is a fair assumption that the EEC, if it is to go beyond the traditional means of curing structural deficits or surpluses, will have to adopt, at Community level, policies such as Britain, France, Italy and other countries have adopted at national level in order to promote economic growth in those regions that suffer high unemployment or low rates of growth. These policies are important parts of what is called in the Community economic union: regional policies to stimulate growth, social policies to alleviate unemployment and equip the people for productive vocations, and the creation of a unified capital market to enable private capital to do its work, once official action has begun to transform the stagnant economy into a thriving one.[3] They require that the Community institutions should dispose of, and should use, powerful instruments of fiscal, monetary, transport, industrial and social policies.

It may be objected that this would go far to give the Community institutions the functions of a federal government, and that the institutions would have to be given the powers and procedures of a federal government if these functions are to be performed effectively. This, it may be argued, may in theory be desirable but in practice more than the member states are willing to accept. The point is well taken. It will be much easier for the member states to deal with their balance-of-payments problems by what may be called disengagement—by temporarily insulating their economies or by altering their exchange rates—than by giving the Community power to do what some of the member governments are themselves now doing for their regions.

It will be particularly difficult for the member governments to give the Community such powers if they do not share a common economic doctrine on balance-of-payments and regional problems, and similar policies to deal with them; and the European countries are in these

[3] These aspects of economic union were considered in some detail in J. Pinder, 'Positive integration and negative integration: Some problems of economic union in the EEC', *The World Today*, London, March 1968.

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respects at present distinctly divergent. The Germans, for example, are inclined to believe that payments deficits are caused by inflation and that the cure therefore lies in sound monetary policies; and they have been correspondingly disinclined to put a lot of money into regional development, with the exception of West Berlin and the frontier areas. The French planning school stressed structural causes of payments deficits, which would be corrected by the mechanisms of indicative planning; under de Gaulle official thinking swung towards the German view; and the future course of doctrine and policy will doubtless be influenced by the outcome of the present balance-of-payments crisis. Throughout these fluctuations in attitude towards the balance of payments—which naturally enough corresponded to fluctuations in the French balance of payments itself—the French have continued to lay strong emphasis on interventionist policies for regional development. The British are sceptical about the adequacy of monetary policies; have a wide range of policies for structural improvement of the economy; and spend a great deal on regional development. From this it may be deduced that the Germans would place their faith in the co-ordination of monetary policies in the Common Market and would oppose the massive introduction of regional-type policies at Community level; that the British would support a combination of flexible exchange rates and of regional policies at Community level; and that the French might be somewhere in between. Until there has been some convergence between these points of view, it is hard to envisage agreement to give the institutions powers to deal with balance-of-payments crises. For the 'monetary school' will fear that they are placing their fate in the hands of inflationists who will waste the creditors' substance as well as their own; and the 'structural school' will be afraid of having massive deflation imposed on them, which will cause a great deal of suffering without really solving the problem. The French government has shown by their devaluation in August 1969 that they are determined this latter should not happen.

One can go further and forecast that economic union organized by federal institutions will not be brought about on the basis of the monetary school, unless there is in the main European countries a very strong growth of neo-liberal doctrine, which values monetary stability above full employment, economic growth or the welfare state. Such a development is not likely to occur because this is the doctrine of the surplus country, generally rejected by countries that have substantial experience of deficits; and the major European countries are not likely all to be persistent creditors for long enough to adhere strongly to the doctrine together. If, then, the Community goes forward from being a customs union, punctuated by shorter or longer periods of disengagement by this or that member country which is experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties, to being an economic union that can cope with these difficulties without such periods of disengagement, it will have to do so on the basis of the doctrine of the structural school, that is to say

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of costly and deliberately discriminatory Keynesian and regional growth policies organized at Community level. The Community that Britain would join during the next two or three years will almost certainly operate on the disengagement principle, and thus do neither great good nor great harm; and the Community will become a permanently single market only when the member governments not only agree that it should do so, but also agree to establish an economic union with federal institutions, for which the precondition will be a broad consensus on economic doctrine and policies that are interventionist and by some standards radical, and that may conveniently be called 'modern economic policies'.

The conclusion of the previous section was that consensus on defence policies on the part of Britain, France and Germany would be very helpful to Britain's application for membership of the EEC. The conclusion of the present section is that, if the Common Market is to become solidly constructed, this is more likely to be done when the main European countries share common conceptions of modern economic policy.

THE way chosen to deal with balance-of-payments crises is, as we have seen, likely to be the crux which will at some time in the future determine whether the Communities will become an economic union governed by federal institutions or whether they will remain a relatively loose trading arrangement. Nor is this surprising. For the balance of payments between two states is the sum of the economic transactions between them, so that the way in which problems relating to it are handled is bound to be crucial. But there are at the same time many other problems which there will be some pressure to solve by means of common policies at Community level.

We saw also that the economic union with federal institutions is more likely to be chosen if the governments of the major member countries share certain ideas of modern economic policy. These ideas are likely to form part of a radical syndrome of policies, which would by and large also be shared by the same governments, and which would consequently be manifested in most of the common policies on which agreement was reached in the Community institutions.

At present there is no agreement among the EEC member governments on such a syndrome, with the consequence that a government with a more radical policy, which is popular with the electorate or with important pressure groups, is unwilling to accept a common policy in which the radical element would be diluted. An excellent example is the project for a European company statute. It is generally agreed in the Community that a European company statute would be a useful instrument of an industrial policy that aims to eliminate artificial obstacles to the growth of European firms; and a draft statute has accordingly been drawn up. But the point on which it has so far proved impossible to reach agreement is co-determination. The Germans have their system of co-determination, or workers on the board, which is

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much prized by the German trade unions to the extent that German governments have not dared do anything to weaken it. But the employers are not so fond of the system, and would be glad to escape from it by adopting a European statute, if one were available in which co-determination did not apply. So the German government, under trade union pressure, cannot agree to a European statute unless it provides for co-determination. But the other member governments, which are largely of conservative complexion, will not agree to a European statute *with* co-determination. So there is deadlock, despite efforts to find a compromise which would allow European companies with mainly German workers to have co-determination, while other European companies did not—in other words, to dilute the principle of the European statute. And deadlock is likely to continue until either the Germans have a government which is sufficiently right-radical to override trade union pressure on co-determination, or other member governments are sufficiently left-radical to accept it.

Similar difficulties confront attempts to use new methods to deal with concentrations of economic power within the Communities. This did not apply to the more traditional anti-trust type of measures, which most European governments, whatever their political complexion, approve in principle at least. Here the pressure for common action came from the Germans, who have a fairly comprehensive cartel law and an active cartel office to administer it. They argued that German firms would be unfairly penalized if they were subjected to such a law while firms in other member countries were left to their own devices. The Germans therefore pressed for a Community cartel law; and since they did so in the EEC's early days before de Gaulle had taken the steam out of it, such a law was passed, which despite important weaknesses has enabled the Commission to deal with some cases of restraint of trade between the member countries.

The French planners, however, who had evolved a new method of guiding the investment policies of large firms by a process of official co-ordination, were not so lucky. They too saw that, if they applied any constraints to the activities of large firms in France, those firms might escape the constraints by making their future investments in other Community countries. They therefore proposed that their methods of 'indicative planning' be adopted at Community level. But Erhard's government was on doctrinal grounds flatly opposed to the idea. There would certainly have been a serious clash between the French, who could maintain their planning system only by getting the Community to adopt a similar one or by derogating to some extent from the rules of the Common Market, and the Germans, to whom either course would have been unacceptable, had not the French government become more conservative in its economic policy and more anti-Community in its foreign policy, so that the planners' case was allowed to go by default. But the problem of harmonizing the activities of big firms with the public interest remains, and will continue to grow with the growth of

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the firms. The need for a Community policy to deal with those firms that are growing beyond the national frontiers, and hence beyond national controls, will likewise continue to grow; and an effective policy is likely to include elements of the French planners' new methods of positive influence, as well as the more traditional prohibitions of anti-trust. Clearly, however, such a common policy will not be agreed unless enough member governments are in sympathy with the idea.

There are also reasons to harmonize those taxes and subsidies that affect trade between the member countries. Thus the level of subsidies to development regions or to industries that are the object of official industrial policy is of concern to the Community, because the country with the highest level of subsidy for a region or an industry may be said to be offering unfair competition. Yet it is very difficult to secure the reduction of a subsidy, so the probable outcome is that subsidies which affect competition will be harmonized upwards. This can have one of two consequences. If the subsidy represents feather-bedding of inefficient sectors, then there will be harmonization upwards towards the most protected level. Although it is mainly a fixed price level rather than a subsidy that is involved, the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy is a case in point. If, on the other hand, the subsidy serves to promote structural reform, as would a large part of the subsidies under the new Mansholt plan for Community agriculture, then harmonization upwards is an aspect of modern economic policy.

By a symmetrical argument, it would be extremely difficult to harmonize taxes in a sense that would be regressive for a major member country. The government and people of the member country would resist it, and they would have the support of the Rome Treaty, which provides that the 'living and working conditions of labour' should be equalized 'in an upward direction'.[4]

In social policy, the principle of harmonizing upwards was already applied in the Rome Treaty in the specific case of equal pay for women[5]; and the principle of not harmonizing downwards in the case of maintaining the 'existing equivalences of paid holiday schemes'.[6] This was because the French government, which was the leader in these respects, insisted on such provisions in order to avert what it believed would be unfair competition from the other member states. International trade theory throws some doubt on these fears, at least in so far as social charges which apply fairly evenly across the economy are concerned, which was the case with paid holidays for example (though not for equal pay, which bore heavily on the textile industries which employed a high proportion of women and where strong French unions insisted that women be paid equally). But it nevertheless seems likely that social charges will be harmonized upwards in a Community which is generally adopting modern economic policies, partly through

[4] Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Article 117.
[5] Ibid., Article 119.
[6] Ibid., Article 120.

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pressure from the unions and from the European Commission, and partly by a kind of demonstration effect.

The argument could be extended by giving further examples; but these should suffice to show that there will in many cases be conflicts between those member states that have the more modern, or in some cases and by some definitions radical, economic policies and those that do not. If the general tendency in Europe, and in the major member countries in particular, is towards the adoption of modern economic policies, then there will also be a tendency for the member governments to harmonize their policies upwards, and to adopt common policies of a modern or radical type at Community level. If the general tendency is not towards modern policies, then those countries that have modern policies (and all the relevant countries have them in specific sectors) are likely to bend the rules of the Common Market in order to keep the policies—unless there is a powerful enough neo-liberal or right-radical trend to sweep the manifestations of left-radical policy away. Since the latter appears unlikely, though not impossible, the choice again seems to be between an economic union with modern economic policies, and a customs union (or common market, defined as a customs union in which not only tariffs but also non-tariff distortions to trade have been substantially reduced) in which the member governments continue to pursue their own economic policies, of whatever complexion they may be, and derogate from the strict rules of the customs union (or common market), to the extent required to enable them to do this.

To the extent that the tendency is towards harmonization on the basis of modern policies, and towards agreement on common policies of the same colour, the chances of moving towards an economic union with federal institutions will be increased. For the member states will develop confidence that they agree on the basic principles of economic policy, and that if they transfer power to federal institutions the common policies that will result will work, not to their detriment, but to their mutual advantage. When, in these circumstances, there is a major balance-of-payments crisis within the Community—as there certainly will be from time to time—the probability that it will be resolved by a decisive step towards economic union and federal institutions will be correspondingly enhanced.

If that step is taken, the opportunity to develop modern economic policies in the Community will be greatly increased; for in place of the mere customs union that tends to restrain the freedom of action of member governments that wish to introduce modern policies, the Community institutions will have the power to secure upward harmonization and to introduce modern policies at the Community level. There will be the prospect of a Community, or a developing federation, which compounds the modern policies of the different member states into a

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many-sided Community policy, based on the ideology of a radical syndrome.

IF the argument so far is correct, a Europe in which there is consensus on the principles of a modern economic policy is more likely than a Europe in which there is no such consensus to create an economic union governed by federal institutions; and if such a union is created, the chances are that its decisions will generally be guided by the principles of a modern economic and social policy, which may for short be called a radical syndrome.

One consequence of such a Europe would be the introduction of a new factor into world affairs. A federal Europe would, to be sure, be a new factor in world affairs whatever the nature of its policies. Thus a federal Europe which did no more than promote its interests as defined by traditional criteria, and employing traditional means, would provide a balancing weight between the two super-powers, which would probably help to stabilize the world political system. But that is a question into which I do not wish to enter here. For if the assumption is that a federal Europe would be based, at least as far as its internal policies are concerned, on a radical syndrome, the essential question is what the impact of a radical Europe on the world system would be.

The question is the more interesting and important since so much doubt has been thrown on the claims of both American and Russian ideologies, which in the post-war period seemed likely to divide or dominate the world of ideas. The economic and social achievements of the Russian system are unquestionably great; but its political faults have become increasingly recognized, and there is much scepticism as to its ability to deal with the problems of an advanced and complex society, and a general feeling that the system has outrun its creative phase. The Americans, for their part, have enormous economic achievements and a deep attachment to political liberty; but despite their wealth they have been unable to deal with the massive social problems of race, unemployment and urban poverty. Both super-powers moreover have lost credit, perhaps in some cases unjustly but nevertheless effectively, as a result of their exercise of power politics, particularly in Czechoslovakia and Vietnam.

It is likely that the Americans, as a result of the convulsions through which they are passing, will solve the social problems which at present undermine their ideological credibility; and the creativity of the Russians will probably at some stage acquire a new lease of life. But this will in both cases take time, and there would be a further delay before either could re-establish a claim to ideological leadership. It is in this context that the emergence of a radical Europe as a world power could be of considerable moment.

There are grounds to believe that Europeans could synthesize the elements of individual liberty and of collective welfare which have developed so strongly, and to an important extent mutually exclusively,

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in America and Russia. One evidence of this is the existence throughout Western Europe, but not in America or Russia, of powerful social-democrat movements in which zeal for welfare is tempered by respect for liberty. Another evidence is that the rate of spending on social services in most West European countries is within the range of 12–14 per cent, against a much lower figure in America; whereas the participation of the state in the economy is much more similar as between Europe and America than as between America and Russia.

It is, then, possible that a radical Europe could fill the ideological vacuum which at present exists in the world. It is not possible to calculate the effects of ideas or of a system of ideas. But history does show that it is unwise to ignore their potential. If, for example, the East European peoples came to admire Western Europe's social system as well as its economic and technological capacity, their relations with Russia would be powerfully affected. If an appreciation of Europe's social system was transmitted to the Russians, who became able to reconcile it with their own views about the development of their ruling ideology, this would have incalculable implications for the future of East-West relations. In the case of America, if its major social problems are still unresolved, it is more than likely that a Europe with modern economic and social policies would have a big influence and would help the Americans themselves to recover a role in the world of political and social ideas that corresponds to their economic and military power. Many of the developing countries, for their part, have been seeking a model that would satisfy their aspirations more than either super-power has been able to do. The world political system as a whole might benefit from the example of a Europe which had succeeded in federating its old and hitherto intractable nation-states, and from the efforts of such a Europe to help in applying its 'federal know-how' in other regions and, eventually, to the world system as a whole.

There is no intention to suggest that these would be the certain or even the likely consequences of a Europe that federated in order to create an economic union and thus to satisfy its own internal purposes. But they are possible consequences, which would if they were realized have a revolutionary impact on the world's political system.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD

John Keep

WHEN Soviet tanks rolled into Prague in August 1968 a wave of apprehension surged through the non-communist world. It was by no means confined to Western Europe and North America, but affected many 'non-aligned' countries as well. Throughout that broad belt of diverse Afro-Asian territories, misleadingly but conveniently termed the 'Third World', government representatives and unofficial spokesmen voiced, with varying degrees of intensity, their concern at the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was widely recognized to be a grave breach of international law and of the principles of 'peaceful coexistence' to which the USSR, along with other communist states, had in the past so loudly proclaimed its allegiance. This shocked reaction could not of itself affect the outcome of events in central Europe. But it is worth inquiring what impact it may have had upon the Soviet endeavour to win a foothold in the emergent countries. Has it caused the leaders of these nations to reassess the merits of collaboration with the Warsaw Pact states? If so, what policies is the USSR likely to adopt to overcome their misgivings?

Before examining the current situation in some of the key regions, two fairly obvious preliminary remarks may be made. In the first place, the Afro-Asian countries today are understandably enough preoccupied with their own regional problems, and tend to regard world affairs from the standpoint of their immediate interests. Certainly their leaders lose no opportunity of publicizing their views on such problems of world-wide concern as disarmament or international security; but they do not share the belief, until quite recently orthodox gospel in Moscow and Washington, that the chief problem of our era lies in the relationship between the two main power blocs. In their eyes such questions as the reunification of Germany or Vietnam are of peripheral and transient interest compared with the survival and progress of the ex-colonial and non-white areas of the globe. Conflicts between the super-powers, or among Europeans, concern them only in so far as they represent potential threats to peace.

In the second place, Soviet policy-makers today do not rate the Third World very high in their order of priorities. Quite properly, they are preoccupied with the security of their own country and the integrity of the communist bloc. Schismatic tendencies on the left and right pose a vital threat to the ideological and organizational unity essential to maintain the vitality of their movement. One reason for the intervention in Czechoslovakia was to free the Soviet Union's hand in dealing with the Chinese; only the unexpectedly vigorous critical response to this action within the fraternal parties obliged the Russian leaders to post-

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pone the showdown they had hoped to stage at the long-delayed world communist congress. So long as the great schism remains unhealed, the Soviet leaders need to maintain a certain degree of calm and stability in their relations with the United States. They cannot risk another direct confrontation in the manner of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis; yet at the same time they cannot afford to take any significant steps towards a genuine détente with the West, lest this give encouragement to the ' revisionists ' in Eastern Europe and also some useful ammunition to the zealots in Peking. The advent of the Nixon administration has enhanced the basic conservatism of post-Khrushchevian foreign policy. The main objectives, in order of priority, are to strengthen Soviet defences, to consolidate the international status quo where possible by reaching negotiated agreements favourable to Soviet interests, and to make use of whatever opportunities may occur to extend the area of Soviet influence.

It is in the Third World, naturally enough, that such opportunities are most likely to arise, since over much of this vast area one finds a high degree of political instability and the latent social unrest inseparable from rapid modernization. Stalin, it will be recalled, took a rather dim view of the chances for communist expansion into this region. It was only after his death—and after the USSR had regained lost ground in its military and economic development—that Moscow launched a serious effort to win influence in the developing countries. Among the events that signalized this change were the Russian leaders' first visit to India and the sale of Soviet-bloc arms to Egypt (1955). The Suez fiasco fortified Khrushchev in the belief that the ' imperialists ' were in swift retreat from the Near and Middle East. Over the next eight years he strove manfully to build up what he called a ' zone of peace ', designed to embrace as many Afro-Asian countries as possible. Within this zone he hoped to eliminate Western military bases and political influence, to accelerate social and economic change, and to instal ' progressive ' nationalist governments which would be willing to accept guidance from the Soviet-bloc countries, Such a development, it was thought, would within one or two decades bring about a decisive shift in the balance of world power.

This grandiose vision, which owed much to the naïve optimism and overweening ambition characteristic of Nikita Sergeyevich, combined elements of realism with a large dose of fantasy. It grossly exaggerated the political advantages that could be gained by extending Soviet economic and diplomatic support to the new states; equally, it underestimated the natural determination of the nationalist governments, and the political élites they represented, to maintain their non-aligned status by playing East off against West. Moreover, it involved the USSR in a competitive race with the United States which overstrained its relatively limited economic resources. This was one reason, although not the main one, for Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964.

Over the last five years his successors have adopted a rather more

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cautious approach in this sphere, as in many others. But it is only fair to recognize that, as a result of the very considerable political and economic investments that it has made, the USSR today possesses 'islands of influence' in a number of countries or regions: that is to say, individuals or groups in prominent positions who, for various motives, are willing to heed Soviet wishes or advice. The great political gamble may not have brought all the rich dividends expected, but it has by no means been entirely in vain. It has helped to bring to power, or to maintain in office, men who may know little about Marxism-Leninism but who are greatly impressed by Soviet physical strength. Such 'hostages', as we may legitimately call them, are seen in Moscow as useful pawns in the power game. They are befriended so long as seems expedient, but are unceremoniously written off should circumstances change. If they should be unseated by their domestic opponents, even by individuals more benevolently disposed towards the West, this is not considered a major disaster, for Soviet policy-makers reckon that surprises of this kind are inevitable in a region where politics are so volatile and unpredictable. They take comfort in the workings of the dialectic. The general sociological tendency, they believe, is favourable to the 'progressive' forces; consequently any local setback is certain to produce a countervailing movement sooner or later, on the same or on an adjoining sector of the front. In their private moments they might be tempted to paraphrase Stalin's well-known remark about the Germans in 1945: the Sukarnos and the Keitas come and go, but the Afro-Asian peoples remain.

THIS view is expressed, in the customary circumlocutory fashion, by certain Soviet publicists who have taken part in recent academic discussions on political and social developments in the Third World. N. A. Simoniya, writing in the journal *Narody Azii i Afriki* (of which he is an editor), makes an interesting comparison between Bolshevik tactics in 1917 and those pursued by their heirs in the developing countries today. (Incidentally, the term 'developing countries' seems to have acquired respectability, despite its Western origins, although some Soviet writers would prefer the term 'liberated countries'.) He argues that in 1917 Lenin envisaged two possible paths of revolutionary development in Russia: one led to Soviet power and 'proletarian dictatorship', achieved in the teeth of fierce opposition by the 'petty-bourgeois' socialist parties; the other catered for a more peaceful, gradual transition, culminating in a 'revolutionary-democratic dictatorship', expressed politically in a united front of left-wing forces enjoying wide mass support. It is the latter course that Simoniya holds up as a prospective model for latter-day emulators, at least as an initial stage towards the one-party state and true socialism. Characteristically, he fights shy of the old term 'proletarian dictatorship', and uses the more nebulous phrase 'a political superstructure based on the principles of scientific socialism'. The ultimate goal receives short shrift; all the

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emphasis is laid upon the positive features of the intermediate 'revolutionary-democratic' stage, characterized by extensive and lasting collaboration between the communist and non-communist left:

> This is in essence the question of the tactics of a united front . . . . This is not a short-term tactical manoeuvre, not a transient or temporary compromise between two political forces, but a political line [oriented] towards lasting voluntary collaboration between the proletariat and the petty-bourgeois revolutionary forces in circumstances where power is monopolized by a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship.[1]

In concrete terms, the policy recommended is to infiltrate positions of power held by the nationalists while relying on extensive support from the socialist countries. Simoniya urges the local communists not to be too alarmed if at first they find themselves actively opposed by their would-be allies, who may even use armed force to suppress them. Such repressive measures, he asserts, do not have 'an objective class basis' (i.e. are not derived from an unbridgeable class contradiction) and therefore do not exclude subsequent collaboration. Reconciliation with the former oppressors will be feasible because they will split, and a sizeable left-wing element will come over to the communists.

Simoniya enlivens this sermon with a blast at the Maoists, who 'are creating unnecessary obstacles to unity between the revolutionary-democratic and communist forces in Eastern countries'. Instead, progressives are urged to put their trust in the USSR and its allies, since 'collaboration with the world socialist system helps them to overcome both petty-bourgeois prejudices and left-wing dogmatism'.[2] One may well wonder whether this near-quietist doctrine—implying in effect that the faithful should bear their sufferings gladly in the hope of ultimate bliss—would appeal to, say, the hard-hit Indonesian communists. It is interesting to note that even the pro-Soviet minority faction of the PKI, licking its wounds in the underground, adopts a far less resigned attitude.[3]

Simoniya's general line of reasoning, which one may label revisionist or right-wing, is pursued further by Vladimir Iordanski, a leading Soviet Africanist, in regard to his particular field of study. He takes a colleague lightly to task for regarding the nationalists simply as representatives of the 'petty bourgeoisie' when, as he sees it, the dominant element among them consists of intellectuals sympathetic to socialism and anxious to advance the interests of the toiling masses. Here Iordanski comes near to the old heresy of treating the intelligentsia as a 'supra-class' entity. But he subtly forestalls potential critics by

[1] N. A. Simoniya, 'Leninskaya ideya revolyutsionno-demokraticheskoi diktatury i nekapitalisticheski put razvitiya', *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1968, no. 2, p. 8.

[2] Ibid. p. 12.

[3] See the statement by the 'Marxist-Leninist group' of the Indonesian Communist Party, discussed by A. B. Reznikov in ibid. no. 1, pp. 35 et seq., and published in *Information Bulletin*, Prague, 1967, no. 106.

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adding that it is precisely such ideas that were once common among the black nationalist leaders, and are now being discarded.[4]

His sympathy for indigenous élites does not blind him to their political defects. Indeed, he goes further than anyone in calling for frank criticism of bureaucratic abuses in the new states which impede their advance. 'In [Soviet] scholarly literature', he writes, 'an apologetic approach is often still adopted towards everything done by governments and parties in progressive African countries'.[5] This was understandable at a time when these states were just embarking upon independence, but now Marxists ought to be more objective.

What specific measures should be taken to combat corruption and other 'bureaucratic distortions' in the African single-party states? Iordanski has no sympathy for the Maoist view that this calls for vigorous popular action (an idea he does not deign to discuss), but instead confines himself to advocating greater devolution of administrative responsibility, enlivening the front organizations, and spreading democratic participation in local government. This advice is open to challenge on several counts. If successful, such actions would be likely to strengthen the nationalist regimes at the expense of their left-wing opponents as well as those on the right. It is also difficult to reconcile such experiments in democratization from above with his defence of charismatic leadership—a point on which he is remarkably frank, asserting that 'The party leader became a guarantee of the party's cohesiveness and durability, which was essential in conditions of intense struggle against the imperialists as against the reactionaries outside the party'[6]—i.e. in the present as well as in the past. He also advances the idea that the nationalist parties should retain a non-elected element in their central apparatus. All this would of course further the tendency towards bureaucratic or paternalistic government, and is incompatible with increased popular participation in the political process, except of the most formal kind. Conceivably Iordanski is anticipating the emergence of fascist-type regimes in Africa, whose efforts at political manipulation of the masses could be turned against them by the communists—but this seems an over-subtle interpretation. It is more reasonable to assume that he is pursuing two incompatible objectives: to achieve greater freedom for the communists and their friends, without antagonizing the nationalists or allowing right-wing elements to turn this more permissive atmosphere to their own advantage. His argument rests upon the optimistic assumption, not made explicit, that the nationalist mass organizations would swing leftwards of themselves, without the communists doing very much to bring about this happy state of affairs.

In his search for common ground with African 'revolutionary

[4] Vl. Iordanski, 'Protivorechiya nekapitalisticheskogo razvitiya v Afrike', *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1968, no. 3, p. 47.
[5] Ibid. p. 55.
[6] Ibid. p. 51.

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democrats' Iordanski recommends that mild policies be pursued towards existing or nascent middle-class groups. The nationalist regimes should avoid 'voluntarism . . . particularly in exaggerating what the state can do in the sphere of internal trade', for such measures as the expropriation of small artisans or shopkeepers cause prices to rise and goods to run short, especially in the remoter areas; and this in turn can stimulate political unrest. (Presumably he has the Ghanaian example in mind here.) Similarly, towards the peasants the nationalists should act with caution, taking due account of their natural reserve about co-operative farming projects and trying first to win their confidence by raising the prices paid for their products.[7] Even towards international capital the new states are advised to move slowly, for 'they face the problem of utilizing the initiative, material resources and technical know-how of native and foreign entrepreneurs'. Many Western developmental economists would concur in this modest statement. Iordanski even has a warm word or two for the Western political system. 'One ought not to forget that "Western democracy" acquired many of its features in the course of the workers' struggle for their rights.'[8] He implies that, for all its defects, it does guarantee some rights and freedoms that have an inherent value, transcending ideological and sociological barriers.

THE revisionist or right-wing point of view advanced by Simoniya and Iordanski does not command general assent among Soviet writers specializing in Third World problems. There also exists an orthodox 'back to Lenin' school of thought, of which A. S. Kaufman may be taken as representative.[9] These hard-liners appear just as hostile to Maoist revolutionary extremism as the progressives. Where the Chinese emphasize mass action, the conservative Russians trot out familiar truisms, such as the vanguard role of the party. Nevertheless they have a certain amount of ground in common with the Maoists, as we shall see.

In his analysis Kaufman warns against 'idealizing the national-democratic regimes' and chooses instead to emphasize their 'petty-bourgeois' class basis. Of the many layers that go to make up this sociological grouping, he asserts, some deserve to be labelled outright as reactionary; moreover, these elements are naturally influential. It follows logically that Afro-Asian nationalist governments pursue inconsistent vacillating policies. Some of them incline overtly towards an anti-communist position, while others contrive to combine a reactionary line on political matters with a relatively progressive approach to social

[7] Ibid. p. 54. For a similar argument, see Konovalov in *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*, 1968, no. 8, pp. 82 et seq.—a discussion of a multi-volume work entitled *Klassy i klassovaya borba v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh*, published in 1967–68.

[8] Ibid. p. 55.

[9] A. S. Kaufman, 'O sotsialisticheskikh doktrinakh v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh', ibid. no. 4, pp. 48–58.

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and economic development. This makes things difficult for the communists and explains why 'the process of consolidating the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-capitalist forces is still going ahead slowly'. The left-wingers face the entrenched power of the nationalist parties and their front organizations—and also of the army. Here Kaufman hits upon a live issue, for the political role of the military in the new states is an embarrassing topic which the right-wing Soviet ideologues tend to pass over in silence. But Kaufman states baldly:

> In some countries the army functions for a long time as the sole effective political force. It can objectively prevent domestic political life from becoming more democratic and the revolution from expanding its mass basis.[10]

He is critical of colleagues who think that the army can play a progressive role in effecting the transition to socialism.

> To put the question this way, without taking into account relations between social classes, . . . contradicts Marxism and in my view inevitably leads to the overestimation of the [positive] role of 'strong' personalities and of the army.[11]

Accordingly Kaufman is less sanguine than either Simoniya or Iordanski about the chances of the nationalist parties in power permitting a process of democratization which would help the communists and their allies. For there is no guarantee, he points out, that the masses would resist the efforts of the nationalists to strengthen their popular base. Kaufman's view of the political attitudes of the Afro-Asian masses is as bluntly realistic as is his view of the nationalist dictatorships or semi-dictatorships that govern them.

> I should like to point out [the introductory phrase signals to the reader that a contentious statement is coming] that in the developing countries the masses have not always or everywhere become disappointed in capitalism; nor have they been able to experience, still less to understand, the advantages of socialism.[12]

It is therefore no use expecting them to turn spontaneously to the left.

Faced with such an unpromising situation, what are the communists to do? Here the orthodox have more concrete suggestions to make than the 'revisionists': for whereas the latter cannot afford to be too explicit about the kind of infiltration from above they are advocating, the former can marshal in their support plenty of good Leninist doctrine, above all the notion of a vanguard party. Kaufman remarks that the absence of a 'party of the proletariat' from the political make-up of many new states means that the masses can only express instinctively their innate longing for socialism, and this helps the enemy. The communist parties which he advocates are apparently expected to operate clandestinely

[10] Ibid. p. 52.
[11] Ibid. p. 55.
[12] Ibid. p. 54.

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and to engage in activities hostile to the nationalist regimes, rather than to participate with others in a common political front. Collaboration with other parties, he concedes, may be correct in France and Italy, where the communists need to win popular support in an electoral struggle,

> But in the developing countries of the East the situation is completely different. . . . The slogan of a single political party, although it superficially sounds like a call to unity, and for that reason attracts certain segments of the population, does not, I think, fit the actual historical conditions in all countries taking the non-capitalist path, especially in those which have a fully-fledged proletariat, on whose shoulders there falls a grave historic responsibility.[13]

In other words, communist parties should be formed irrespectively of whether they lack an adequate working-class base, and should act independently of their nationalist 'allies'. This is orthodox Leninism. 'Lenin's ideas that in such countries it is . . . essential to create parties with a scientific socialist ideology . . . is fully apposite in modern conditions.'

It goes without saying that the revisionists do not deny the need for such parties, but simply allot them a lesser role, expecting other forces to do much of their work for them. For Kaufman there is no alternative but for cadre parties to constitute themselves formally and to embark upon the long and thorny path. 'The period of transition to socialism . . . will probably be extremely lengthy.'[14] Nevertheless there is a gleam of hope. Just as the early Bolsheviks qualified their determinism by anticipating, in certain favourable circumstances, a drastic acceleration of the revolutionary process, so 60 years later their ideological heirs hope that the less developed nations of the Third World may overtake those that have been tainted with capitalism. Backwardness can be an advantage.

> In my view [writes Kaufman] the path of non-capitalist development will be accompanied by a fiercer class struggle, and will occur in more difficult conditions, in those countries where capitalism has won some ground . . . than in those of a pre-capitalist formation.[15]

We are not so far here from the heady doctrine that 'the East is red'. Clearly it is the *political* rather than the socio-economic conditions in these new countries that Kaufman has in mind. The principal difference between him and the Maoists is that he would like to see the appeal to pristine pre-capitalist youth coming from the USSR rather than China. Moscow might take a few leaves from the 'Little Red Book'. His proximity to the Maoists is evident from another passage in which he says that, among the factors speeding up progress in the developing

[13] Loc. cit.
[14] Ibid. p. 55.
[15] Loc. cit.

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countries is the impact made upon their leaders by 'certain distortions of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice which are sometimes taken by national democrats as genuine scientific socialism'.[16] The wording here is more than usually opaque. If taxed with pro-Chinese sympathies, Kaufman could plead that he is referring only to the *negative* consequences of Chinese influence: the nationalists, disappointed in Peking, will turn to Moscow. However, this does not alter the fact that he sees Chinese influence *per se* as having a useful function to fulfil. This idea would undoubtedly be strenuously resisted by his right-wing colleagues, who avoid all mention of the subject.

WE are thus faced with two fairly clearly demarcated schools of thought on the socio-economic evolution of the Third World and the tactics which the communists should adopt there. One final item of evidence may be cited from a recent issue of *Narody Azii i Afriki* to clarify another aspect of the debate: the role which the USSR itself can play by bringing its economic strength to bear. Yu. F. Shamrai starts out from the point that economic relations between the communist states and the developing countries are, or should be, mutually beneficial. Although the new nations need to overcome the over-specialization on certain products inherited from the colonial era, it is nevertheless expedient to utilize this legacy of specialization, since it exists, in order to produce certain kinds of raw materials and manufactured goods which can be exchanged with Soviet-bloc countries.[17] But does this not mean condoning or perpetuating an unjust exploitative relationship? Shamrai's editor seems to think so, for someone has added a footnote to the above passage: 'Of course, such specialization ought to take place in the context of complex, harmonious development, for otherwise it would not be rational.'

Despite this qualification, the author goes on to argue in favour of establishing in these countries mixed enterprises, for which the necessary capital should be raised by one or more socialist states. As precedents for such a scheme he mentions Polish-sponsored ventures in India and Yugoslav ones in Tanzania and Tunisia. We are further told that the idea was discussed at a conference of specialists four years ago in Moscow's African Institute, but that some economists present—presumably a majority—felt that the time was not ripe for such initiatives.

It would be wrong simply to describe Shamrai as a progressive and his opponents as conservatives: the matter is more complex. If one may judge by Shamrai's arguments, the motives of those who oppose the scheme are mixed. Some of them appear to feel that such enterprises would not yield sufficiently beneficial results to the countries concerned, and that this might lead to an adverse political reaction. Others appear

[16] Ibid. p. 56.

[17] Yu F. Shamrai, 'Ob uluchshenii ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva mezhdu sotsialisticheskimi i razvivayushchimisya stranami', ibid. no. 4, p. 7.

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to be more anxious about the possible damage that might be done to the USSR's material interests. For what would happen if a Third World country in which such joint enterprises had been set up turned to the West, and the investments were lost? These countries are politically so unstable that such a development could not be ruled out. It would place the USSR in an embarrassing predicament, not altogether dissimilar from that encountered by certain capitalist concerns in this part of the globe. Even leaving this eventuality aside, there would be a risk of serious disagreements between the responsible communist authorities and the nationalist governments concerned over the terms on which such mixed enterprises should be established and maintained: not least over the distribution of the profit. After all, the socialist countries could hardly put themselves in the position of demanding a larger share than corresponding non-socialist international concerns. Yet if their share were too low, they would derive little economic benefit from them. As Shamrai puts it:

> The income (*dokhod*) received by a socialist country on its invested capital ought to be much less than that claimed by competitors in Western states. At the same time this income ought to ensure that the socialist country not only recoups its actual expenditure but also gets a certain return (*prirost*) on the resources invested.[18]

Many of Shamrai's Soviet readers, one suspects, will feel that he has raised more problems than he or anyone else can solve. If his ideas were to be implemented, Soviet policy-makers would have to balance a large number of economic and political imponderables and might easily find themselves the losers on both counts. In the present political climate they are more than likely to refrain from taking such unaccustomed risks. Now more than at any time in the recent past local forces will be expected to carry the burden of promoting the communist interest.

IT is (or used to be) a convention among Western students of the USSR to link discordant views expressed by Soviet academics with particular individuals or groups within the party leadership, on the assumption that factional rivals probably authorized or encouraged them for their own political purposes. This is not the place to speculate on the current Kremlin scene. Even if, as is widely thought, the Politbureau has for some time been badly riven by schism, there is as yet nothing to show that arguments about Soviet policies in the Third World have played any part in the debate. This is not to rule out the possibility, for an arbitrary element enters into the choice of issues ventilated within the top leadership at times of tension.[19] But it would seem prudent to conclude that, if this problem is discussed, it is treated

[18] Ibid. p. 13.

[19] On this point cf. the recent illuminating work by M. Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, translated by H. Katel, London, 1968.

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as one aspect of the broader question of the orientation of Soviet foreign policy as a whole.

In deciding the merits of any move towards better relations with the Western world—or for that matter with Peking—the Soviet leaders must take into account a wide range of factors, among which considerations of military security will rank very high, if not supreme. The Defence Ministry and other service pressure groups obviously exert a most important influence upon the determination of policy, while the arguments advanced by the professional diplomats or economists usually carry rather less weight. One suspects that the views of the ideologues, if they are considered at all, will receive relatively short shrift. It is even doubtful whether these men constitute a pressure group or lobby in the same sense as the military or the economists, for their prime function is to explore, explain and embroider policies adopted or in preparation. Thus one is unlikely to arrive at a very satisfactory appreciation of Soviet foreign policy in the Third World from a reading of published sources—if only because these are the work of men who stand on the lower fringes of the decision-making process. Would a cinema critic presume to judge the quality of a film after viewing some preliminary rushes shot by juniors, while the director's work remained under lock and key? It is therefore much more profitable to approach the subject 'from outside' in the normal way: i.e. to observe actual Soviet conduct and to infer from it a plausible range of policy goals and priorities.

The basic Soviet objective in the Third World is to consolidate and expand the vantage points that have been won by maintaining existing aid programmes in all forms: economic, military and political. It is self-evident that this implies revolution 'from above' rather than 'from below', i.e. the infiltration of key positions rather than the violent overthrow of existing authorities by mass action. Soviet diplomats and advisers are willing, indeed eager, to work with the governments to which they are attached, in the belief that 'life itself', reinforced by persuasion and a certain amount of pressure, will force their partners to adopt a viewpoint closer to their own on most, if not all, problems of international and national policy. In contrast to the Khrushchev era, there is a general absence of excessive haste and fuss; the attitude struck is one of patient realism, not untinged with a certain chagrin that such considerable efforts have hitherto produced rather meagre results. As a consequence of this feeling, support has tended to be concentrated more carefully upon those areas where it is thought likely to bring the highest dividend. Of these areas we may briefly consider in turn southern Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

IN the Indian subcontinent politics still revolve around the simmering conflict over Kashmir. The brief war of 1965 gave the USSR its first opportunity to play an active part in Indo-Pakistani relations. The Tashkent conference led to a compromise agreement which relieved

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the tension between the two states but did not settle the basic issue. It cast the USSR in the role of arbiter and made both countries more conscious of its power than they had been before. The promised bilateral talks were never held, and the USSR did not use its new leverage to insist that they should be, since it suited its interest better that the two ex-combatants should go on eyeing one another suspiciously and devoting a high proportion of their budgets to military purposes. Moscow could supply India with some of the equipment she needed, and so strengthen Soviet influence in Delhi. It suited both capitals that India's north-eastern border should be better secured against the threat of further incursions by the Chinese, and that other local separatist movements (some of them inspired or supported by Peking) should be held in check.

For the USSR this had another welcome result in forcing Pakistan to abandon her previous unilateral dependence on the West. Disappointed in his CENTO allies, President Ayub began to cultivate China; and then, when the Cultural Revolution made this power less useful, followed India's example by turning to his northern neighbour. The USSR provided the Indian armed forces with submarines and sophisticated aircraft, some of the latter built in Indian factories to Soviet specifications. Ayub responded by inviting Kosygin to Pakistan at an earlier date than diplomatic protocol required, in the hope of securing the same favours extended to the 'neutralist' Indians. The results of their talks, held in April 1968, are still not quite clear. Spokesmen for both governments later hinted at the differences between them, and no arms deal was ever made public. But the Indians, who at first optimistically concluded that the whole matter had been shelved, were concerned to see a Pakistani military delegation, headed by the Commander in Chief, fly to Moscow two months later to continue the negotiations, which seem to have been successful since in the latter half of 1968 Soviet deliveries of military *matériel* were expanded to include tanks and modern aircraft. For New Delhi, which had been led to expect that only 'defensive' equipment would be sent, this came as a rude shock. However, the government contented itself with mild complaints to Moscow. In an effort to assuage these fears Marshal Grechko visited India in March 1969, and was followed by Prime Minister Kosygin three months later. The Indians were given to understand that the USSR would not disturb the existing military balance in the subcontinent, and would extend more favours to its old friends there than to the new. Nevertheless they could not be certain how far the rapprochement between Moscow and Rawalpindi would go, or how far the USSR was still committed to India's support over Kashmir. Thus in four years the USSR had not only driven a wedge into the crumbling structure of CENTO, but had also obliged the two major south Asian powers to heed Soviet views when formulating their respective national security policies.

It is also worth pointing out that the USSR has now acquired a

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sizeable stake in the economies of both countries. In the case of Pakistan this is a fairly recent phenomenon. Aid from communist states now accounts for one-fifth of the country's total foreign assistance,[20] and trade with the USSR has increased threefold within three years. At approximately 60 million rubles per annum, it is already over half as great as the well-established Soviet trade with India. This country now ranks as the USSR's largest partner among the developing nations. In 1967 no less than 18 per cent of India's exports to the USSR went to service debts incurred through various aid projects—a figure close to the 20 per cent margin recognized by the World Bank experts as the maximum compatible with a developing country's economic health.[21] The Chinese have naturally cried 'exploitation'. It is certainly embarrassing for the USSR to be seen stepping too obviously into the colonialists' shoes—as Shamrai's opponents are well aware—but it is only fair to add that the problem is not one for which the Soviets are responsible. India's chronic backwardness imposes its own limitations upon the configuration of that country's economic connexion with industrialized countries, whatever their political colouring. Like the Americans, the Russians have had to employ some highly artificial expedients to maintain their trade in some kind of balance. The best example of this is the agreement, concluded shortly after Kosygin's visit to the country early in 1968, to import over the next seven years no less than 40,000 Indian-built railway waggons, whose suitability to Russian climatic and operating conditions is still unproven.[22] Soviet planners, like their American counterparts, doubtless have reservations about some of the consequences that flow from wide-ranging involvement in economic aid to developing countries—which may explain why this agreement has apparently not been put into effect.

The fact that both India and Pakistan are today beholden to the USSR, although to a varying degree, was reflected in their attitude to the intervention of the Warsaw Pact powers in Czechoslovakia. Neither wished to jeopardize its good relations with Moscow by appearing to be more critical than the other of this action. When the Security Council considered the eight-power resolution condemning the intervention, the Indian delegate tried to soften the word 'condemn' to 'deplore', and when the proposers rejected this amendment he abstained. The Pakistani representative did likewise, but explained his action on technical, not political grounds: he had received no instructions from his government. This diplomatic nuance illustrates the underlying differences in attitude between the two states. By October 1968 the gap between them had widened. The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, addressing the UN General Assembly, chose to employ Soviet terminology in her reference to the Czech crisis. She spoke of 'recent *events* in Czechoslovakia' and urged that '*normal* conditions' be

[20] *The Hindu*, 5 July 1968, quoting an official Pakistani source.
[21] Ibid. 2 January 1968.
[22] Ibid. 17 February 1968; *New York Times*, 9 and 18 March 1968.

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restored there; the intervention was said to have 'cast a shadow' over the principles of peaceful coexistence, not to have infringed them. The Pakistani government had by now found its tongue. Its delegate declared that the Czechs had as much right as any other people to their national sovereignty, and called for prompt withdrawal of the invading forces.[23]

One need not be unduly surprised or censorious at this reaction. For the leaders of both countries Czechoslovakia lies within the Soviet sphere of influence, which as realistic politicians they are bound to recognize; they certainly have no cause gratuitously to offend the USSR over an issue which does not affect their immediate interests. Of the Great Powers the USSR is the closest to them geographically, and unless one of its rivals, China or the United States, chooses to assert its strength in southern Asia, recent political trends in the region may be expected to continue. It remains to be seen whether Brezhnev's latest initiative, launched at the world communist conference in June 1969, for an Asian collective security system directed against China, will find a positive response. For all the countries concerned this would seriously reduce their freedom of action, and for India in particular it would imply the renunciation of some cherished diplomatic doctrines.

THE Middle East is of far more intrinsic importance to the USSR than the Indian subcontinent. Historically, its interests in this region go back for many centuries. Strategically, it lies close to densely populated industrial areas of the Soviet Union, which for this reason alone would be glad to see it 'neutralized' and denied to a potential enemy. Economically, it has more to offer in trade, and assistance projects can make a greater local impact. Above all, it is a region of high political awareness, where every ounce of influence yields a correspondingly valuable return.

Whereas in southern Asia the USSR can afford to be fairly impartial in the local dispute, since she has no direct interest in it, in western Asia she has to put her money on one side only. The reason is self-evident: Jewish nationalism, a Western-oriented movement that originated in Eastern Europe, poses a latent threat to the party's control in all communist countries, where the *apparat*, emulating earlier insecure rulers, has often found it expedient to exploit latent anti-semitic sentiment to reinforce its popular base. It is not just 'opportunism', but a basic (if misconceived) interest, that impels the USSR to support the Arab cause against Israel.

In the 12 years since Suez the Arab nationalists have largely overcome their initial ideological suspicion of communism. In the UAR, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and the Yemen power has passed to modernizing revolutionary regimes whose leaders are basically well disposed

[23] United Nations. General Assembly, XXIIIrd Session. *Provisional Verbal Record*, 4 and 14 October 1968; cf. Mr Bhagat's statement of 21 October.

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towards the Soviet Union. However, they are not strongly attracted by the communists' emphasis on doctrinal purity and social discipline. This fact, together with the lack of a common border, makes it hard for the USSR to build up a stable power base in the area. What may seem an assured position today may tomorrow turn out to be as insubstantial as a desert mirage. The list of Soviet disappointments is long: Syria and Lebanon in 1957–58, Iraq under Kassem, and Algeria under Ben Bella; even in the Yemen the Republicans, despite extensive Soviet support, have taken a long time to triumph over the Royalists.

Throughout all the recent vagaries of Middle Eastern politics one factor has remained constant: the growing Soviet commitment to Nasser's Egypt (UAR). This may at first sight seem odd, since in Syria native communists enjoy much more freedom to influence domestic policy than they do in the UAR. But the Soviet leaders understand very well that the UAR's greater size and resources make her better suited to serve as a rallying-point for Arab national sentiment, which they hope can be directed into anti-Western channels. The main Soviet objective in the Middle East is not to acquire more satellites but to bring the Arab world into closer unity. Cairo is the natural focus. At the same time Moscow must take care that this process does not gather too much momentum, lest Cairo prove a powerful rival to Moscow—but such a contingency has so far been remote. The Arab-Israeli conflict suits the Soviet leaders' basic purpose well, although ideally they would prefer the Arab states to direct more of their fire against the Western powers than against Israel, for in their view this country is no more than an appendage of 'imperialism', whereas to the Arab militants it seems to be the vanguard. Hence the cautious line taken by Moscow towards the *fedayeen*.

The USSR wants a state of 'neither war nor peace' (to abuse Trotsky's celebrated phrase) between Israel and the Arab states. That is to say, it wants neither an open conflict, which might eliminate or seriously weaken either party (and even provoke a global conflagration), nor a settlement that might take the issue out of current politics altogether. This policy demands a degree of subtlety and fine calculation that is rare among Soviet diplomats, who were unpleasantly surprised by the six days war they themselves had done much to bring about. After the war the USSR had to step in quickly in order to rebuild the UAR's shattered army and restore her morale. Today her effectives and equipment are thought to have surpassed the pre-war level, although it is characteristic that the USSR has not supplied the UAR with sophisticated ultra-modern weapons which could have given her a decisive margin of superiority over Israel. No doubt the Soviet leaders were also alarmed that the June war showed that they could not prevent Arab governments from behaving irresponsibly or contrary to Soviet long-term interests; much, though not all, of Soviet policy since 1967 can be explained in terms of an effort to impose more effective control upon its client states.

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Meanwhile the USSR has taken care not to alarm the United States by intervening too blatantly. It applied diplomatic pressure in Washington to prevent the dispatch to Israel of 50 Phantom aircraft—a force which in its view would have upset the military equilibrium. For the same reason the USSR joined the Western powers in the Security Council resolution of November 1967, calculating that if the Great Powers assumed a pacific posture Israel would be hindered from exploiting her victory internationally at a time when the Arabs were still very much on the defensive. By the autumn of 1968, when the imbalance had been corrected, the USSR could afford to stiffen its attitude towards Israel. This accounted for the sharply-worded TASS statement of 24 September. Subsequently, however, the provocative toughness displayed on both sides brought about another change of course, and in December a new diplomatic campaign was launched to secure a limited détente under a Great-Power guarantee. In the negotiations that have followed, the Western powers have had one valuable lever: the reopening of the Suez Canal would be of considerable advantage to the USSR and other East European countries, especially in the transport of oil. It remains to be seen whether this economic interest will lead to any modification of the political interest that the communist powers have in maintaining a certain level of tension in the area. The USSR will probably stand out for an agreement framed in such a way as to enable it to pursue its long-term objectives in the Middle East with less risk than hitherto.

So far as Soviet-UAR relations are concerned, it appears that lavish aid has dissipated much of the friction observable just after the war of June 1967, when many Arab nationalists felt that the USSR should have done more to help its protégé. On the other hand, the presence in the UAR of several thousand Soviet officers and technicians has led to a certain amount of disaffection. This trouble can, however, probably be contained by the regime without too much difficulty. It seems doubtful whether a right-wing military coup, designed to stiffen the government's attitude to communism, could succeed.

The USSR has also established a naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, of which the long-term objective is to challenge American predominance in these waters and to give the Soviet deterrent an added flexibility. This fleet can be maintained without the need for elaborate local bases, but it does require port facilities, and this is another reason why Moscow values UAR friendship more than ever before.

The Soviet stake in the Arab world is economic as well as political and military. Up to 1966 (the last year for which full figures are available) these countries accounted for nearly a quarter of the total aid commitments of the Soviet bloc.[24] The USSR alone has 53 aid projects operating in the UAR, of which the most important, the High Dam at

[24] Calculated from data in United Nations, *External Financing of Economic Development . . . 1962–1966*, New York, 1968, pp. 15 ff. Cf. also *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 25 July 1968, for a global breakdown of the latest figures on Soviet-bloc credits.

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Aswan, is now beginning to yield dividends. Trade is growing rapidly and in 1967 amounted to more than 300 million rubles, and for the Middle East as a whole to more than 800 million.[25] While this is only a small proportion of overall Soviet trade, it is of great significance to a small country such as the UAR, which now carries on more than half its foreign commerce with Soviet-bloc countries. Today it is no longer the USA but the USSR that makes up the UAR's chronic grain deficit and so helps keep the peasants above subsistence level.

The leaders of the Arab states had to be even more careful than the Indians what they said about the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Their first reaction showed them to be *plus royaliste que le roi*: Cairo Radio accepted at its face value the story that Soviet troops had been invited in by the Czech authorities, which Moscow later dropped. The standard refrain, particularly in domestic propaganda, was the allegation that the Czech reformers were hand in glove with the Israelis: 'Revolutionary Iraq considers the destruction of the imperialist plot in Czechoslovakia . . . as also a blow against the world zionist conspiracy and a constructive contribution to the international liberation movement.'[26] (The Soviet envoy in Baghdad later thanked the Iraqi Prime Minister in public for his support.) This line was no doubt primarily a product of the Arab leaders' psychological fixation on the Palestine question, but conceivably an element of political calculation was involved as well. If so, it was nicely designed to appeal to the USSR's self-interest and to raise Arab prestige in Moscow. The Arab states could plausibly argue that their warnings of 'zionist aggression' had been taken insufficiently seriously by the Soviets, who now found themselves deserted by Western communists but strongly backed by their Arab nationalist friends.

In this way the Czech crisis cemented the Soviet-Arab entente. Some nationalists were aware of the danger that the USSR, flushed by its victory in central Europe, might raise the price it put on Arab friendship, and for this reason moderated the initial enthusiastic support expressed for the intervention.[27] But soon the whole issue was quietly dropped from the press and other media. At the UN General Assembly in October nearly all the Arab states followed the UAR's lead in making no mention whatever of Czechoslovakia. This was true even of more conservative countries like Jordan, the Sudan and Libya, which at first had not been uncritical. The only state whose representative did refer to the matter was Morocco.[28]

[25] *New Middle East*, London, December 1968, no. 3, p. 4.

[26] Baghdad Radio, 21 August 1968 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, no. 2855).

[27] M. H. Heikal, in *Al Ahram*, 30 August 1968. M. Heikal is often regarded outside Egypt as an authoritative spokesman for the government.

[28] United Nations. General Assembly, XXIIIrd Session. *Provisional Verbal Record*, 8 October 1968. The Tunisian delegate, who spoke on the previous day, did not mention the subject. The Algerian representative uttered a remark of almost Delphic ambiguity: 'Some think that peaceful coexistence is endangered by the latest events in Czechoslovakia, but intervention in non-aligned countries also threatens international pace' (ibid. 25 October). Does 'some' include persons in Algeria?

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TO understand this reaction, one must bear in mind the rather complicated three-cornered relationship between Moscow, Cairo and Algiers. The UAR and the USSR are rivals in the Maghreb, and both of Algeria's closest neighbours are afraid of her. From the USSR's point of view this is an area in which its interest is of recent origin and where distance creates additional problems; nevertheless the potential prize is attractive enough to make a determined effort worth while. With its revolutionary traditions and rich natural resources, Algeria could serve as a useful political base. Since the fall of Ben Bella in 1965, which administered a sharp setback to Soviet hopes, two developments occurred to give them further encouragement: the Franco-Soviet rapprochement, which had an incidental effect upon the North African states, and the Arab-Israeli war, which turned Algeria violently anti-Israeli and anti-American. In this way conditions were created to facilitate an impressively rapid build-up of Soviet strength.

In the economic sphere this has taken the form of an agreement to buy Algeria's wine surplus (an unexpected bonus for the Soviet consumer!) and to import crude petroleum. In 1967 trade between the two countries more than quadrupled and in 1968 was expected to double—not counting military supplies, believed to be worth between two and four times as much as those for civilian use. By the end of 1968 there were believed to be about 3,000 to 4,000 Soviet 'technicians' in the country, of whom 1,800 were military personnel.[29] Nevertheless French influence remains predominant, and the Algerian government has continued to deal firmly with local communists. The Soviet challenge in the Maghreb is less immediate than long-term.

Further south, in 'black Africa', the USSR finds itself operating in territory where conditions are still by and large unripe for really effective mass-based political movements, whether nationalist or communist. Thus any 'hostages' it may secure by penetrating the political élite are unlikely to prove durable. Most states are small and their regimes unstable. The old Latin tag, *ex Africa semper aliquid novum*, might cause some wry smiles among Soviet Africanists, for so many of their ventures have ended in disappointment. Soviet diplomats have been expelled from the Congo of Mobutu and the Guinea of Touré; the fall of Nkrumah in Ghana was followed in November 1968 by that of President Keita of Mali—the latest official spokesman for the ultra-left wing of African nationalism.

Keita's party, the Union Soudanaise, embraced an anti-colonialist line even more strident than that preached in Moscow. Of all the African states Mali alone gave wholehearted support to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. At the UN General Assembly its representative vehemently attacked Western critics of this action and declared roundly that 'non-alignment is not a balancing act but a

[29] For various estimates, see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 July 1968; *Neues Deutschland*, 13 August 1968; *The Guardian*, 12 November 1968; *New York Herald Tribune*, 7 December 1968.

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struggle for peace against imperialism'.[30] Welcome as these words must have been in Soviet ears, they also struck a perturbing Maoist note. The news of the overthrow of this regime did not evoke any official response in Moscow.

It would be rash to conclude that this setback will lead the USSR to give up its efforts to win influence in black Africa. She may be expected to concentrate more attention on the next most promising area, Nigeria. The civil war there has given her an excellent opportunity to establish her influence in a part of the continent where it had hitherto been minimal. Not only did the Nigerian federal government need arms which the communist states could supply, but the intervention of Britain and France on opposite sides in the conflict enabled Moscow to denounce the struggle as the product of neo-colonialist intrigue. The official British argument, that by helping to arm the federalists Soviet influence could be counteracted and minimized, has yet to be set forth in detail before the public and would appear open to serious objections. Certainly Nigerian government representatives have formally denied that this will indeed be the effect, and in the present climate of opinion in Africa no government could afford to appear dependent on any Western power. Should the federal government emerge victorious, one may expect an accretion of Soviet influence within the country. Whether this position could be maintained is another question. In African politics each manifestation of external interference tends to produce a countervailing tendency.

The attitude adopted by the black African states to the Czech crisis may once again serve as a rough-and-ready criterion of their basic orientation in world politics. Senegal, the African states' representative on the Security Council during the year 1967–68, took a strongly critical line in August, but two months later ranged itself with the neutralists. Others who spoke out boldly in the October debate were: (in West Africa) Dahomey, Liberia and Togo; (in East Africa) Tanzania and Burundi; (in southern Africa) the Congo, Zambia, the Malagasy Republic and finally the two new states of Botswana and Lesotho.[31]

The Tanzanian reaction undoubtedly reflects a more immediate concern: communist influence in Zanzibar. In Zambia's attitude there is a particular logic, since President Kaunda is one of the few African leaders to have espoused the right of Biafra to self-determination, and is thus consistent in opposing communist military involvement in West Africa as well as in Central Europe. The smaller states of southern Africa also have another motive: to embarrass the Republic of South Africa by demonstrating full loyalty to UN principles. This does not necessarily mean that their expressions of moral indignation are any less genuine. On the contrary, young nations, precisely because of their

[30] *Provisional Verbal Record*, 21 October 1968.

[31] For an able but somewhat over-optimistic analysis of the African reaction to the intervention, based on first-hand impressions in August 1968, see K. Mehnert, 'Afrika reagierte empört', *Osteuropa*, 1968, nos. 10–11, pp. 793–99.

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relative insignificance in terms of the international struggle for power, can afford the luxury of a moral stand denied to the Great Powers, whose global responsibilities impose upon them a more flexible ethical standard. However sad this may be, it is by no means novel.

THE future of communism in the Third World will depend ultimately on the resolution of the Sino-Soviet schism, a problem that cannot be examined here. One may state only that many Western commentators tend to oversimplify this conflict, seeing it as one between 'soft' and 'hard' policies and assuming that the triumph of a 'soft' line would lead to an improvement in East-West relations. However, it seems more likely that, should the USSR achieve a decisive victory over China (whether by awaiting a 'biological solution'—the death of Mao —or by isolating the pro-Maoist elements in the world communist movement at the summit congress), this would enable the Soviet leaders to take a firmer line toward their critics on the right. These critics include revisionist national communists like the Yugoslavs and the Italians and also those who seek an accommodation with 'bourgeois nationalists' in the developing countries. Should the schism continue, the USSR will have little alternative but to pursue its present compromise course and to apply fairly conventional power-political techniques in attempting to expand its influence abroad. These tactics have after all brought it a fair amount of success. It is unlikely that a policy with Maoist overtones would ever be acceptable in Moscow, if only on account of the internal disturbances it would cause.

It is therefore in the interest of Afro-Asian nationalists, if they value their independence, to work for a perpetuation of the Sino-Soviet schism. This should also be an objective of the Western powers. Provided that the latter respond to the Soviet challenge in the Third World with realism and imagination, there seems no reason why it should not be contained within limits compatible with basic Western interests as well as with the interests of the peoples concerned.

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FIVE YEARS AFTER KHRUSHCHEV

In April 1963 Survey *published a* Questionnaire—Ten Years After Stalin *in which leading specialists were invited to sum up the post-Stalin decade and indicate their views about the prospects of Soviet development. Now that the 'collective leadership' has been in power for about five years, we have again addressed the same questions to some of the specialists.*

Zbigniew Brzezinski

RECENT developments in the Soviet Union seem to indicate that the highest stage of communism is fascism. The Soviet political system, initially led by an internationalist and ideologically motivated élite, has increasingly passed into the hands of a chauvinist, étatist, and bureaucratic political élite, inimical to social change and hostile to innovation. Its primary concern is with the preservation of its domestic power and imperial position in states contiguous to the Soviet Union. It appears to be neither interested in social reforms nor truly in revolutionary activity on the international scene.

Its intervention in Czechoslovakia was undertaken in the face of extensive disapproval on the part of many communist parties. The ruling bureaucrats in Moscow were altogether indifferent to this disapproval, for their concerns were much more limited and immediate. Representatives of a new power élite, wielding state power on behalf of their positions, they responded to that disapproval by citing considerations of *raison d'état* and *Realpolitik*, only thinly veiled by ideological verbiage.

More important, domestic change in the Soviet Union has brought about a situation in which a narrow stratum of society is now interested in employing bureaucratic levers of power and once revolutionary slogans on behalf of the status quo. In order to combat dissent, that élite is quite willing to exploit anti-intellectual, anti-semitic, and intensely nationalist emotions, In doing so, it is supported by its counterparts in Poland and East Germany.

The ruling Soviet élite, moreover, is currently a divided one. Its behaviour during the entire Czechoslovak crisis was indicative of deep internal divisions, of shifting coalitions, and of unstable alliances. No one person in it is a paramount leader; in that setting, major policy issues inevitably give rise to intense disputes. The result, so far, has been a series of compromises; compromises extended over time could become the cause of intensified friction and frustration. Major political upheavals in that setting almost become unavoidable.

Readers of the 1963 discussion might recall that I discussed at that time the likelihood that Khrushchev would be replaced by Brezhnev,

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and that the successive regime would search for a new internal balance, relying more on social control and nationalism. I also felt that Russia by the end of this decade—as well as America—would be on the defensive. On the whole, I am inclined to stand by these prognostications, but with the qualifications that now follow.

From the standpoint of the future, recent developments pose both a danger and a hope. The danger is that this regime, because of conflicting pressures, may embark on actions that will be fundamentally irrational, though ostensibly based on rational calculations. I do not expect the Soviet Union to embark on overtly irrational activity, à la Hitler. That requires centralized, personal leadership of a highly fanatical character. The collective Soviet leadership, mediocre in quality and cautious in behaviour, is not likely to embark on anything of that sort. However its caution and mediocrity may lead it into actions that, though overtly rational, may become irrational in their consequences. Soviet behaviour in Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1968 is a case in point.

In the long run, however, the prospects are somewhat more optimistic. Though recent Soviet actions, and internal trends, are hostile to liberalization, they do have the effect of creating widespread resentment against the status quo. Half-way measures, typical of a mediocre and divided leadership, simply stimulate frustration and contempt. The disaffection of many key groups is thus gaining momentum both within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Not to be neglected in this context is the mounting nationality crisis in the Soviet Union, so far disregarded by most Western observers of the Soviet scene. One of the key reasons why the Soviet leaders fear liberalization is their awareness of the fact that further liberalization would intensify nationality demands for greater autonomy. However, ineffectual and partial suppression of these demands merely breeds greater hostility and intensifies the desire for increased freedom.

It is unlikely that a policy of terror could cope with this trend. Even if it wished to do so, it is unlikely that Moscow could compartmentalize a policy of violence to Czechoslovakia alone, or only to some specific groups at home. Khrushchev could still do that in Hungary in 1956, while continuing at home with his relative liberalization. Today, brutality in Czechoslovakia would mean brutality also within the Soviet Union, within Poland, within Bulgaria, because these societies are no longer passive and pliant.

The result of such a course of action would be to create a pre-revolutionary crisis in the bloc as a whole. It would alienate a number of key groups, and would create a potentially explosive situation, which could be sparked at some point by a leadership crisis at the top of the Soviet power pyramid. The result could be a challenge to the survival of the Soviet system itself.

Many thoughtful Soviet citizens are aware of this dilemma. They understand that the options facing the system are either that of a degeneration into social fascism or of a transformation into social

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democracy. Pressures on behalf of the latter will rise as the present inclination of the system in the former direction becomes more and more self-evident. The next few years are hence likely to witness a very profound struggle for the very soul of modern Russia.

IN so far as foreign policy is concerned, I incline to the view that the Soviet Union will not be a positive and creative force on the international scene in the coming years. Domestic difficulties, maximized by difficulties in other communist countries, will keep it preoccupied with internal power problems, offset perhaps by intensified Soviet efforts to redress its strategic inferiority. This means that the initiative will have to come from the West.

My view is that, despite the events of Czechoslovakia, it still behoves the West to pursue a policy of peaceful engagement. If rebuffed, the very process of rejection creates difficulties for the dogmatic communist leaders. It discredits them abroad, and it generates some resentment at home. If it is affirmatively met by the communist leaders, it promotes the forces pressing for change and contributes to the transformation of the communist states. By the same token, a policy of hostile rigidity on the part of the West makes it easier for the Soviet hard-liners, and their East European counterparts, to maintain a policy of militant hostility and uniformity. That is why the Soviet leaders would clearly prefer the West to adopt a policy of undifferentiated hostility. It is not an accident that whose who advocate a policy of peaceful engagement, including this writer, have been the targets of most intense Soviet abuse and attacks.

The policy of peaceful engagement accelerates the further erosion of ideology in the Soviet Union, an erosion which has already contributed to the transformation of the communist doctrine from a revolutionary, militant, intellectual force into a sterile, bureaucratic and defensive doctrine. It is symptomatic that the New Left no longer considers Soviet ideology as relevant in any way to the dilemmas to which it addresses itself in many countries around the world. The only people who today take Soviet ideology seriously are those who benefit directly and materially from its continued survival. In the history of ideas one finds that a self-serving ideology is usually a sclerotic ideology.

Melvin Croan

ASSESSMENT of the Soviet political system with a view to divining its future prospects has always constituted an undertaking fraught with numerous hazards and hidden pitfalls. The present moment, dominated by the occupation of Czechoslovakia and its consequences, is no exception. To be sure, the Kremlin's military move against the Prague reformers served to highlight both the priority that Moscow's

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leaders put on preserving Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe and their determination to maintain a strict disciplinary dictatorship at home. But the invasion of Czechoslovakia has yet to prove itself to be a 'major historical event', in the sense in which Hannah Arendt once used that phrase to connote occurrences that throw instant bright light upon an entire range of previously obscure directions. Almost a year after the August invasion we still know precious little about intra-élite politics inside the Kremlin and we have no clearer picture than before of the inner workings of the Soviet decision-making process. One need not subscribe to the Kremlinological school of analysis nor necessarily adhere to the 'hero in history' approach to emphasize the crucial importance of the top political élite (and its obscure politics) for the entire Soviet system. And precisely in this connexion, one should be thoroughly chastened by recollection of the fate of yesterday's hero, Nikita S. Khrushchev. Who among all the Western specialists who undertook to assess the Soviet political system a few years back on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Stalin's death really conceived that Khrushchev would be retired for reasons of 'old age and failing health' in quite the manner in which he was? And who, even if he had been prescient enough to suggest the possibility of the sudden evaporation of Khrushchev's formal plenitude of power, would have been so additionally rash as to predict a relatively stable successor collective leadership of almost five years' duration?

A healthy respect for contingency, always advisable in the analysis of Soviet affairs, has now become utterly essential. This is true not merely because the occupation of Czechoslovakia may mark only the beginning of a protracted crisis with potentially far-reaching ramifications, but also because, irrespective of particular crises, the Soviet Union's political development is presently at such an ambivalent stage. Viewing the post-Khrushchev phase within the broader context of the decade and a half that has elapsed since Stalin's death, the Soviet political system appears at once post-revolutionary and pre-institutional. It is post-revolutionary in the sense that the ideologically motored totalitarian transformation of society, as it occurred under Stalin, is a closed chapter. Even if political power should again devolve upon a single leader—a possibility that can never be ruled out—it is unlikely to be employed in the Stalinist manner to uproot a social structure which, for all its many shortcomings in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, is nonetheless its own proud product. Moreover, Soviet communist ideology no longer serves as much of a guide to domestic social change; indeed, it has rather become a disciplinary strait-jacket, clamped upon Soviet society, first and foremost, in order to defend the Party's political monopoly. But the Party dictatorship itself remains pre-institutional in two basic senses. First, the Party exercises its 'leading role' over society without benefit of regularized procedures for the representation of social forces or even very effective consultation with those special interests upon which it must depend for the attainment of the high level of economic performance *and* social control which it seeks. Indeed, Czechoslovak experimentation

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aimed at institutionalizing Communist Party rule seems only to have convinced the Kremlin that procedural adjustments—to say nothing of genuine political pluralism—is simply incompatible with the retention of the Party's 'leading role'. Secondly, the Soviet Party dictatorship remains pre-institutional in the sense that it has yet to discover a serviceable mechanism for the effective long-term sharing and the eventual orderly transfer of personal power at the very apex of the political system. The relative stability of the post-Khrushchev oligarchy does not disprove the point. In fact, in a curious way, it only mirrors the basic deficiency. Nothing is better designed to curb the public eruption of political in-fighting than a shared awareness of the risks of all hanging together. What remains to be tested, however, is the collective's cohesiveness in the face of a major political crisis of the sort that may yet build up in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia.

On balance, a major crisis of regime, if it occurs, is much more likely to have foreign rather than domestic origins. The incongruity between the political superstructure and the socio-economic base of Soviet society will count for little as long as the top Party leadership remains alert to the primacy of politics, inculcated by its Leninist heritage, and provided that it is not crippled by internal dissension. The practical political significance of the disaffection of critical Soviet intellectuals ought not to be exaggerated either, for the present bureaucratic oligarchy has shown itself quite capable of isolating and controlling all such disaffection and has done so in a manner that increasingly stamps it as 'neo-tsarist'. Its management of disintegrative tendencies has been greatly facilitated by two socio-psychological factors: mass political apathy and intense national pride. While the first factor makes for longer-term political stability, the second could turn into a source of instability. Leave aside the growing self-consciousness of the non-Great Russian nationalities (which the next Soviet census may show to constitute a majority of the total population) and the concomitant threat to the heavily Russified 'Soviet patriotism'. Quite apart from this, any major setback abroad could easily activate dormant political forces and encourage a bid for power on a nationalist platform. In this connexion one thinks inevitably of the Soviet army whose high-ranking officers enjoy a measure of corporate identity (if not quite group autonomy) second only to that of the Party. With the gradual replacement of superannuated military cadres by younger blood, today's Soviet colonels may have to be counted among the many contingencies that could play a decisive role in shaping the Soviet future.

'COEXISTENCE', we can all agree, is here to stay unless or until it is obliterated by a major war. Certainly, there is no evidence that the destructiveness of modern weapons systems, belatedly acknowledged by the Kremlin, has been lost upon the present Soviet élite; indeed, there are abundant signs that Moscow seeks agreement on limiting the arms race and may desire a partial political détente with the United States if

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for no better reason than to block a rapprochement between the United States and China. Nonetheless, the present state of East-West relations harbours all sorts of dangers. First, 'ideological coexistence' with the West remains as much an anathema to Moscow as ever. Given Soviet fears of disruptive Western influences, which today are comparable to those which motivated Stalin to contribute so heavily to the onset of the Cold War in the first place, it is really impossible to envisage the emergence of anything like a genuine community of interests between the Soviet Union and the West. Secondly, even if one 'concedes' Eastern Europe as a 'legitimate' Soviet sphere, which the Western powers can only do at the sacrifice of their own best political traditions and international interests, there remain important areas where power-political interests will continue to clash. Foremost among these is Germany and this will continue to be the case as long as Moscow feels it needs the West German bogeyman to consolidate its control over Eastern Europe. Thirdly, committee government such as that which presently exists in Moscow might be expected to conduct a cautious foreign policy, except that deeming itself on the defensive it is always liable to try to export the internal contradictions of its domestic rule. If, in the wake of Vietnam, American foreign policy turns neo-isolationist, the temptations to Moscow to pursue a more dynamic and aggressive foreign policy might well prove irresistible. Whether to try a last ditch attempt to vindicate ideological rhetoric which otherwise rings increasingly hollow or else to satisfy the urges of great power chauvinism, Soviet foreign policy is unlikely to turn quietistic.

By now the notion of 'convergence' is pretty much of an old saw. All industrial societies evidence certain structural similarities and share certain problems in common. The Soviet Union, uneven and incomplete though its industrialization may be, is no exception. But *problems* do not become *issues* in the same way in different political cultures. Particular political systems, shaped by distinctive historical experience, can make a crucial difference. No, one is not entitled to envisage a convergence of social and/or the political systems of the West and the Soviet Union, as long as the Soviet leadership continues to set its face against such a convergence and retains effective power to prevent it.

'POLYCENTRIC communism' has always been something of a *contradictio in verbis* and the occupation of Czechoslovakia may have gone a considerable distance toward resolving the basic contradiction. The decision to intervene militarily against the Prague reformers marked the unmistakable triumph of naked Soviet imperial interests over residual concern for the international communist movement. By thus shattering the myth of 'proletarian (or more recently, socialist) internationalism" the invasion of Czechoslovakia may be remembered as having begun the final disintegration of international communism whose pluralistic decay was well advanced in any event. A much more pertinent question, at the moment, is how the Soviet leadership will go about

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reimposing its hegemonic hold over Eastern Europe. A major miscalculation concerning the Czechoslovak domestic political scene accompanied the Kremlin's military intervention of August 1968 and a measure of indecisiveness has dogged its path ever since. The 'Brezhnev Doctrine', merely formalizing what everyone knew after Czechoslovakia anyhow, provides no real basis for policies of imperial reconstruction. Judging by the less than wholehearted endorsement given by Moscow both to East German suggestions for the re-establishment of a Cominform-type organization for Eastern Europe and to Polish proposals for closer economic integration (including freely convertible currency) between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe within Comecon, one can only conclude that the Kremlin is at a loss (or at internal odds) about where to go from here. Judging by Soviet eagerness to convene the international communist meeting in June, one must suppose that Moscow still wants to have its cake and eat it too. It is scarcely surprising that it cannot get either, despite its much-vaunted "success" at the conference.

Pierre Hassner

THE essential feature of the recent past which seems to me likely to hold the key to the prospects of coexistence in the proximate future emerges precisely from the confrontation of the following basic tendencies: domestic change in the Soviet Union, convergence with the West, polycentrism. What recent years have or at least should have shown is the futility of isolating one of these trends and of projecting it into the future. Not one but all of them have grown; they have tended both to produce their respective counter-reactions and to interact, sometimes contradicting, sometimes reinforcing each other. What this should mean to the Western observer and policy-maker is an end to innocence, i.e. both to single-factor determinism and to single-track grand designs. The only safe trend to predict is increasing unpredictability: i.e. an increasingly complex and contradictory world, and an increasingly irregular and contradictory evolution. The only safe lesson is to be ready with a flexible policy capable of reacting constructively to various possible favourable developments, to limit various possible crises and, if possible, to anticipate, to prevent or to exploit their outcome. Coexistence will be more demanding than in the past, for it will require from the West a stance of active vigilance involving both initiative and restraint, both the acceptance and the limitation of risk, which run against the grain of Western societies particularly in the present phase. The danger is that instead of evolution in the East encouraged by common purposeful policies in the West, we should have explosions in the East encouraged by even greater passivity in the West.

Let me elaborate a little. Changes do take place in the Soviet Union

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but, especially for the post-Khrushchev period, nobody would deny that they go in different directions. The tension between rationalization in economic and technological matters and neo-Stalinism in cultural ones is one of the most obvious. The most general, and the most generally accepted common denominator for the policies of the present collective leadership is its bureaucratic character as opposed to Khrushchev's 'inspirational' leadership; but bureaucracy can mean irrational parasitism as well as rational management. Of the three possible patterns of development distinguished by Barrington Moore, Jr. at the time of Stalin's death—continued totalitarian development, a technical-rational pattern, the emergence of a traditionalist form—the first (in the sense of permanent revolution from above, based on terror and/or a dynamic ideology) has obviously receded, but the third has grown at least as much as the second. Moreover, it is by no means excluded that the tensions between the third and the second should lead to a reassertion of the first, at least under the form of an increased reliance on force (whether police or military) and on dogma, even though both would be more traditional and more rational, more conservative and more cautious than Stalin's domestic terror or Khrushchev's foreign adventurism.

In other words, while conservative totalitarianism may be a contradiction in terms, neither conservative dogmatism nor defensive terror, nor even conservative expansionism as an 'escape forward' are necessarily so. That the ruling group is basically conservative may make it all the more aggressive if it sees the forces of change as a threat to its authority. The invasion of Czechoslovakia provides sufficient illustration of this point, and sufficient basis for the prediction that the Soviet regime has entered a phase of prolonged colonial crisis, in which the rulers can maintain their authority only by the readiness to use force.

The basic issue is whether this is also likely to be the case within the Soviet Union itself. I should think that the basic contradiction between the 'power structure' committed to the status quo (at least to the extent of maintaining its ruling position) and the pressures for change is equally present there. While one crucial difference is that nationalism in the imperial power works for the regime and not against it as in the colonized countries (which in turn leads the regime to identify itself increasingly with nationalism), and while the majority of the population seems, again unlike Eastern Europe, to be more isolated from the outside world and from the intelligentsia than from the rulers, the other basic tensions and challenges, raised by the generation gap, by the aspirations of scientists, of artists, possibly of managers, and of the military, and certainly of nationalities or minority groups, are all there. Moreover there are two basic tensions which apply more specifically to the Soviet Union, the tensions linked with the essence of an oligarchy which, in R. Lowenthal's expression, must guard itself both against one-man rule and against democratic participation and hence must for ever be in danger of allowing for too much or too little institutionalization and rejuvenation, and the tension between the increasing need to satisfy

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consumers and the increasing cost of the space and the arms race which seem, for the time being, to lead them to sacrifice industrial investment—a not very tenable proposition in the long run.

IT would seem, then, that the basic equation on which the stability of the regime is based—the tacit agreement between the solidarity of the Party bureaucracy and the passivity of the population—must be submitted to severe stresses and strains. Pressures and reactions, crises and conflicts are bound to occur, and something has got to give; but what, how, over how long a period, and with what results seems impossible to predict; one must get used to a period in which the greatest challenges to the predictability and the stability of the world may come from within the two great powers themselves. Indeed, the main form of convergence which may have been occurring between them is the convergence of worries: domestic conflict and pressures—unsolvable minority problems, alienation of the intelligentsia, contradiction between an antiquated political system and explosive social problems—as well as external challenges—nuclear weapons, China, rebellion among smaller allies—and the resulting psychological and budgetary tensions are more strikingly convergent than the two political systems themselves which remain the greatest differentiating elements. Even if the challenges are analogous the immediate reactions and the long-run adaptability of the two political systems are likely to diverge. More than the difference in strategic power, they constitute the 'asymmetric ambiguity' which limits both the trends towards convergence and towards polycentrism and the predictable and stable character of coexistence.

If one starts from the bipolarity and confrontation of Stalin's time, two long-range trends have seemed to challenge both the ideological and the power structure of the Soviet bloc and hence of the international world: convergence with the West through technological, economic and social evolution; polycentrism through the desire for independence and the reassertion of nationalism. The first seemed to lead to the overcoming of the Cold War in the direction of unity, by a community of the developed people starting from rapprochement between the two alliances led by the two super-powers; this was the Kennedy idea of coexistence. The second seemed to lead to the overcoming of the Cold War in the direction of diversity, by a new balance of power based on the breakdown of the two alliances and the emergence of new combinations based on traditional national interests; this was the Gaullist idea of coexistence. In the event, what tarnished both images is that they both began to be partially fulfilled; this immediately showed both their respective dangers and their respective limitations.

Co-operative bipolarity, as exemplified by the negotiations for the non-proliferation treaty, is based on two inescapable facts: the difference in power between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other; the need for a permanent dialogue between them in order to minimize the dangers of the nuclear

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environment. But the reactions of the rest of the world to the first steps in this direction have shown that its political translation in the form of a common responsibility for the rest of mankind smacked, at best, of enlightened co-paternalism, at worst, of oppressive co-colonialism, and led to a freezing of the status quo both vertically, in terms of super-power superiority, and horizontally, in terms of their respective spheres of influence. Conversely, polycentrism is based on a no less inescapable reality, the inability of the Soviet Union to act as a model and an inspiration for the communist states and parties.

It cannot control directly by force the growing gap between national situations and aspirations exaggerated rather than compensated by ideology, the impossibility for the rulers of the imperial powers to understand the problems even of the provinces they continue to hold and to rule their regime in a way which should be at the same time centralized, tolerant and efficient. But the independent actions of China or of Cuba, the independent initiatives of Rumania or the independent evolution of Czechoslovakia were bound to provoke hostility in the Soviet Union and hence doubts in the rest of the world, especially in the United States. A world of fully independent nation-states would by definition not only challenge the Soviet Union's imperial position; it would probably challenge its domestic regime as well; and it would, perhaps, jeopardize the limited stability due, in certain parts of the world, to the direct presence of the super-powers, by throwing doubts on their ability to control their allies and on their willingness to protect them. In front of the spectre of communism which would freeze the status quo, rises the spectre of a balkanization which would unleash anarchy. One spectre leads to the appearance of the other: while the Soviet Union and the United States cannot be said to be acting in collusion to maintain their respective authority any more than the rest of the world is acting in collusion in order to challenge it, it is clear that a *de facto* solidarity between the great powers is encouraged by the rebellion of the small ones and encourages it in return.

There develops, then, a double gap, in terms of both aspirations or interests and of effective power, between the two great powers and the others, neither side being able either to convert or to supplant the other. As a result, the picture of the world is characterized in a static view by the discrepancy between bipolarity in terms of military power and resources and polycentrism in terms of aspirations. The actual political influence consists mainly in the negative power of each system to stop the other from bringing about some kind of security or stability; the dynamics tend towards the vicious circle of resentment, towards the coexistence of thwarted expectations. Given the realities of the balance between and within camps, it would seem, however, that the only positive formula for coexistence would be to work for some kind of *modus vivendi* not only between the increasing convergence and the permanent opposition of the two super-powers (under the form of the limited-adversary relationship), but also between bipolarity (hence the

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continuing existence of spheres of influence around the super-powers) and polycentrism (hence the need for a redefinition of the relationships within these spheres, in the light both of the claims to autonomy coming from the lesser powers and of the challenges coming from the existence of other centres which negate the bipolar character of the world). In this respect more than in any other, the end of innocence means 'the end of either-or'. A coexistence based on the suppression of bipolarity, blocs, spheres of influence and alliances is just as unrealistic as one based on the exclusive authority of the leaders and on an understanding between them: coexistence between super and smaller powers is as important as coexistence between super-powers, if only because the latter is likely to be short-lived in the absence of the former. In spite of all their mutual understanding of each other's problems, the two super-powers cannot really co-operate when one is actively engaged in suppressing its allies by force unless they are both resolved to rule by force alone. If the threat of the hostility of the other camp is no longer available as a means of unifying one's own, the only way, other than brute force, of making one's leadership accepted by one's allies is by giving some leeway to their desire for autonomy and for an opening to the outside world, or by going from a siege or state of emergency mentality to a more relaxed and hence more tolerant one. The common Western reaction to the Prague invasion—'It's hardly our business—This is their sphere'—is just as short-sighted as the earlier assumption that the Cold War is over, alliances are obsolete and great powers are powerless. The issue is not whether or not there are spheres of great power hegemony or influence, responsibility or security, but how they define these zones, what scope and what means they assign to their influences, how they define the threats to their security—to what extent this involves domestic regimes etc. It is here that ground rules for coexistence are urgently needed, just as much as for the nuclear dialogue of the super-powers or for their competition in the Third World. While coexistence has to be based on the mutual acceptance of the military territorial status quo, it also has to be based on the mutual acceptance of the possibility of peaceful change behind the borders and of contacts, dialogue and influences across them. While the West cannot and should not threaten the status quo in the military territorial sense, or threaten intervention by force in the crises within the Soviet world, it does have powerful indirect weapons, by its own behaviour within its own sphere, by the possible opening of other perspectives outside the two spheres, and, above all, in negotiations between the two camps for preventing or moderating, through rewards and punishments, those Soviet actions which, although taking place in their own sphere, can, through reaction, contagion or escalation, endanger the peace and the stability of the whole world. Examples of possible Western bargaining counters are the possibility of a return to a collective solution of Atlantic nuclear problems (if the détente which encouraged the choice of the opposite—NPT versus MLF—road is put into question), the possibility of a Sino-American rap-

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prochement (which, for the long run, seems to preoccupy the Soviets very much) and, above all and more immediately, the possibility of using arms-control talks, from the non-proliferation treaty whose value is mainly symbolic as would be its rejection, to the talks on arms limitation which, even though desirable for the American economy, seem even more imperative for the Soviet one. This would seem to give the USA a chance for making them conditional on an improvement in Soviet behaviour as the Soviets themselves did for the USA over Vietnam. While the necessities of nuclear coexistence will, due to technological and economic factors, lead increasingly to arms-control talks, the necessities of political coexistence, due to the growing contradictions within the alliances, should lead just as much to talks about the security implications and the political framework, conditions and limits of social and ideological change. But the latter talks are obviously more difficult than the former, and the desirable link between them even more so.

For it is here that the problem of coexistence leads us back to the first question, that of changes within societies. While the strategic level based on the search for equilibrium, and the diplomatic-military level based on a mixture of balance and instability may lend themselves both to negotiations and to tacit agreements, the fundamental level of social and political evolution within states and across borders, while impossible to freeze in the long run, is almost as impossible to channel and to control, especially by inter-state negotiations. Hence the temptation to buy time either, as in the East, by repressing it or, as in the West, by concentrating exclusively on it within one's own jurisdiction.

WE are back, then, to the fundamental difference between the political systems of the two leaders, and to their reflection in the political structure of the two alliances. By not calling for complete unity, the West is more able to tolerate divergences within states and within the alliances, and to hope that the nexus of extra-political ties will limit centrifugal forces. In the East, one is constantly faced with an all-or-nothing situation, as the Soviet ruling group believes, perhaps rightly, that to tolerate pluralism means to risk its getting out of hand. Since, however, they cannot suppress the forces of diversity and change, the likelihood is a succession of crises, based on an alteration of centrifugal trends and attempts to reassert the central authority which, increasingly, must rely on force; hence the danger for the outside world, especially when ambiguous zones, like Yugoslavia, are involved, or when success abroad is sought to compensate for domestic problems, or a domestic show to compensate for foreign defeats. But in the West the same tendency to a priority of domestic problems may lead to a more or less unsatisfactory, more or less tolerable muddling-through within, but to an increasing passivity in foreign affairs. From the temptation of activism and of direct military involvement, as in Vietnam, one may go to the other extreme of neglecting the various indirect means of activity (diplomatic, economic etc.) and the necessity of preserving a certain credibility to the

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risk of escalation involved for the other side in aggressive behaviour. This pattern—a combination of unpredictable but probably sometimes violent crises of decolonization in the East, and of division and passivity in the West—would be among the most dangerous ones in the years ahead. Unfortunately, it is not among the least likely.

Tibor Szamuely

MICHEL TATU, the distinguished French expert on Soviet affairs, ended his recently published *Power in the Kremlin* with a cautious prediction concerning the future political development of the USSR: either ' a return to undisputed one-man rule ' or ' the collective will have to be broadened and eventually accept true democratization '. As an experienced observer of the Soviet scene M. Tatu is well aware of the pitfalls surrounding the prophet, yet his final conclusion is unequivocal: ' Whichever the solution—totalitarianism under one-man rule, or an extended parliamentary system—major transformations will have to take place.'

Most commentators tend, on the whole, to agree with this conclusion. Certain variations on the theme are sometimes introduced, such as the possibility of a Bonapartist military dictatorship taking over from the Party. Nor should one overlook the occasional forecast of a complete collapse of the Soviet system—predicted, in at least one instance, with great precision for 1970. Of course, all these prophecies, including even the last one, are not outside the realm of possibility. One of the beauties of studying Soviet politics is the knowledge that almost anything can happen. Yet I would rather think that, on balance, the most likely prospect for the USSR within the foreseeable future—discounting cataclysms like atomic war—is a continuation of more or less the same system (' bureaucratic equilibrium ', as Trotsky would have called it) that has evolved in the last 10-12 years, and with the unpleasant reality of which we are faced today.

The conviction that the system will *have* to change, that it is *bound* to undergo major transformations, stems from a variety of causes. One of these is the belief—deeply ingrained in the Western mentality—in the inevitability of constant change, of permanent movement: the belief in progress, in short. Another factor is our perfectly understandable reluctance to accept the awful prospect of living with a faceless, impersonal and brutal totalitarian system for as far into the future as we can see. Finally, one must take into account the difficulty—human nature being what it is—of appreciating and assimilating a genuinely new concept which overturns hallowed traditional certitudes: in this case, the idea that totalitarianism, a revolutionary form of government invented in the twentieth century, may have become as stable and as lasting a

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political system as democracy, absolutism, autocracy, oriental despotism, theocracy or any other long-lived type of government, past or present.

The transitional nature of the present political system of the USSR is taken practically for granted. 'Collective leadership' cannot be sustained for long; monopolistic Party control over every sphere of life conflicts with the requirements of a rapidly expanding technological society; the primitive Soviet version of Marxist-Leninist ideology has no attractions for a highly literate population; the inexorable quest for greater efficiency and material comfort cannot be successful without the growth of democracy; the USSR must evolve a more rational method of decision-making if it is to remain a super-power and the leader of a worldwide political movement; the technocrats will demand an increasing part in public affairs; the young generation—just as in the West—is becoming ever more alienated from the regime and its official ideology. And so on and so forth.

All perfectly sound, commonsensical, rational propositions. Indeed, 'rational' is the key-word. The Soviet regime, we are told, must become, will become, is becoming, or has already become, 'more rational'. Maybe this is so. But are we not being rather presumptuous? For we are assuming as self-evident that to be 'rational' is to conform to what we in the West regard as standards of rationality. Yet people brought up within a totally different conceptual framework might well regard our 'rationality' as the height of unreason. After all, Marxists (even many non-communist ones) see capitalism as an utterly irrational system, in contrast to the socialism of the USSR, which, for all its shortcomings, is at least firmly based upon principles of rationality. So why should we expect them to move in a direction which we, but not they, happen to regard as 'rational'?

Or take that other hopeful catchword: 'pragmatism'. Soviet leaders have now become 'pragmatic'; Khrushchev was pragmatic, Kosygin is even more pragmatic. The magic word seems to serve as an antonym for 'brutal' or 'bloodstained'. But there can be little doubt that the most 'pragmatic' of Soviet leaders was . . . J. Stalin. Compared to him Khrushchev and Kosygin act like pedantic doctrinaires. So where does this get us?

Many of the reasons adduced to prove the inevitability of drastic change in the Soviet Union (some of which I have quoted above) sound wholly convincing. Applied to familiar, 'rational' systems similar to our own they would be unassailable. But if we apply them to a completely different society such as that of the USSR we might at least attempt to discover whether they fit into the actual reality of that extremely peculiar (to us) system. I fear that not all students of Soviet affairs make this effort: too much is taken for granted, too many inconvenient facts are impatiently brushed aside as ideological irrelevancies or 'Cold War' artifacts. Which is why we are constantly being taken aback by events that would have been perfectly comprehensible had we tried to

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view them within the framework of Soviet reality—or Soviet 'rationality'.

Before proceeding any further I should like to make it clear that all my remarks refer to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union alone. It is a gross error to speak of the 'communist world' or the 'communist countries' as of something which is much of a muchness, lumping the USSR together with the East European satellites into a single category *sub specie aeternitatis*. Thus, one hears of 'liberalization' or 'democratization' or 'restalinization' in communist countries, of 'hawks' and 'doves' or 'reformers' and 'conservatives'. This practice serves only to confuse the issues still further. In reality there is only one communist country: the USSR (China is an entirely separate case, and is by now generally accepted as such). For good or bad, communism came to power and evolved in Russia of its own volition, engendered by Russian problems and shaped by Russian forces. There it is a *national* system. Everywhere in Eastern Europe it is an artificial system—unnatural, anti-national, upheld solely by foreign arms. Had communism not been imposed by a conquering power it might have become viable—as may be the case in Yugoslavia and Albania (though it is too early yet for an entirely confident judgment even there). As it is, the East European countries remain simply colonies of the USSR; after 25 years communism has not put down any roots, and the likelihood of this ever happening is exceedingly remote. Czechoslovakia has made the point all too clearly—as, in its own peculiar way, has the Rumanian tightrope-walking act.

TO return to the USSR. It is a chastening thought, but the post-Stalin era now comprises nearly one-third of the whole period of Soviet history. This enables us to take a more detached view of the Age of Stalin, and also to see the post-Stalin era itself in perspective. How has the USSR changed in the 16 years since Stalin's death? And what deductions concerning Russia's future development can be drawn from this experience?

The system created by Stalin during his 25 years' dictatorship is commonly known as 'Stalinism', or one of the varieties of the general phenomenon of totalitarianism. The concept of 'totalitarianism' has been of great service to the social scientist—yet not infrequently its indiscriminate use has blurred the profound distinctions between Soviet communism and the rest. Some students of communism, more familiar with nazi Germany than with Soviet Russia, have facilely applied the conclusions drawn from their study of fascism to communism, on the assumption that one totalitarianism is much like another. Yet a comparative analysis of totalitarian systems reveals far greater differences between them than would, say, a similar study of parliamentary democracies. 'Totalitarianism' is not just equivalent to 'bestiality', and Hitler's system was never really totalitarian in the sense that Stalin's was —to say nothing of the puny efforts of Mussolini, Franco, Salazar,

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Nkrumah, Sukarno, Nasser *et al.* The Soviet regime is *sui generis*; it is a dictatorship—but not, like the others, a dictatorship built up around the personality of one charismatic leader. The popular notion of the instability of dictatorship does not apply to the USSR; nor, most emphatically, does the idea that 'every true totalitarianism is a one-man system' (R. Tucker). The Soviet Union is certainly a 'true totalitarianism'—the only true one, in fact—yet it has had three periods of (more or less) one-man rule, and three periods of (more or less) 'collective leadership'. Unlike any other modern dictatorship it has surmounted innumerable internal and external crises unscathed; what is even more extraordinary, it has survived the deaths both of its founder and of the man who gave it its final, definitive shape. It is in a class of its own.

'Stalinism' does not mean the system of Stalin's personal dictatorship: it means the social, political and economic structure created by Stalin in the course of a total revolution, of a total transformation of society on a scale unknown to history. Using the instruments inherited from Lenin, Stalin forged a new society and a new polity capable of outliving its creator. And this it has done.

The question of 'neo-Stalinism' or a 'restoration of Stalinism', so anxiously debated in the West during the last year or so, is really irrelevant. There is nothing to restore. Stalinism was never dismantled. Since 1953 the Soviet Union has always been a Stalinist state, and even Khrushchev, for all his power (and, I believe, sincerity) was unable to escape from the Stalinist strait-jacket. In the end it throttled him. To destroy Stalinism would mean to destroy the Soviet regime, and that would require a revolution on the scale of 1917.

Obviously, when one speaks of the USSR as a Stalinist state one does not mean a state run by a Stalin: Stalin is dead, and it is hardly likely that a second Stalin will appear in the near future—fortunately, men like him come only rarely. Besides, apart from the scarcity of the human material, there is little chance of a new Stalin achieving supreme power within the present rigid system of Soviet politics. Nor is there any need for one: the job has been done, and done extremely thoroughly.

'A Stalinist state' means, quite simply, a state built by Stalin and run in accordance with Stalin's principles, in Stalin's spirit, using the techniques and methods of rule perfected, if not devised, by Stalin. It would be foolish to deny the manifest changes that have taken place since 1953—but they must be seen for what they are, not for what one fondly imagines them to have been. Take 'destalinization'. Undoubtedly, the Stalin myth has been deliberately destroyed; much of the unsavoury truth about him has been disclosed, many of his victims rehabilitated. Yet the term itself is a dangerous misnomer. Its obvious analogy is 'denazification', and that is what many people compare it with. Nothing could be further from the truth. Denazification was instituted in Germany by the victorious allies *after* the whole political and social structure of nazism had been irrevocably destroyed. Its object was the detection and punishment of all active nazis and the purification of public life, *by force*, of

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every vestigial remnant of nazism. Can this process really be likened to Khrushchev's 'destalinization'?

A proper German analogy to 'destalinization' would have been an imaginary 'dehitlerization'. Suppose that after Hitler's death at the height of his powers the government is taken over by a triumvirate of Goering, Bormann and Himmler, who immediately put an end to the more vicious manifestations of the late Führer's tyranny, such as the extermination of the Jews and the establishment of SS stud-farms. Most of the concentration camp inmates are released. Gradually power is appropriated by a less well-known but more dynamic and radical figure—say, Erich Koch, the *Reichskommissar* for the Ukraine. At a *Parteitag* Koch unexpectedly denounces the 'cult of Hitler' and describes his incompetence and cruelty, instancing the murder of good comrades like Röhm or Ernst and the humiliating removal of old fighters like Streicher. Goering and Bormann are skilfully implicated—as well they might be—in the Führer's crimes and soon expelled from the leadership (Himmler had already been summarily executed). Koch becomes—not the Führer, but the *Leiter*, and introduces a number of welcome reforms. The empire he governs is as great as it had been; the technocrat Speer becomes Prime Minister and makes the economy run more efficiently; the old laws and the old apparatus of power are retained, with some modifications; the party functionaries play an ever increasing role in running the Reich; the populace are allowed to listen to the foreign radio; books are no longer burned and some books by foreign anti-nazi authors are even translated into German, etc. Everyone is happy, and the West (a negotiated peace having been signed and a détente proclaimed) is delighted to deal with a new, liberalized nazi regime—with Koch, and then with the team of tough Gauleiters who throw him out of office because they think he has got too big for his boots.

A fantasy? Certainly. But almost the exact counterpart of what *actually* happened in the USSR after Stalin's death. This is what 'destalinization' amounted to in practice.

SIXTEEN years after Stalin's death, after all the erratic zigzags of 'destalinization' and 'restalinization', after a whole generation has reached adulthood without ever having known Stalin's rule, the USSR remains unchanged, in every *essential* feature, from the state wrought by Stalin in his own harsh image. The Soviet Union as we know it today was created in the decade 1929–39: probably the most horror-packed 10 years in modern history. It has changed less since 1939 than any other country in the world. Great events have transformed the shape of the globe; empires, federations, regimes, constitutions, leaders have come and gone; even such stable societies as those of Britain and the United States have altered beyond recognition. The USSR remains alone, like some gigantic rock amid the turbulent seas, defying change, impervious to innovation.

The political, social and economic structure of Stalin's Russia has

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hardly altered since it emerged from the storms of the 1930s. Its institutions are intact, its ideas firmly fixed. A few landmarks have gone: the machine-tractor stations, for instance, have been dissolved. What else has changed? Khrushchev's not entirely 'hare-brained' attempts to reform the economic structure, the Party apparatus, the educational system etc. have all been revoked—any tinkering with Stalin's monolithic edifice, it was soon realized, could only lead to trouble. The idea of a new Constitution was dropped (not that one could really draw up a more democratic Constitution than the 1936 model). Some legislation has been brought up to date—but it remains Stalinist legislation. The new Model Collective Farm Statute, the new Family Law, the new Penal Code—all are pathetic in their inability to introduce the slightest significant change after 35 or 40 years. Some formulations have been made more precise, but generally speaking they are, if anything, a shade more rigid than their predecessors. As for the famous 'economic reform' and the sainted Liberman: one does not hear much about them nowadays, even from their most fervent boosters.

All the basic tenets of Stalinist ideology remain in force: the retention of the state until the construction of 'full communism' and even beyond; the intensification of the class struggle; the principles of *partiinost, ideinost* and *narodnost;* the dogmas of 'socialist realism' and of culture 'national in form and socialist in content'; the successful construction of socialism in one country; the wickedness of egalitarianism etc. Nothing has been retracted—the great 'ideological innovations' of the Twentieth Congress regarding the non-inevitability of war and the peaceful transition to socialism have proved an elaborate hoax: the same points, with 'peaceful coexistence' thrown in, had been often enough made under Stalin, with similar effects. As for 'independent roads to socialism', seized upon in the West as an earnest of a genuine change of heart: first Hungary and now Czechoslovakia have demonstrated the true worth of this doctrinal innovation. It has now been superseded by the newer concept of 'limited sovereignty', which goes even beyond anything thought up, or at least formulated in so many words by Stalin himself.

Needless to say, Stalin's *policies,* with two exceptions, have all been consecrated by his successors as basic to the construction of the socialist order (which no doubt they were): the defence of the Leninist line against its Trotskyite and other 'enemies', the forced collectivization of agriculture, the liquidation of the kulaks, the Soviet-Nazi Pact, the territorial aggrandizement of 1939-45, the establishment of the 'People's Democracies' and so on.

Only two aspects of Stalin's policies have been condemned and partially rescinded. One is the wholesale deportation of several nationalities during the war. The remnants of these unfortunate groups—but not of the Crimean Tartars and Volga Germans—have now been 'rehabilitated' and allowed to go home; their 'autonomies' have been restored. But by far the most important 'retreat' from Stalin has been the denunciation of his indiscriminate terror, the rehabilitation of most of his victims, the

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liberation of millions of concentration camp inmates. True, in the last few years the flood of gory revelations has been firmly checked; true, also, that only good communists—in fact, only good Stalinists—have been publicly rehabilitated as 'victims of the personality cult'; anti-communists, anti-Stalinists and even plain non-communists still remain in the nether darkness. Yet the immense practical significance of the mass releases and rehabilitations should on no account be underestimated. Millions of people were returned to life, millions of 'relatives of enemies of the people' became equal members of society again—for what that was worth. No other conceivable measure of any post-Stalin government could have brought greater happiness to a greater number. It is, in the final analysis, the one genuine and valid achievement of 'destalinization'.

If once this simple fact is realized, if 'destalinization' is stripped of the extravagant claims made for it by naïve Western observers and reduced to its real accomplishment of rehabilitating the 'victims of the cult' (as they are popularly known), then we begin to approach an understanding of what has actually changed in the USSR since Stalin. Certainly *not* the emergence of competing 'power groups' or 'power structures' (these were, if anything, in greater evidence under Stalin), or the 'shift in power from the Party to the state apparatus' (again, the state apparatus was more influential under Stalin than after 1953), or the 'de-ideologization of society' (of this more later), or the 'consumer revolution' (the consumer has no more say in the economy than at any previous time), or—most emphatically—a gradual introduction of freedom of speech, press, literature and of criticism in general. What *has* changed is the ending of indiscriminate, arbitrary, capricious terror on a mass scale.

I REMEMBER how some 20 years ago in Moscow, when discussing desirable changes in the system with a small group of close friends (Russians are inveterate talkers, and Westerners hardly realize the amount of free discussion that went on, in private and at great risk, even at the height of Stalinism), I remarked that everyone would be perfectly happy if only they would be freed from the constant fear of being arrested at any moment of day or night. This is exactly what has happened: terror unlimited by law (since laws are changed at will) still remains a prime weapon of the Soviet regime, but its *practical application* is now limited to actual enemies of the government—or, rather, to people who have committed acts indicating their hostility. To be sure, the Soviet definition of subversion is very different from ours—no non-totalitarian government would treat Andrei Sinyavski or Pavel Litvinov or Vyacheslav Chornovil as criminal offenders—yet the fact remains that all the victims of political trials since 1953 had effectively committed *acts* classified as hostile by the communist regime. In other words, the striking difference between the present-day USSR and Stalin's Russia is that today if one keeps one's nose clean and one's mouth shut and does nothing then one is guaranteed (barring a genuine misunderstanding) not to go to gaol—whereas under

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Stalin millions of people were sent to slave labour camps literally for 'doing nothing' (*ni za chto*).

This may not seem much to the Western reader, especially after the highly coloured descriptions of a 'liberalized', almost democratic Russia upon which he has been fed over the past years—it means a great deal indeed to the ordinary Russian. Written constitutional guarantees are of little interest to him—he has always had them anyway—but he now knows that if he conforms to the accepted rules of Soviet life nothing will happen to him. Moreover, to achieve this blissful security he does not even have to denounce others: although regarded as a desirable quality, this is no longer *de rigueur*. Or, as the famous nonagenarian actress Yablochkina is said to have exclaimed soon after the Twentieth Congress: 'Things are almost as good as they were before the revolution!'

Apart from the elimination of sheer arbitrariness, there has been a distinct improvement in living standards. This improvement has been nowhere near as great as that constantly forecast by starry-eyed true believers like the late Isaac Deutscher, who 10 years ago predicted that by today the USSR would have surpassed West European living standards. Nor should one be taken in by the breathless accounts of the intourists and fellow-travelling journalists. In actual fact the gap between living standards in Russia and in the advanced industrial countries is today almost certainly greater than in tsarist times. Finally, it must be borne in mind that living standards rose even more rapidly in the last years of Stalin's rule—admittedly from the abysmal level of 1945.

Nevertheless, life *has* become perceptibly easier and less uncomfortable for the ordinary Soviet citizen. Food is still scarce and expensive, consumer goods still shoddy and hard to obtain, service still appalling—but there is a bit more of everything for everyone. The most tangible improvement is in the field of housing: after 25 years of practically no housing construction and of squalor beyond the imagination of a Charles Booth or a Friedrich Engels, it has now become possible—with luck—for families to move into tiny tenement flats of their own, with separate bathroom and kitchen. Once again—how little this may mean to the Western reader, yet what fantastic luxury it represents for the wretched life-long inhabitants of Soviet 'communal flats'.

TO sum up: the end of arbitrary, lunatic mass terror, the release of millions of innocent prisoners and the posthumous rehabilitation of other millions of dead victims of the system, on the one hand, and the overall improvement in living standards, on the other: these are the genuine positive achievements of the post-1953 era. They have contributed in no small measure to the stabilization and institutionalization of the regime bequeathed by Stalin to his successors.

For there can be little doubt that the basic stability of the regime is today greater than at any time under Stalin. It has, in a sense, finally come into its own: the Bolshevik Revolution has reached fruition.

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Often in the post-Stalin years one heard the state of affairs in the USSR described as a 'transitional stage'. Quite conceivably we may have had it all wrong: the future might show that it had been Stalin's dictatorship that was the 'era of transition' from the early post-revolutionary chaos to the full flowering of the ordered totalitarian society that now exists in Russia. The West, largely under the influence of the violent changes effected by Stalin (and in a much less violent, or successful, way by Khrushchev) has learned to think of Russia as a country in a state of constant evolution, as a society in a state of permanent flux. The relative tranquillity, not to say *immobilisme*, of the last five years is often seen as a temporary aberration. Oddly enough, these views are shared by Western observers from the 'Left' and the 'Right' alike: the first refuse to accept the final extinction of the revolutionary 'socialist' dynamism, the second continue to hope for an evolution towards 'liberalism' and 'rationality'. Both may well be mistaken. There is, when we come down to it, no real reason—apart from wishful thinking—to doubt that the Soviet regime can go on existing indefinitely in its present form.

As Professor Brzezinski pointed out recently, Russia has evolved a self-sustaining political system in which élite direction from above is met by orthodox mass support from below. I might add that this is an ingenious, elaborate and highly sophisticated system, based upon an inbuilt mechanism of self-conservation and self-preservation. Yet the Western mind, even when it agrees with some definition similar to the above, finds it difficult to accept the stability of the system and the permanency of its institutions.

The reason for this is, once again, a perfectly understandable inability to break out of the accustomed conceptual framework of our own civilization. It might help if we would try to view the USSR 'through the looking-glass', so to speak. Indeed, Lewis Carroll is an invaluable guide on a Sovietological expedition: a journey to a land where, for instance, a memory that only works backward is regarded as a pretty poor memory, and where most people have acquired the practice necessary to believe as many as six impossible things before breakfast. In the USSR viewed through the looking-glass one finds symmetrical counterparts of many of our own institutions—distorted beyond recognition, no doubt, yet nevertheless functioning perfectly in their own peculiar fashion.

We believe, for example, that social and political stability can exist only under a government of laws and not men. But the Soviet Union *is* governed by laws: the laws of ideology, not jurisprudence—yet laws none the same, founded, like our own, upon certain basic principles, and adaptable, also like ours, to changing circumstances. Or take constitutionalism. The Stalin Constitution, of course, is a meaningless scrap of paper, but the USSR *does* have a genuine constitution—unwritten, or rather, unpublicized, yet perfectly well understood and recognized by all concerned. This real constitution contains the actual rules of Soviet

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political life: the rules of Party management of the country, of *nomenklatura* and Glavlit, of the organization of elections and of the passport system, of 'doublethink' and 'thought-crime' (to use the Orwellian shorthand). Every intelligent Soviet citizen is familiar with these rules and acts in accordance with them.

The important thing about these 'constitutional laws' is not that they are unpublished but that they exist and are strictly adhered to, by government and subjects alike. The stability they provide may be very different from ours—but it is nonetheless stability (they are already older than many of the laws on our own statute book).

Probably the single most important factor which has impaired our understanding of the essential stability of the Soviet system has been the theory of 'the permanent purge'. To say that Soviet Russia has been the land of unparalleled mass purges and show trials is to state the glaringly obvious. We all know that six of the seven members of the post-Lenin Politbureau were liquidated, that three-quarters of the Central Committee elected in 1934 were shot, that only two per cent of the delegates of the Seventeenth Congress were present at the Eighteenth, and so on. Nothing like this had ever happened before, in any country, under any regime. But the sense of shock and revulsion aroused by these truly horrifying events has tended to blind us to the astonishing (and perhaps also unparalleled) degree of continuity that has existed in the top Soviet leadership over the past 50 years.

I shall list some of the facts. Since 1917 the USSR has had seven heads of state: five of them are still alive—and all members of the Central Committee. Over the same period the USA has had 10 Presidents.

There have been only eight Prime Ministers of the USSR, five of whom are still alive (Britain has had 11 Prime Ministers, four of whom are alive today); seven Foreign Ministers (against 19 in Britain and 14 in the US), of whom three are alive; 10 Ministers of Defence (against 23 Secretaries for War or Defence in the UK and 20 in the US), of whom six are still alive.

Obviously, the turnover (not to mention the mortality rate) has been higher in the post of head of the secret police under its various titles. Yet even here the picture is less black than one might think. Of the 12 occupiers of the hot seat the first two died of natural causes (if we accept Menzhinski's death as a natural one), the next five were shot, and the last five are still alive, to the best of our knowledge, with two even sitting on the Politbureau. (All the above figures of surviving Soviet and foreign dignitaries include the present incumbents of the posts mentioned.)

The most striking case of continuity is that of the top job itself, the General Secretary (or First Secretary) of the Central Committee: in the 47 years since its establishment it has only been occupied by three men.

Whatever else these facts may indicate, they are certainly proof of a basic stability of top Soviet cadres going back to the revolution. In the

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last 30 years, since the end of the Great Purge, this stability has become even more pronounced. Seven of the 11 Politbureau members elected after the Eighteenth Congress are still alive—three of them in the Central Committee. Of the 71 persons then elected to the Central Committee 12 remained members for 30 years (two of them have died very recently). True, most are now in honourable retirement, but one of them, Alexei Kosygin, is the present-day Prime Minister of the USSR.

Since 1938–39 the Soviet Union has created a layer of top 'civil servants', or ministers, whose length of service defies comparison with any other country. A few examples will suffice. Vasili Zotov has been Minister of the Food Industry for *31 years*, from 1938. Close on his heels come Pyotr Lomako and Alexander Ishkov, Ministers respectively of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy and Fisheries since 1940. Dmitri Ustinov, today a Secretary of the Central Committee, has been overlord of the defence industry (a most sensitive post), under one title or another, since 1941. Boris Beshchev was appointed Minister of Transport in 1948, after four years as deputy minister. Nikolai Psurtsev has been Minister of Communications since 1948; Anatoli Kostousov—Minister of Machine-Tool Construction since 1949 (after six years as deputy minister); Pyotr Dementev was appointed First Deputy Ministr of Aviation Construction in 1941, and Minister in 1953; Vladimir Zhigalin has been deputy minister and Minister of Heavy Machine Building since 1945. Arseni Zverev retired in 1960 after 22 years as Minister of Finance. The list could be easily prolonged.

The same applies to the Soviet foreign service. How many twentieth-century diplomats have had as good a run for their money as—to mention but two—Andrei Gromyko, first appointed ambassador in 1943, or Valerian Zorin, ambassador since 1945?

In short, I believe one is fully justified in speaking of an incredible degree of stability in the top governmental offices of the USSR. Purges come and go, rulers die or are deposed, reforms and counter-reforms are carried out—the same men remain in the same top jobs. Even the British Civil Service seems ephemeral by comparison.

But it can be argued that these men, for all their eminence, are really glorified administrators. Far more powerful are the great territorial satraps, the *obkom* and *kraikom* secretaries. And it is in these posts that upheavals and changes have been most frequent. Yet a closer examination of the facts shows that today there is a considerable security of tenure at this exalted level as well. If we take the 76 First Secretaries of the *obkoms* and *kraikoms* of the RSFSR (the administrative units of the national republics being far less important) we find that they have occupied their present posts for an average of six years. Forty-six of them, or nearly two-thirds, were appointed to their posts under Khrushchev (32 before the Twenty-second Congress of 1961), and one amazing character has been running Tuva since 1944. In the light of these figures it is impossible to speak of the continuing instability and insecurity of leading cadres. On the contrary—and this is a factor

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of the utmost significance—the Soviet élite has finally achieved the personal security it so sorely lacked under Stalin. Hence its vastly increased political weight.

AMID the frequently synthetic turmoil of Soviet life, the largely contrived 'happenings' and the loudly trumpeted non-events, the extraordinary continuity of the ruling élite is often lost from sight. This is a grave error. However, the main argument usually advanced as evidence of the instability of Soviet government has nothing to do with the élite as such, but concerns the absence of an ordered system of succession at the very top. This is undeniable: there are no provisions for the orderly transfer of power in either the written or unwritten 'constitutions'. Yet the developments of recent years have to a considerable degree vitiated the force of this argument. Khrushchev's accession, however turbulent, was very different from Stalin's. Nor did he exercise anything like the power wielded by his fearsome predecessor. By now it has been fairly well established that even this limited power steadily diminished from 1960 onwards. Khrushchev's overthrow—though in no sense 'constitutional', and certainly not indicative of any 'democratization' of the regime, as many Western optimists earnestly announced at the time—was executed in a perfectly orderly fashion. It was confined solely to the First Secretary and his personal entourage, and carried no repercussions or purges in its wake. Indeed, it resembled the mysterious processes by which the British Conservative Party gets rid of its failed leaders far more than the bloodstained Byzantine intrigues customarily associated with Kremlin power struggles. It was, one might say, a symptom of adulthood, of confidence and of stability.

The 'collective leadership' has now been in power for the better part of five years—yet it is still generally accepted in the West that it cannot survive for long, that (as I quoted at the beginning of this article) it will either be superseded by a single dictator or else inevitably evolve towards a form of parliamentary democracy. While not excluding either possibility, it is legitimate to ask: why should this be so? What real reasons do we have to doubt the staying-power of the collective leadership? Basically it boils down to an argument by analogy: two collective leaderships have broken up in the past, and no third can ever survive. This will hardly do. Discussing the post-Khrushchev regime in terms of the post-Stalin triumvirate (or, come to that, of the post-Lenin one either) makes no more sense than discussing the period of Khrushchev's supremacy in terms of Stalin's dictatorship. In neither case are the situations comparable.

There is no historical inevitability about the break-up of a collective leadership in the USSR. Of course its members do not share a complete identity of views, but that need not prevent it from functioning indefinitely. One can hardly speak of an identity of views among the members of, say, the British cabinet—yet it has governed the country, for good or

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ill, for exactly the same period of time as the Brezhnev group. If there were no constitutional requirement of quinquennial general elections I suppose it could go on governing for ever and ever. (An important difference here is that Mr Wilson possesses more personal power vis-à-vis his colleagues, in terms of promotions, dismissals and demotions, than Mr Brezhnev has over his—which is why the composition of the British cabinet has changed much more than the Politbureau over the same length of time.)

Another popular argument against collective leadership (which I have myself used in the past) is that a great country and a complex industrial society simply cannot be run in that way. It cannot work. Yet the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and the system has worked and is visibly working. True, they are a rather inferior lot of third-rate men —but, to quote the immortal words of Count Oxenstierna, '*An nescis quantilla prudentia regitur orbis?*' They have not been an activist government (perhaps a source of strength), but when they have had to take a tough decision, as over Czechoslovakia, they have been as ruthless and as unyielding as any previous Soviet government. And they have weathered the storm intact.

'Weathering the storm', in a broader sense, is a key phrase when explaining the Soviet system's ability to survive and to resist change. Over its 50 years of existence the regime has undergone every conceivable, and even inconceivable, test of its stability: the harshest civil war in modern history, followed shortly by forced industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture, a murderous famine and an even more murderous Great Purge—all crammed into 10 years. Then came the war, with devastation on an unheard-of scale. What other Russian regime could have survived the near-total military collapse of 1941? Afterwards—picking up the pieces, rebuilding, new cruelties, new deprivations. And throughout it all the system has stood, practically unchanged. Why should it be dismantled now, when the worst is behind it?

Many people in the West expect 'inevitable' change precisely because of the easier conditions of today. It seems a remarkably weak argument. If one looks back at the history of Russia one sees that reforms of the system (as distinct from partial alleviation of certain grievances or shortcomings) have never been undertaken in times of relative peace, success and plenty, but only under the traumatic effects of defeat: whether by Peter the Great, or Alexander II, or after 1905. In Russia, perhaps more than anywhere else, nothing succeeds like success. Try as one will, one cannot find today in Russia any real signs either of impetus for change, or of forces for change, or of reasons for change, or even of possibilities for change. The factors of stability, of permanence, of changelessness, are deep-rooted in Soviet society. Some of these I have already mentioned. There are other, perhaps even more important, ones as well.

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THE profound innate conservatism of Russia explains a great deal about Soviet society. It is fashionable to dismiss this centuries-old tradition of resistance to change, the Muscovite bureaucratic tradition of despotic state power and unlimited popular obedience, as a thing of the past, swept away by the great social convulsions of 50 years. Wiser men, with a deeper understanding of Russia, have taken a far more pessimistic view of the power of the 'Russian tradition'.

Speaking in 1904, 40 years after the inauguration of the 'era of the great reforms' and only a decade before it was to be overwhelmed by the tidal wave of war, Russia's greatest historian, Vasili Klyuchevsky, made a profound comment on the nature and fate of all attempts at transforming his country:

> Having decided that Russia has now abandoned the old foundations of her life, society has adjusted its historical ideas accordingly. . . . Not so long ago we thought: why look back, when there is so much to be done, and such a bright future before us? Today we think: what is there to learn from our past, when we have broken all our ties with it, when our life has irrevocably shifted onto new foundations? But a vital point has been overlooked: lost in admiration for the way in which the Reform has been transmuting the Russian tradition, we have shut our eyes to the way in which the Russian tradition has been transmuting the Reform.

Nor were these forebodings confined to 'bourgeois ideologists'. In 1906 Plekhanov issued a grave warning against Lenin's plans for nationalization of the land: this 'would be an attempt to restore our ancient system, now undermined by the economic development of the second half of the nineteenth century . . . the system under which both the soil and the tiller of the soil were the property of the state, and which was but the Muscovite edition of the economic basis of all the great oriental despotisms'.

Lenin—a trifle uneasily—pooh-poohed Plekhanov's fears. But years later, during the last agonizing months of his conscious life, he was to return with increasing anxiety to the 'damned Russian past', to the centuries-old tradition of bureaucratic inertia, which was taking over the Party and reshaping the revolution. Perhaps he had begun to realize—as Plekhanov had foreseen years before—that it was precisely his revolution that was resurrecting a distant past. Addressing a Party congress for the last time, Lenin drew his famous parallel between a vanquished nation imposing its culture upon the conqueror, and a defeated ruling class imposing its tradition upon the new rulers. Might it not be the case, he asked, that the Bolsheviks 'had been subjugated by an alien culture? True, this might create the impression that the vanquished do possess a high culture. Nothing of the kind: their culture is miserable and trivial—but it is still higher than our own. However paltry, however miserable, it is still higher than that of our communist functionaries.' And even in his 'Testament' Lenin warned: 'Under no circumstances should we forget that the apparatus of state

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has been taken over by us essentially as it was, from the Tsar and the bourgeoisie.'

Not only the state tradition, one should add, but the mentality, the social attitudes, the passivity, the staying-power, the resistance to change —in short, every negative feature of the traditional Russian-Muscovite system was taken over and imbued with new life by the Bolsheviks. In the dictatorship of the Communist Party Russia found a unique instrument for the stabilization and perpetuation of its tradition. Communist élitism coalesced with Russian bureaucratic despotism to form modern totalitarianism. The absolute, unlimited and undivided dictatorship of the Party, unchanged through all the vicissitudes of Soviet history, provides the basis for the stability of Soviet society. The Party is the sole source of power and leadership, the sole source of social cohesion, the sole driving-force of the nation. Everything is subsumed within the Party. The Party remains, as it always has been, monolithic: the splits, arguments and factional struggles of the past 50 years were at all times confined to the leadership—throughout it all the Party itself has been united behind the 'general line'.

I cannot accept the widely held notion that the Party more or less ceased to exist in the last 20 years of Stalin's rule and was only revived after 1953. It certainly did not *govern* the country—neither has it done so, in any genuine sense of the word, either before or after Stalin—but even in the Stalin era the Party was the prime instrument of government, the instrument which mobilized the country's energies and channelled them in the direction indicated from above. Without the Party Stalin's dictatorship would have been impossible: it was through the Party that the leader's will was enforced upon his lowliest subject (the role of the secret police, however crucial, was always subsidiary to that of the Party). In this sense Soviet propaganda is right when it maintains that 'the Party continued to live even under the cult of personality'.

Since Stalin's death, of course, the importance of the Party, its overwhelming position of power with regard to any other social or political force, has increased immeasurably—so has its stabilizing influence. The majority of Western observers believe—hopefully—in an ever deepening contradiction between Party supremacy and the demands of a modern industrial society. Party rule, it is thought, stifles the creative development of science and technology, retards the economy, becomes a fatal impediment to progress, which will inevitably have to be eliminated. Moreover, as every progressive-minded person knows, the growth of education is the best possible barrier to tyranny: an educated population will not put up with despotism. Hence the faith in 'liberalization', 'democratization', 'convergence' and what not.

BUT the nature of modern totalitarianism is still imperfectly understood, even after so many years. It has a disconcerting tendency to disprove all our most cherished assumptions. The very same *bien pensants* who await an 'inevitable' liberalization are also the first to

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acclaim, and even exaggerate, the Soviets' gigantic achievements in industry, science, technology. Yet all these have been effected under the leadership of the Communist Party. Granted, the Party has been a conservative force, its ideological shackles have hampered scientific progress, it has stifled controversy and imposed the authority of charlatans like Lysenko. But it was in the worst years of the *Zhdanovshchina* that Russia constructed the A-bomb and made decisive strides in rocketry. The first Russian nuclear test took the West by surprise. So did the Sputnik. Yet we have still failed to draw the obvious conclusion: freedom of thought and speech is *not* an absolute prerequisite of great scientific achievements. Russia's development will probably slow down, but the commonly held assumption that she will either have to introduce intellectual and political freedom or condemn herself to stagnation is, I believe, quite unrealistic.

I would reverse the argument. Not only is a totalitarian regime *not* inimical to technical and scientific progress—such a regime is *inconceivable* without the benefits of the most up-to-date technology. A totalitarian regime could not come into being or exist without our century's revolutionary inventions in the fields of transport, communications, armaments and so on. The development of technology does not weaken totalitarianism—it strengthens it. In 1857 Herzen forecast the coming—in a totally state-dominated Russia—of an unprecedented system 'of slavery and brute force upheld by every achievement of science: a Genghis Khan equipped with telegraph, steamships and railways'. It has all come to pass.

The same applies to education: a totalitarian system does not fear education for all—it requires it. Totalitarianism is based on literacy. Two basic factors must be borne in mind: (1) a totalitarian system, by definition, possesses the means of controlling and directing the education it gives its subjects; (2) literacy and education are indispensable for indoctrinating the whole population, for achieving that complete politicization of life which is the hallmark of the totalitarian regime. Illiterates or semi-literates are impervious to political propaganda; the higher the education, the greater the degree of ideological conviction and intellectual conformity.

And ideological conformity is still as much a foundation of the regime as at any previous time—whatever we may believe about the 'end of ideology' in the USSR or elsewhere. After all, ideology remains the source of the regime's legitimacy: its claims of mastery over the 'laws of history'. Ideology provides it not only with a coherent world-outlook but with its 'will to power'. Ideology supplies the basis for the legal order and for the loyalty of the people. There can be no substitute for ideology.

This simple fact is well understood by every Soviet *apparatchik*. Western observers tend to be surprised and not a little amused when they see important and busy men, rulers of a great country's destinies, spending days and weeks in discussing the fine points of modern art or

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abstruse questions of literary theory or draft outlines of school textbooks. Yet these matters pertain to the very core of communist government. Ideological erosion has to be prevented from setting in: hence the interminable ideological plenums, theoretical discussions, reorganizations of political education. The 'pragmatism' of certain Soviet politicians about which one hears so much is invariably placed within the confines of the general ideological framework.

It is fallacious to assume that as a result of 'destalinization' the average educated Soviet citizen has lost his faith and freed himself from the bonds of ideology. 'Belief' and 'disbelief' in the USSR is a complex matter. Probably nobody except a few simpletons believes, or has ever believed, the entire 'Marxist-Leninist' canon. It is taken for granted that some things have to be said which are untrue; this knowing acceptance of elements of untruth in itself implies an acceptance of the basic truth. And practically everyone believes *in part*. Thus, any intelligent Russian will know that his country's standard of living is much lower than that in the West; he will probably even accept that there is more freedom of speech in Britain than in the USSR. But he will almost invariably be convinced that free education, free health, paid holidays, old-age pensions are unknown under 'capitalism'. He knows that his elections are not really free—but he thinks that free elections are not very relevant to 'true democracy' anyway. Far more important, he believes, is the opportunity for ordinary workers and peasants to rise to the top—an opportunity which, he 'knows', can exist only under communism. I could go on listing the elements of 'real' and 'pretended' ideological convictions: the point is that the Soviet mentality has by now been largely shaped in the Marxist-Leninist mould. There is far more conformity in thought than in behaviour.

Ideology has survived and even, in some respects, strengthened its hold over the population because it has succeeded—like the regime itself—in moving with the times, whilst preserving its essential continuity. The primitive class-outlook of the twenties has been gradually transformed into a more sophisticated combination of pseudo-Marxism and traditional Russian nationalism. In recent years, despite Khrushchev's attempts to revive some of the original revolutionary fervour, the nationalistic elements have become even stronger: today it is no exaggeration to speak of the USSR as a racialist country, with rampant anti-semitism, hysterical fear of the 'Yellow Peril' and undisguised popular contempt for 'Blacks'. (In fairness to Tsarist Russia, this pathological racialism—with the sole exception of anti-semitism—was absent before 1917.) The new nationalist-racialist strain of Soviet ideology has proved far more powerful in its popular appeal than the outdated doctrine of international class consciousness. Its effectiveness was shown last year, during the Czechoslovak crisis. The West has not yet grasped the full implications of this development: it had better do so.

The all-pervasive nature of communist ideology is today one of the strongest guarantees of the regime's stability. Thanks to its syncretism

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it has left nothing for any opposition movement to use as a theoretical platform—and any political discussion in the Soviet Union must be couched in ideological terms. The recent experience of various disaffected intellectual groups has demonstrated a tragic failure to discover any coherent countervailing philosophy. What have been the ideas put forward in the 'underground' publications? A 'return to Leninism'; glorification of nineteenth-century Populism; the cult of Chernyshevski and Serno-Solovyovich; the resurrection of Slavophilism. In other words, a return to pristine-pure Bolshevism or to its precursors. The young rebels find themselves in the cul-de-sac of the legends upon which they were reared. But what else can they suggest? One could hardly expect them to preach the philosophy of Vekhi, or the advantages of parliamentary democracy, so vehemently denounced by the great Russian 'progressive' thinkers to whom they turn for spiritual guidance. They have nowhere to go—the Party has appropriated and defiled every 'progressive' and national idea of the past, every symbol of a revolutionary tradition, every popular slogan. As a KGB officer recently remarked to Pyotr Yakir: 'You think that you are your father's heir? No—we are his heirs.' And he was right.

There simply is no credible alternative to Communist Party rule or to communist ideology—therefore the regime can take a more lenient attitude (by comparison with Stalin) towards the occasional nonconformists. Nor is there any real danger of a popular revolt. Never in Russia's history have the masses subsisted in the state of complete lethargy, of indifference and apathy to which they have sunk today. They may be disgruntled and dissatisfied, but after 50 years of unremitting violent convulsions they have had enough. All they want is a little peace and quiet and a slow improvement in their living conditions. The outlet for their cynicism is brutish drunkenness. They have become Orwell's 'proles'.

Even if this were ever to change, a successful revolt against Soviet totalitarianism is hardly conceivable. The military and psychological odds are overwhelmingly in favour of the regime. Brezhnev & Co. are a very different breed of men from the soft-hearted old imperialists of London and Paris or the vacillating chiefs of the Pentagon. They have none of Mayor Daley's concern for human life. If the need were to arise they would use armed force as savagely and as immoderately as Stalin had done when quelling rebellions in the 1930s and 1940s. If a million people had be be killed they would not flinch. And the West would not even know about it—or, if it knew, would not care.

I believe, in short, that the Soviet Union has now achieved a state of political stability undreamt of in the past. There is little need for change, and even less likelihood that any will occur in the foreseeable future. It is idle to pretend otherwise.

Social stability, of course, is another matter. Soviet society is still an insecure formation. None of the basic problems have been solved. Agriculture, inequality, poverty, national oppression: all the old sources

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of stress remain. Given some quite exceptional circumstances—say, widespread rebellion in Eastern Europe, or four disastrous harvest failures in a row, or an unsuccessful conventional war with China—they might erupt and sweep away the system. But, to put it mildly, the chances of this happening are slight.

Is it not high time for the West, after 50 years of dashed hopes, to stop expecting miracles?

Peter Wiles

I BLUSH, and am not surprised that, for instance, NATO planners have lost confidence in Sovietology after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But I refuse to cry *mea culpa.* Any 'expert' who said it was impossible needed his head examining, but most of us merely said it was improbable, and so it was. I do not repent of my optimistic pre-invasion assessment of Soviet communism in general, since up to mid-August 1968 there *were* solid grounds for hope, indeed much more solid than for gloom. I repent only of having failed to predict the final choice itself correctly. But all predictions are merely probable, and the perfect prophet in, say, July 1968 would have made allowance for the invasion as a rather improbable event, certain to change everything if it really occurred.

In just the same way Michael Karpovich used to describe the 1905–14 period, with Vekhi and the Duma and Stolypin and the industrial revolution, as one of an accomplished liberal victory, from which further progress along the same lines was nearly certain, barring a catastrophe. Great events, he used to say, cast their shadows backwards in the minds of historians: we reinterpret and switch the emphasis in order to make inevitable what was merely possible, and the minor trends that actually gave rise to the future bulk large while the major ones that actually constituted the present are forgotten. Hindsight is not insight, and we have to avoid this kind of thing. It is for historical determinists to reshape the past in the light of the present. Rational men, on the contrary, must merely check that there is no actual incompatibility. Mere discontinuity and surprise occur often enough, and are in no way unscientific.

Anyhow the invasion has happened, and nearly everything has changed. The Politbureau has fully accepted the long-term implications of its action. It has formally proclaimed the right to invade other communist countries on the basis of the Soviet definition of socialism; it has defined the useful and correct [1] concept of peaceful counter-revolution; it has abandoned the myth that any legitimate Czechoslovak authority called it in; it has condemned extreme economic decentralization; it has explicitly denied that either the 'bourgeois freedoms' or any 'transformed', 'parallel' version of them will ever flourish under 'socialism';

[1] 'Correct' because that is exactly what was happening in Czechoslovakia.

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and it has—already before the invasion—persecuted domestic dissent again, especially in the arts. Historians—especially military ones—are even defending Stalin himself.

All this adds up to neo-Stalinism. This is the old Stalinism without sadism in the police sector—wholesale repression is good enough; without interference in natural science and technology—Lysenko and his ilk will not revive; and with more rational economic planning—but no extreme decentralization. It is as manipulative and cynical about ideology as the old Stalinism—the Khrushchevian faith, a half-genuine revival of Leninism, has quite gone. It is imperialistic-defensive—what it has it holds. It is chauvinistic in cultural and emotional matters, and must surely lead to anti-semitism, following the Polish example. It is, of course, the deeply conservative reaction of rightly frightened people. It is not in the nature of frightened people to avoid regressive syndromes; and the only one available is Stalinism.

What evidence we have points to the generals and the middle-aged politicians as the principal vehicles of neo-Stalinism.[2] It is not, like Maoism, the raving of a very old lunatic. Therefore we must expect it to last.

There are, however, two points of instability. The first is these same generals. They have lately become very independent. That they have a budgetary quarrel with everyone else is of course natural in any society. It is natural too that they continue to criticize the political adviser system, but their prominence in the restalinization is something else, a political act not required by their professionalism, and seemingly not altogether imposed by their political advisers.

The second point of instability will surely be the *national minorities*. This is an age of regionalism, indeed of aggressive particularism. The Soviet national minorities are nearly the only ones in the whole world not at present in a state of uproar.[3] This unnatural state of affairs can only be due to terror, but terror increases resentment and so necessitates super-terror. Unwilling to predict super-terror—it is after all *neo*-Stalinism with which we have to do—I am bound to predict overt unrest. There are plenty of political, cultural and economic claims already on the table upon which to base such unrest, and presumably at first the regime will, like others, wobble and fall between two stools, satisfying no one. The ultimate outcome, however, is no more predictable than the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

We must note in particular that liberalism is quite unnecessary to fuel minority unrest in a communist country. When Dubcek turned on Novotny he did so as a Slovak nationalist, decently conservative in communist terms. His liberalism was added unto him later, and Husak (his successor in the Slovak chair) has never been a liberal. On a higher plane of authority, Rumanian nationalism has never been at all liberal. Again

[2] Suslov and Kosygin are identified as doves, and Brezhnev as a wobbler.

[3] This generalization is meant to be strictly factual. Possible other exceptions: Transylvanian Magyars, Chuangs in Southern China.

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the high point of Yugoslav Stalinism came after the break with Stalin, in 1949. No doubt nationalism leads to liberalism, as it has led Dubcek and Tito; but that is another matter. So it is no argument against a minority explosion in the USSR that there are no identifiable minority liberals.

Neo-Stalinism is a highly conservative and therefore unadventurous force, like Stalinism. Its founding act was to reduce an ally to an unreliable colony. It inherited two others in the GDR and Hungary. It will wish to avoid doing the same to Rumania. It stands at any moment to lose all four countries through any disturbance in Europe. Peace in Vietnam is beyond its power but would be highly welcome. The Cuban situation is at the moment stable. The nuclear race is and looks like continuing to be a stalemate: moreover it is almost totally within the control of only two powers, since the others are too small to count. There remain only the Near East and Africa. Chastened by Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, I find it difficult to imagine either side taking rash steps, even when—inevitably—local troubles break out. It follows that the growing Soviet high seas fleet will be used with restraint. The US threat is a budgetary aid to the Soviet generals; it surely does not engage their emotions like 'Czechoslovak counter-revolution', 'German revanchism' and 'Chinese ingratitude'. The Americans are the friendly, necessary enemy.

The most important ideological development since Stalin is the revival of sheer faith under Khrushchev, its subsequent withering under his successors, and the retreat from interference with natural science and technology. In all material matters, even atomic physics and genetics, ideology has retreated from the laboratory to the confines of *Voprosy Filosofii*, and the scientist may say and write what he thinks. This attitude already began under Khrushchev, and is connected with the perceived lag in technical progress; it is also of course the product of common sense. It has even spread to the far more dangerous fields of economics, sociology, political science and military strategy.[4]

However, if the Party is not the repository of secret wisdom *here*, it has no right to rule. I have radically misunderstood neo-Stalinism if it does not mean a tightening of these controls at least. I expect that, with the dreadful example of Ota Sik before them, the Politbureau will permit far less autonomy in the social sciences from now on. This is not exactly a revival of ideology: it is a reimposition of it.

ON the economic front, there is much talk, including Soviet talk, of the lag in technology. Now that the simpler foreign techniques have been imitated, bought on licence or stolen, it remains for the USSR to develop its own, or at least to keep abreast of the very much more complex inventions that constitute the latest in foreign technology. By long

[4] I refer to the timid appearance of civilian strategists à la Herman Kahn: games theorists, conflict simulators and the like. Perhaps these will now be encouraged to grow as a counterweight to the generals.

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tradition Soviet research is excellent, but development and application are poor. In a command economy it is difficult to cut across bureaucratic lines and get a prototype machine made; and difficult, where plans are taut, to persuade a director to use it once made, lest it turn out a failure and ruin his bonus.

Research also is threatened. Today, in contrast to the past, researchers require not merely access to foreign technical journals—which is now guaranteed to them—but access to foreign researchers. As the pace and complexity of discovery increase, the printed word becomes a less adequate record of what is going on. Oral traditions, nurtured by conferences and telephony, become more rather than less important. In order to make the next advance, one must fully understand the present advance, and one cannot do this without being in the swim. But the 'swim' is the advanced capitalist countries, and so much intimate contact is incompatible with neo-Stalinism. Therefore, again, in most fields the USSR will remain behind.

Such, at least, is the optimistic line now being peddled in the West. I see no sign of slackening Soviet growth, however, in the last five or so years. Four per cent per head per annum is a very healthy rate. It is not the heroic figure of 1950–60, and it is not outstanding in comparison with many capitalist countries today. But its military component is exceptionally heavy, and surely embodies technical progress that has been underestimated by statisticians who record advanced weapons at cost, in the absence of any plausible market price which would be very high indeed. Should this component come down from 11 per cent of the national income—its present level—to the six per cent or so normal in the West, I confidently anticipate a rise in the rate of growth. There is nothing in neo-stalinism to prevent such a reduction, provided there is peace in Vietnam and a corresponding reduction in the USA. On ordinary Keynesian reasoning one would expect peace to diminish the US rate of growth, in contrast to the un-Keynesian behaviour of the Soviet economy.

It remains undeniable that Soviet growth is purchased at extremely heavy investment cost by Western standards. This is inefficient but tolerable. Indeed with increasing wealth it becomes more tolerable.

In agriculture the question is whether the new mechanized 'link' will spread. Will decentralization within the sovkhoz and kolkhoz be permissible under the new, more technocratic, Stalinism? This seems to be the only possible way of squaring the circle—making agriculture efficient within its traditional organization. The link is a small group of skilled and able-bodied people to whom specified land and machinery are entrusted for a specified period, and who divide (equally) among themselves the proceeds. Thus they are almost like a tenant farmer and his family, and the kolkhoz or sovkhoz becomes almost like a landlord's estate office. It is an efficient system, giving incentives, raising productivity dramatically—and laying off the old and unfit, who have to cultivate their private plots. It is not unlike the Hungarian '*Nadudvar*' system—and not unlike

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the new decentralized Chinese People's Commune! But China is in extremely bad odour and Hungary is under a cloud; and once before in the USSR, in 1950, a 'link' system was condemned as capitalistic. I am therefore absolutely unable to prophesy its future. Without it, agriculture will limp, but there is no reason to suppose it will limp worse than before. There will undoubtedly be, as always, innumerable other changes in agricultural organization, especially in farm size and in planning hierarchy. They will, as always, stir the soup but not cool it.

I do not expect *industrial planning* to vary very much from the new, not very decentralized, system. What the USSR has forbidden in Czechoslovakia it can hardly permit at home. But there is no evidence of a retreat from the Kosygin reforms, such as they are. Their principal feature is and will remain more rational wholesale prices and more rational *central* decision-making.

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Social Democracy

EQUALITY AND AFFLUENCE

John Vaizey

SOCIALISM meant equality, so Tawney, Crosland and others held, after the process of revisionism had gone far enough to cast doubt upon public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange as the basis of socialism. What were the causes of inequality and, more pragmatically, what were to be the means of moving the world towards greater equality? Those were the socialist questions.

Inequality had many dimensions. It could be inequality between races, between sexes, or between generations. It could be inequality of status, as between slave, serf and freeman. It could be inequality of incomes, or inequality of capital, or inequality of social status. Thus inequality had to be defined and measured, before it could be explained. For this measurement and assessment Crosland turned to the social sciences.

The social sciences had an important role in socialist theory and practice. The earliest socialists, from Proudhon, Marx and Comte onwards, claimed that their socialism was 'scientific'—that is, that their analysis of the course of events was objectively true and corresponded to scientific criteria of observation and analysis. The developments in the natural sciences showed that this use of the word 'scientific' was question-begging; Hegelian logic could not correspond to the usage which became common in the experimental sciences. A new kind of science—calling itself social sciences—grew up with economics and psychology as the prime examples. To Marxists these were not sciences at all, but apologias for bourgeois society.

Socialists differed from Marxists in accepting the methodology of the social sciences, whether in economics, psychology, sociology, social anthropology or statistics. The methodology was rooted in statistical and mathematical techniques, with emphasis upon accurate observation, and upon the importance of the validation of prediction. In the course of the development of these 'scientific' social sciences, the place of social and political philosophy, of moral and aesthetic judgment, tended increasingly to be cast among the value judgments of the logical positivists. The implication—a false reading of their thought, but one that came to be generally used—was that the social sciences were neutral tools for discerning the truth, and that judgments about society were matters of individual choice, which could not be discussed objectively and which were, indeed, often mere rhetoric.

If socialism were scientific, therefore, it implied an acceptance not

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only of the methodology but of the findings of the social sciences. If Marx predicted increasing mass unemployment in capitalist economies, and Keynes explained what caused mass unemployment, then Keynes's work was more socialist—because more scientific—than Marx's. Marx became merely another exploded scientist, whose tomb was erected on the long highway of scientific truth. Socialism thus became identified with social engineering; the manipulation of society, on the analogy of engineering, to attain given results. But what results? How were the targets to be set?

The conservatives, deeply suspicious of the social sciences and regarding social engineering as inherently socialist, had several answers. The first was that society was organic, that its values represented the wisdom of the race, and that to interfere with society, other than piecemeal and cautiously, was to invite disaster, since inherently the whole of life was greater than the power of any person or group (part of life) to comprehend or control the whole. Thus attempts to seize control of the whole of society would be totalitarian, as Russia showed, for what could not be controlled would be regarded as wicked.

Another answer was that the proper object of mankind's life was religious; that truth had been revealed; that investigation would show the Creator's design, and that to attempt in any ultimate sense to design a just society was impious, since it implied that man had usurped God's place. Since man could not, his efforts would end in disaster—either totalitarianism as in Russia and Germany, or senseless materialism as in Western Europe and America.

The socialist answer to these charges took two forms. The first was manifestly absurd. It was that when people had been shown what could be done by the applications of the social and natural sciences to the world, through technology, the very abundance of life would become its own justification. Man would be materially happy, and spiritually free to explore the wonders of the universe, aesthetically and scientifically. This answer was absurd because it ignored the brute fact of the deep dissatisfactions and yearnings that led to violence. Either these manifestations could be called original sin, or (as in Marx) characterized as social conflict deeply embedded in the nature of social reality (and probably in life itself), but they were sufficiently powerful and obvious to make scientific-humanism's optimism appear shallow and unacceptable to all save the shallow and unacceptable. Such doctrines fell into the hands of 'scientific' popularizers. If socialism was based on this, it was indeed built on sand.

More appealing, because more subtle, was the argument that certain values—truth, justice, kindness, compassion—were implicit in certain modes of life, and that the patient unravelling of complex social problems would enable difficulties to be worked through in detail, which would enable people to contain social evil. It would be hard to deny that in many respects life had become more tolerable because of patient investigation—that pedagogy, medicine, penology, for example,

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were immeasurably more effective and more humane because of the application of scientific methods. The use of general statements—such as that ' human nature will never alter '—was purposeless, because such assertions could only be understood in particular contexts, when they would seem to be absurd. The patient, step by step approach to social questions was a way to enlarge the area of human choice, since it made what happened to people more open to rational discussion. In such a context, steps towards more equality, or towards greater social justice were not part of some grandiose scheme for human improvement, but rational choices, dictated by humane criteria, in highly specific contexts. Often, desirable aims would be in conflict, and it would be necessary to trade off gains in one direction against losses in another direction.

THE question for socialists, then, was not so much the ends as the means. The ends—equality, justice, freedom—resolved themselves (in the detail of any situation) into the humane alternative. Did the totality of these choices add up to a consistent pattern of social action, involving the use of the power of the state, that might be called socialism? Socialism could be defined as the ends of equality, justice and freedom, achieved by this pattern of social action.

Richard Titmuss, following R. H. Tawney, would have answered the question affirmatively. Because the problems showed a consistent pattern, it was almost axiomatic that solutions to the problems would show a consistent pattern of response.

What was the consistency of the problems? It seemed that study of the problems of poverty and deprivation suggested that growing national incomes—the economics of affluence—created distress at a rate possibly as fast as distress was alleviated, distress which was different in form but similar in nature. It was as though industrial society had a centrifugal tendency; as development took place, those who were at a disadvantage were flung out, and fell to the bottom of society. In industrial societies these were the elderly, the mentally and physically handicapped, oppressed minority groups like Negroes, widows, children from large families who, because they owned no capital and could not earn very much, if anything, became the ' poor '—the absolutely and relatively deprived. Further, as change accelerated, the number of victims of change increased; there was, thus, a constant tendency for the number of deprived people to increase. Thus inequality could be seen as a function of change. Change itself—industrialization and automation—acting within the social context of bourgeois institutions, thus became the systematic cause of inequality, suffering and injustice.

The response to these problems was a growing network of publicly-provided social services. In the first place there was a growing political pressure from the underprivileged for the redress of their ills. There was also a growing body of professional opinion that wished to exercise its skills free from the pressures of the market place—doctors, teachers, social workers—and whose professional judgments involved radical

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reallocations of resources. To deal with an accident victim, for example, many thousands of pounds worth of medical skills would be needed, and then he and his family might need social security payments for many years, rehousing and other provisions. Whether the accident was incurred in war or in employment, on the roads or at home, might affect his legal status as a claimant of insurance benefits, but his social needs were the same. Only the state, it was argued, could make this provision for the victim whose right sprang from his needs and not from the legal status of the accident that caused those needs.

Thus it was that the violent changes of the Second World War were cushioned by the growth of public provision. This public provision was based on equal treatment of equal needs; the socialist principle of to each according to his needs was therefore adopted; and this entailed progressive taxation—from each according to his ability. The growth of the social services was egalitarian; and to sustain them, the public ownership of the profits of industry and trade was essential. Whether the profits came directly by nationalization or indirectly by taxation was almost immaterial. That, roughly, was the egalitarian case.

AS prosperity mounted in the 1950s it was obvious that not only had the breakdown of capitalism which seemed obvious in the early 1930s not occurred, but like a phoenix capitalism had risen from the ashes of the Second World War. Indeed it had risen most dramatically in the defeated nations of Germany, Italy and Japan—literally from the ashes of their destroyed cities and factories. The nature of the society and of the economy that provided this affluence and extraordinarily high growth rates was in some respects radically different from earlier periods.

It was a society geared to rapid growth. It was a society with a high propensity to invest, and it was this high level of investment which explained the full employment levels achieved. Even in the occasional periods of slackening of growth, unemployment rarely rose above four per cent in the USA, which was the industrialized country with the highest unemployment levels, and which measured its unemployment in such a way that it was always apparently several percentage points above that of the rest of the world. The national income per head rose rapidly. This rising national income led to much higher consumption expenditure, especially in the income-elastic areas of consumer durables. The 1950s, for the industrial world outside the United States, were a decade of the car, the television set, the washing machine and the refrigerator. There was a dramatic improvement in housing and in the standard of clothing, food and holidays of ordinary people. In the United States, the most prosperous country in the world, many millions of people were sufficiently rich to live in a way hitherto confined to the upper middle class. Nor was it true that the social services were neglected. Education expenditure rose to from five to seven per cent of the gross national product of most industrial countries. Expenditure on

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medical services was largely publicly subsidized, and reached four to six per cent of the gross national product (it was lowest in Britain with a comprehensive National Health Service and highest in the United States with a substantial private sector). Social security benefits, especially in France and Germany, rose rapidly, on a basis closely related to earnings. Only in Britain, often regarded as the most left-wing of the industrial countries, were social security payments substantially on a flat-rate benefit basis.

The economic underpinning of this affluence was high investment. High investment was determined by high profit rates, which in turn depended on rapidly and steadily rising demand. This depended, in turn, on rapid rises in wages and salaries, which were guaranteed by the full-employment conditions that prevailed, in which employers could usually grant wage rises without pricing their products out of the market. Demand was also kept up by rapidly growing international trade, a growth that was accelerated by the successive measures adopted internationally to reduce or abolish tariffs, quotas and other obstacles to trade, as in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the tariff-free areas like the European Economic Community. Growing public expenditure, especially on social welfare, and steady expenditure on defence also kept up demand. In such conditions there was a rising demand, especially for housing, consumers' durable goods and services—especially transport; this led to rising investment; and this high rate of investment led to accelerated technological progress.

The firms that provided this high investment and rapid technological progress were unlike the businesses which had built up capitalism. In the first place they were often very big and international, employing many thousands of people and hundreds of millions of dollars of capital in many countries. They did not compete as in the neo-classical models (where many small firms offered the same product), but by offering different products, whose sales they ensured by vigorous advertising and selling effort. Nor were they, like traditional entrepreneurs, concerned with maximizing profits. Rather, there was a division of ownership and control. Hundreds of thousands of shareholders were scattered throughout the property-owning classes. Many of them held shares indirectly through pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds. Few of them had long-term loyalties to the firms in which they had stock; when the price of shares fell they sold; when the price rose they bought. The management of the companies was in the hands of a professional class of managers, for the greater part salaried, whose loyalty was to the corporation as such. This loyalty was to make the company grow in size and reputation; to market a product of high repute; to serve the public weal by disinterested service; and to be good employers. The net surplus of the country was thus distributed between consumers, workers and stockholders on an equitable basis. The large corporation behaved in fact as a public trustee; its corporate philosophy was almost

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indistinguishable from that of the publicly-owned body or nationalized industry.

It followed then that modern capitalism was welfare capitalism. The corporations sought steady markets. They co-operated with the state. They were good employers. They produced sound products. They invested in long-term development and research. In such circumstances to talk of the class war seemed preposterous.

DEMOCRATIC socialism was committed to constitutional action and not to revolution. Like Parnell's Irish Party, it had to achieve its aim through parliamentary institutions. This involved compromises. At what point the compromises involved betrayal was the perennial question. In part it depended on the nature of the constitution, and of the attacks on it. Were imperial Germany, fascist Italy or Gaullist France intolerable regimes that had to be violently overthrown? Or could they be reformed from within? If the attacks on the regime came from communists, or anarchists, or fascists, determined to establish a tyranny, should not a democratic socialist defend institutions that, however imperfect, guaranteed some sort of public order, some freedom from arbitrary arrest, some freedom from terror, and had some hope of reform? The answer depended partly on the degree of horror that was evoked by the attacks; John Dillon, the last leader of the Irish parliamentary party, said after the Irish civil war that he would almost have preferred to continue the union with Great Britain than live under the nationalist terror. A democratic socialist has often been in this position. He sees a choice between evils; he does not see a utopia.

To be a democrat, therefore, is to regard the possibility of revolution as something to be avoided at almost all costs. To be a social democrat is, however, to hold that this constitutional parliamentary process can be used for social engineering to make society more rational. Rationality—and this is a huge claim—would, it is held, lead to a more desirable, a softer, more prosperous, more equal and more just society. Rationality involved the understanding of society. Social democracy, therefore, is the application through social engineering of the findings of the social sciences.

Democratic socialists, therefore, in contrast to the Marxists (who had a revealed doctrine) had the pragmatic, empirical application of transitory findings as the body of their approach. If, as often happened, the social sciences were wrong, or were wrongly interpreted, democratic socialism failed its own tests. In any event, too, the world has often, perhaps usually, preferred irrationality; in olden times it preferred religion; and now it prefers nationalism.

The findings of economics on the causes of unemployment and on the causes of economic growth drove democratic socialists to seek to use the power of the state to create employment and to hasten innovation by promoting investment. The process of economic policy-making involved the greater use of state power; but not necessarily its use in a direction

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of greater equality and social reform. The process of wage control, for example, which is an integral part of the programme for economic growth, necessarily involves a redistribution of the national product away from the wage-earning class. The building up of investment almost necessarily involves an increase in the level of profits. It does not necessarily follow, therefore, that economics will lead to socialism.

SOCIALISM has to be defined more by what it is not than by what it is. On the one side stands liberal capitalism, with its distrust of the state and its emphasis on competition and the liberation of the individual from many (if not all) social principles of obligation. On the other side stands communism, with its totalitarian identification of the individual with the state, and its identification of liberty with the realization by the individual of a collective social purpose. Socialists have sought to tread the middle way. In the Second World War English socialists like J. B. Priestley defined England's future as a country which embraced the best of American capitalism and Russian communism (both allies of the British at that time): and, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Sweden was held up as the example of a country which, while aiming at equality and prosperity by social intervention, managed to enjoy the greatest degree of individual aberration from the mean. Legalized abortion on the welfare state seemed an ideal socialist society, contrasted with the suppression of the kulaks on the one hand and the mass unemployment in America on the other.

Socialism, then, is best defined as a self-conscious middle way. Its original doctrine was opposition to capitalism, its later doctrine was opposition to communism. For many years communism and socialism were synonymous; after Marx they were regarded by some as separate successive historical stages, but the socialist movement was not split cleanly from communism. The split came after Bernstein and other thinkers had differed with the majority of Marxists on the nature of revolution and on the direction of the bourgeois state. For Bernstein, as for the Fabians, the state was a mechanism for social improvement and for the gradual achievement of socialism; for the Bolsheviks it was an instrument of the bourgeoisie, with no possibility of other use. After the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia the division between socialists and communists attained an objective basis. Political and economic actions by the Russian government showed clearly that the Bolsheviks were not liberals, were not gradualists, but were apostles of violent revolution throughout the world.

Thereafter, socialism represented as much a response to communism as an alternative to capitalism. Whenever communism moved, socialism felt bound to move too, usually in a different direction. Socialism had become, in the late nineteenth century, part of the ordinary party system of liberal (and increasingly democratic) politics; socialist tactics and, increasingly, socialist strategy were dictated by the needs of the political situation in liberal countries; but socialist philosophy, when it came to

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take stock of where socialism was going, felt obliged to orient itself to the Soviet state. Because what was going on in Russia bore little if any direct relevance to the party politics of liberal states, socialist philosophy and socialist practice increasingly diverged.

When, as often happens to all parties, a serious electoral defect occurred, the rethinking of political strategy and the rethinking of socialist philosophy tended to be identified, and the disputes about the direction that politics ought to take, which are frequent enough in all parties, took on a metaphysical other-worldly tone, because they were, indeed, about another world. It is difficult, therefore, to relate socialist practice to socialist philosophy, or to relate either to political and economic reality, because socialist practice has for the greater part been dictated by short-term parliamentary considerations, and socialist philosophy has been like the shadows on Plato's cave, reflected and refracted from capitalist societies to communism and back to socialism, and then hastily related to what socialist parties were doing. To attempt to make socialist policies and principles consistent is self-evidently an impossible task, for both philosophical response and political urgency have led to innumerable accretions which are often incompatible one with another. But that is not unusual, for the same criticism could be made *mutatis mutandis* of liberal, communist, capitalist and catholic apologias. Yet, one doubts whether the criticism of incoherence when laid at the door of communist doctrine would have much force, for—doctrine or not—communism in its various forms manifestly exists and, though its forms vary, they have many essential features in common. It is a matter for dispute whether socialism exists in the sense that communism does, and certainly, if it does exist, then the regimes that have called themselves or are called socialist have little indeed in common.

How, then, is socialism to be defined? It is, first of all, parliamentary in conception and in operation. In the dispute between capitalism and communism the socialists accepted the parliamentary political structure which the communists denounced as irredeemably bourgeois. Socialists put parliament at the centre of their political institutions. This was an inevitable consequence of their decision to achieve socialism by gaining a majority in existing parliamentary institutions. It meant that socialists were organized in parliamentary parties and that 'after the achievement of socialism' the party system would continue. This was in direct contrast to the communist view that in a socialist society parties would cease to exist since the objective reality of a classless society would remove the basis for political parties. The acceptance of parliamentary institutions as the central feature of a political system marked, therefore, a clear break with Marxist principles and practice.

PARLIAMENT, then, was at the centre, and socialists were one party among others. As a party they put themselves on the left, in a continental semi-circular chamber ranged between the communists on *their* left and the radicals on their right. Socialists, therefore, defined them-

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selves as on the left of the parliamentary system; whenever the centre moved to the left the socialists moved to the left as well, to preserve their original position. Thus, within the parliamentary system, the socialists were bound always to provide from their own members the most extreme members of the parliamentary opposition (though, of course, there were extremists of the left and the right who were outside the parliamentary system); and at any particular time their orientation was bound to be part of the total orientation of the parliamentary system to the society in which it was functioning.

Their situation on the left meant that they were bound to choose the more populist course and the more 'democratic' course when choices were presented. The extension of the suffrage, first to all males, then to all adults, the extension of the right to elect officers and representatives in many institutions—all this conception of radical democracy, 'one man one vote', equal constituencies and the secret ballot were taken over from the Chartists in England and, ultimately, from the American and French revolutionary doctrines. The socialists developed the conception of representative democracy along the most liberal lines in all the countries where they were active.

In contrast to the liberals, however, their concern for democracy was accompanied by a different view of the role of the state. Under liberal capitalism the state was, in the final analysis, a referee; the game was played by the capitalists. According to the communists the state was a corrupt referee; rigging the match against the proletariat. According to the socialists the increasing majority of voters would be working class and they would use the power of the state in their own interests. The nineteenth-century state, according to the Webbs and to historians not of their persuasion writing subsequently, was a tremendous social invention, exciting the community to perform tasks that previously could not be performed at all. This was the case first of all in the social services, where education, health and social security could be provided free or cheaply with impressive consequences for the happiness and well-being of mankind, and secondly in the ownership and control of productive enterprises. The Webbs took the examples of municipal gasworks, waterworks and tramways and the post office to show that the state could operate business successfully in the public interest, and the case of the co-operative movement demonstrated that the private entrepreneur was not the sole means of running a business for profit.

Thus, in practice, socialism came to mean the growing extension of state power through the public ownership of industry and the extension of social services. Bismarck's social security legislation was copied in Australia and then in Britain, with socialist advocacy. The state railway enterprises of the continent formed the forerunners of extensive public holdings in business and commerce, ranging from agricultural credit corporations in Scandinavia to coalmines in Britain, to airlines throughout the world.

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THE extension of state power was a further argument for public control. The analysis of capitalism's defects that underlay socialist policies put stress upon the apparent fact that capitalism could produce goods but not sell them. The division between the owners of property and the propertyless workers was seen as the cause of inequality of incomes, and an inequality that, in Marxist terms, would lead to the breakdown of capitalism because of the crisis of over-production in which what was produced could not be consumed because of the absence of purchasing power. Thus socialism was intended to be a mechanism to boost producing power.

It was to do so by a redistribution of incomes away from the rich and towards the poor. Under communism this would have been achieved by a general political convulsion in which the propertied would have been hanged from the nearest lamp-post while their property was socialized. Under socialism the expropriation would be gradual, so that increasingly society's surplus value would accrue directly to the state, and also through progressive taxation the rich would be deprived of income which would be given to the poor. The rich, who saved, would be replaced by the poor, who would spend. This spending would also effect another change: production would now be for use, rather than of vain fripperies for profit. 'Production for use and not for profit' was a slogan that carried with it many implications. One was derived from the utilitarian felicific calculus that extra goods gave greater satisfaction to those who were poor than to those who were rich. Another was that profit was a disreputable surplus derived from the exploitation of the poor, producing unnecessary goods for the wealthy.

The consequences of this view of profit were many. Inevitably, egalitarian anti-profit measures were bound to commend themselves to socialists (within any one nation, an important qualification), but the consequences for production and output were grave, for it turned out that capitalism had not solved the problem of production. This was seen most obviously in poor countries like India where a socialist government's most pressing problem was not distribution but output, but it was also seen in the third and fourth Labour governments in Britain (1945-51, 1964–70) which were elected on egalitarian expenditure programmes but were forced to deal almost entirely with problems of production.

The difficulties of production were intrinsic to all societies, and a mistake had been made in believing that technical advance had gone so far that it would be possible easily and painlessly to incorporate it into physical capital and to allow the production of abundance to proceed. The conditions for technical progress were complex, but they depended, certainly, upon the rapid and continuous accumulation of capital, which implied that a high proportion of total potential output would not be available for consumption but would have to be invested. If the rich were deprived of their surplus, which they had largely saved and made available for investment, then the state would have to save. This made 'production for use,' or selling at or below cost, an unfeasible

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process for publicly-owned industries. Increasingly, therefore, the debate about the ownership of property became a debate about how business was to be managed.

A publicly-owned, democratically-controlled economy is a concept that raises immediately the questions, who is to manage the enterprises and on what principles are they to be managed? For public ownership is not the same as public control; a series of socially-owned enterprises operating on no common principle could be anarchic, and (in their various ways) despotic.

A variety of answers were given. The first, historically, was that workers should control their own enterprises and run them by consensus or by majority rule. This co-operative conception, as applied to whole enterprises, was called syndicalism. It was a French conception, applied first in the 1848 revolution and subsequently in small ways elsewhere, culminating in experiments in Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s. Its drawbacks were manifold, but two drawbacks stood out. Managerial skill is rare, and an enterprise requires managerial skill and authority to be exercised if it is to survive. This is difficult, if not impossible in the given conditions. Above all, even if this difficulty could be overcome there was no general rule by which the output and pricing policies of each enterprise were to be determined. It was implicitly assumed that the economy would function ' normally ' as it did under capitalism.

At the other extreme from workers' control was state control. A municipal tramway in Belgium, a state electricity company in Latin America, the state coal industry in Britain could all be managed exactly as though they were privately-owned corporations. Except that profits went to the state (or the losses were borne by the taxpayer), there was no difference that could be discerned, immediately. Thus, the management of state enterprises was a perennial topic of discussion. At one extreme, syndicalism came near to the fascist doctrine of corporatism, in which the state consisted of groups of people organized according to their working groups; at the other extreme, state control came near to the conception of the absolute state, on the Hegelian Prussian model, which libertarian socialists had set out to oppose.

The problem of workers' control arose not only because socialism had a concern for public ownership. It arose because socialists called themselves a working-class party. In fact, at most times a majority of the working class, and especially working-class women, voted for right-wing parties, and in many countries—France, Italy, Germany—a majority of those voting for left-wing parties voted communist. The socialists called themselves a working-class party for three reasons. It was their view that political parties represented different social groups—peasant parties represented the peasants, liberal parties represented the manufacturers and conservative parties represented the big landowners—and they were the representatives of the working class. This sprang from their Marx-like interpretation of politics as a manifestation of the class struggle. In fact, the basis of party allegiance was far more complex than this

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simple-minded division would have suggested. The second reason for the socialist identification with the working class was the objective fact that in some countries they were objectively the representatives of that part of the working class organized in trade unions (which was usually but not always a minority of the manual workers). Thirdly, socialists were a working-class party by aspiration, in the sense that they desired to redistribute wealth, income and power to the working class. It was this aspect of socialist thought that led to the great preoccupation with equality and the notion that liberal equality in political terms was virtually meaningless without an economic and social interpretation as well.

It is the search for economic and social equality that has been the hallmark of social-democratic theory, and the way to achieve this equality has been held to be to apply the findings of the social sciences to political affairs. Yet the paradox is that steps taken towards equality have rarely succeeded in their object; the side-effects of almost all liberal legislation have led both to more and to less equality. The preoccupation of socialists with the social sciences has been disillusioning; for the social sciences have only rarely upheld the original socialist tenets. It is the process of desocializing the social sciences that has been disillusioning.

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McINNES AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY—A REJOINDER

Walter Kendall

THE failures of social-democratic parties in Europe after the Second World War are only to be equalled or exceeded by those of the communist parties which have competed with them for the allegiance of the masses. This is an old story, but we should thank Mr McInnes for recalling our attention to it.*

One might, nevertheless, venture to differ with a view that the Labour Party in the 1950s, despite the adoption of the Morrisonian Public Corporation 20 years earlier, was still committed to 'workers' control' and a 'proletarian form of socialism'. Equally one might fairly question whether the Labour Party in 1945 was really committed to 'peaceful revolution', when 19 years earlier an admittedly rigorous critic could already ask of the party leaders, 'How can they make an attack on bourgeois private property when they have not the courage to refuse pocket money to the Prince of Wales?'

McInnes in short is open to the charge that he achieves his effect by contrasting a fallen present with a 'golden age', implicitly but incorrectly assumed to have existed at some time in the past. The major changes in social democracy, the shift from revolutionism to reformism, the key phenomena to which McInnes refers, originated not after the Second World War but after the First.

The failures of social democracy in the last quarter of a century cannot be evaluated apart from the social context of our time.

It ought to be clear that in a unified post-war Germany, the SPD, given its past strength in Berlin and in what is now the *Un*-Democratic German Republic, would have emerged as a majority party. The characteristics of the Ulbricht regime shattered the hopes of the SPD and drove it to the right as surely as it destroyed the KPD, formerly the greatest communist party in the world outside Russia.

The essential course of subsequent development in France and Italy was similarly decided during the immediate post-war years. In each of these countries the old regime was badly discredited. In France the entrepreneurial class stood convicted of collaboration. In Italy business and the large landowners had actually sponsored the fascist regime. By 1943 the whole fascist Italian state structure lay in ruins. In France at the conclusion of hostilities the situation was not a great deal better. Yet it was not only the socialist but also the *communist* parties which collaborated with the parties of the right in the reconstruction of the old

* See *Survey*, no. 70/71.

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regime. In Italy the communists, from the time of their unilateral decision to enter the Bagdoglio cabinet, took the lead.

The initial, jointly sponsored stabilization was followed by the demoralization of the masses caused by the failure of adventurist (but essentially reformist) strikes initiated by the Communist Parties in France and Italy after 1947. The splits and faction fights in the labour movement which resulted all served to undermine the basis for any kind of social-democratic advance. In Continental Europe after the war, Germany, France and Italy were the crucial sectors of the front on whose success all other socialist progress depended. It was the joint failures of both social-democratic and communist parties at this time, more than any other factor, which determined the basic character of the standstill which has followed for more than two decades.

The failure of movements for social change in Western Europe is thus not to be laid at the door of over timid social democracy alone. The communist parties also bear a heavy share of responsibility.

THE post-war vacillations of the Socialist Party in France, the dependence and ideological subservience of the PSI on the PCI in Italy enabled the communist parties to erode and conquer the socialists' popular and working-class base. Yet at the same time the communist parties' role as guardians of Russian state interests prevented them from becoming an effective force for social change. The ultra-reformism, the pro-Western alignment of social democracy emerged as a reaction to the demagogic revolutionism and subversion of the labour movement in the interest of the Russian state which characterized the activity of the Stalinist parties. Where Stalinist demagogy retained its hold on the masses, this was in large measure the result of popular reaction to the failures of social democracy, for which Stalinism itself bore important responsibility.

Yet, as the record of events shows, this was in no way a revolutionary-reformist split of the type originally formalized by the foundation of the Comintern in 1919. By any real test the communist parties are every bit as reformist, despite their Leninist phraseology, as the parties of social democracy. The separation of the socialist movement into two blocs revolves around the dispute over the primacy of the interests of the Russian state and has been a major roadblock to progress ever since the 1920s. By taking the revolutionaries out of the social-democratic movements, it gravely impaired the left-right policy dialectic. Instead of radicalizing mass organizations, it largely handed them over to the social-democratic right. By delivering the revolutionary forces within society over to a hidebound Stalinist bureaucracy, it neutralized revolutionary aspirations in Western society more effectively than any police repressive action has ever done.

The spectacle of reformist parties which fail to carry out reforms, challenged by revolutionary parties which have no intention of carrying

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out revolutions, is one that characterizes the bankruptcy of the post-war socialist years. It is this false conflict which reduces so much socialist debate, especially in France and Italy, to no more than empty ideology.

That is not to say that were the basic dilemma of an unnecessarily divided allegiance overcome there would not remain basic problems to resolve.

The socialist belief, derived from Marx, that capitalism would enter a period of definitive crises from which there would be no escape, *except* via the socialist revolution, has not been borne out. The crises have been there and on an incomparable scale: 1914–18; the post-war collapse and inflation in Germany and Austria; the general strike in Britain; a world slump on a scale unparalleled in history; the rise of nazism; the French sit-down strikes of 1936; the Spanish revolution and civil war; the 1939–44 holocaust; the destruction of the state machine in Germany and Italy; the total post-war discrediting of the ruling élite in France. Yet nowhere in Europe have either socialist or communist parties succeeded in taking advantage of these opportunities and securing a socialist transition.

The reverse is true. Confronted by the failure of socialist pretensions to bring an end to the archaic division in Europe, the ruling élites have set about doing it themselves with considerable success. Instead of out-dated national barriers to the free movement of economic resources we see in the international companies the emergence of a form of social productive organization far in advance of anything achieved in the 'East' to date.

As far as Europe is concerned the general crisis has ended in utopia. If we take 1955 as a base year, industrial production per head stood at 51 in 1913, 67 in 1937, 100 in 1955. Given that despite two world wars the average standard of living roughly doubled between 1913 and 1955, the absence of social revolution is, perhaps, not surprising.

THE socialist view of economic betterment as a road to utopia is also under heavy fire. The disintegration of social and urban life which we see at the present time in the USA is a positive refutation of the belief that if only certain elemental needs could be filled human life would be richer, happier, fuller, more cultured in every way. The adman's apparent success in converting mankind into a gigantic social intestine doomed to consume endless quantities of increasingly useless, artificially obsolescent, but highly saleable commodities, suggests that the extension of human needs may not be finite but infinite. The media may be able to ensure that properly indoctrinated we go on keeping up with the Joneses for ever.

The third dilemma of socialism is linked with the first. Capitalism has succeeded not only in surviving shocks and adapting itself, but also in maintaining and increasing the growth of the productive forces. But at the same time the simplistic socialist belief that TOTAL STATE CON-

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TROL+PLANNING=SOCIALISM=UTOPIA has been utterly exploded by the experience of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, by the labour camps and by the purges. It is clear that the growing economic crisis of the Soviet bloc demands a limitation of total planning and the re-emergence of some degree of independent market economy if its problems are to be resolved. Manifestly, neither the USSR nor Czechoslovakia comes very close to utopia. They may come nearer only by laying claim to the ideas of 'bourgeois' market economy and freedom, and not the other way about.

There is, however, a positive sign. A whole range of forces is at work to sap and undermine the attractive power of the Great Soviet Myth. That the communist parties can maintain their strength in the next two decades, as they have in the last, seems highly unlikely. A new generation finds 'communism' increasingly discredited, by the events in Berlin in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968–69. Paris in May 1968, the present worldwide student unrest, both serve to indicate that discontent with social democracy and Stalinism is now beginning to break through the restraining barriers. If the present naïve millenial optimism which characterizes these movements can be replaced by a positive orientation towards the real problems of society, then new and valid forces of social change may at last begin to emerge in Western society.

There does, nevertheless, exist an alternative possibility. It is conceivable that the forces of social change may in the future, as in the past, prove unable to rise to the level of the tasks with which they are confronted. It was the thought of such a prospect that caused Trotsky in 1940, the year of his assassination, to speculate that 'if the international proletariat, as a result of the experience of our entire epoch and the current war, proves incapable of becoming the master of society, this would signify the foundering of all hope for a socialist revolution, for it is impossible to expect any more favourable conditions for it; in any case no one forsees them now, or is able to characterize them'. 'Have we entered', he asked a little dismally, 'the epoch of social revolution, or on the contrary the epoch of the declining society of totalitarian bureaucracy?'

The greatest phenomenon of the twentieth century may yet prove to be the rise of a proletarianized intelligentsia which occupies all key decision-making centres of power.

The socialist ideal rested on the view that since appropriation was private and production social, the conflict between the mode of production and the mode of appropriation could be resolved by the socialization of the appropriation process. This indeed was theoretically possible. The entrepreneur and his capital were discrete entities and self-evidently separable. Entrepreneurial activity could itself be socialized with the production process and the individual entrepreneur himself eliminated.

The new intelligentsia, as Machaiski foresaw long ago, is an entrepreneurial animal of an entirely different order. In the case of the

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intellectual his capital is in his head. The unity of capital and entrepreneur is indivisible. One either accepts the two together or goes without both. If that be so then the capital of the modern intellectual cannot be socialized, and it is here that we find the root cause of bureaucratic power in both Stalinist and non-Stalinist regimes. The socialist critique of capitalist society may remain true, but its view of the working class as a catalyst may turn out to be utopia.

If that were to be the case, the failures of social democracy and the evils of Stalinism would both prove to be manifestations of the same phenomenon. The failings demonstrated by McInnes would be the indications of the social incompetence of a whole class and not of the alternative factors suggested by myself.

For all our sakes one would hope that this will not prove to be the case.

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Psychological Reflections

ON TERROR

Manès Sperber

UNDER the sightless stare of the victims of the Moscow trials our arguments shrank to pitiful excuses. We owed a debt of loyalty—we argued—in the first place to our comrades in Hitler's concentration camps; without Russian tanks and planes, Republican Spain would not be able to hold out; unless we remained united, we would have no chance of mobilizing all forces against fascism. The reasoning was plausible, but the executed never ceased staring at us. We could escape their stare only by coming to terms with ourselves. The break became inevitable. What remained thereafter was a desert of loneliness and the vain hope that we might gradually learn how to master the art of indifference.

In fact, nobody has succeeded in giving a convincing account of this experience and in finding adequate words for that silent dialogue with the executed which destroyed our certainties one after another until we felt in danger of drowning on dry land.

Like the defendants in Stalin's trials who were compelled to turn themselves into false witnesses for the prosecution, we also remained all too long dishonest witnesses; eventually we fell silent just when we should have spoken out, and so we began to hate our very voices. We became guilty like them because we, too, had resisted only in our secret thoughts; only too rarely had we stood up to the leading bureaucrats and the *apparatchiks* who had themselves risen to power over cowering backs and, in the end, over mountains of corpses. Stalin succeeded in destroying so many men precisely because they had *failed* to do the things of which they were accused; because they had basely surrendered their conscience and had capitulated without struggle; just because, long before their fate overtook them, they had disowned themselves in the belief that this would help to preserve the unity of the Party and of the defensive power of the Soviet Union. Their false confessions at their trials were but the very last of countless acts of capitulation. Others who had really opposed the regime and had never capitulated were not made to stand trial. They were executed in secret. Yet, in staging the diabolical farce of the trials, the regime managed to achieve something that had hardly ever before even been attempted. It succeeded in depriving every one of the defendants of his entire past and his very identity, sending him to his death under a mask which turned him into his own enemy and into the deadly foe of the cause to which he had in fact dedicated his life.

I wrote these words in the summer of 1958 after the execution of Imre Nagy and his comrades. They, by contrast, had gone to their death like

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revolutionaries, sacrificed for deeds which they had really committed and for actions which they had really taken.

In his excellent analysis of the mechanism of the Moscow trials, *The Great Terror**, Robert Conquest rightly describes the trial of Traicho Kostov in Sofia as the last of the public Stalinist witch trials. The Slansky trial was not really public; everything about it was falsified; the radio accounts were mere montages. The proceedings—assuming that they took place at all—which led to the condemnation of Nagy and the other leaders of the Hungarian revolution remained completely secret.

That there have been no further Stalinist trials during the past two decades does not, however, alter the fact that our century bears the double stigma of the Stalinist terror and the unspeakable nazi crimes. Many of the techniques employed by the two tyrannies were strikingly similar. Both made consistent use of terror, of anticipatory suspicions, of the isolation of groups and individuals presumed to be in opposition, of the organization of jubilant unanimity or staged outbreaks of popular wrath.

Still, a closer look at the peculiarities of the Moscow trials immediately reveals the difference between Hitler's and Stalin's terror. The so-called people's courts of nazi Germany imposed ruthlessly murderous sentences. But the victims of these sentences were actual opponents. Defendants standing trial, such as the conspirators of 20 July, either persisted in denying their guilt or defiantly professed their hostility to Hitler, without ever betraying any of their comrades. The defendants in the Moscow trials, by contrast, went out of their way to indict themselves. Playing prearranged parts, they acted as the eager auxiliaries of the public prosecutor, confessing to crimes which they had not committed and denouncing others for equally fictitious acts of complicity. The drama was staged in blatant disregard of common sense, of the most self-evident psychological truths, and of a historical record which nobody could have forgotten and which nothing could have expunged. It was thus impossible for a sane man to mistake this murderous fiction for truth without accepting a more or less conscious share of affective and intellectual complicity.

Thirty years ago I put the following words into the mouth of the hero of a novel who was recounting his experiences in a German concentration camp:

> All or nearly all the inmates of our camp had been subjected to frightful interrogations, and they had stood firm. One or another had emerged with bent shoulders, but none had been broken. Only after we had arrived in the camp did something happen which made us prisoners in our innermost selves. We submitted to the camp discipline. It penetrated our souls. As soon as we had resigned ourselves to our fate, we became prisoners all over again. The guard, the enemy, had become a part of each one of us.

* Macmillan, 1968.

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The totalitarian terror regime can thus also sustain itself by imposing a form of self-alienation on those whom it threatens and punishes. Once the process of self-alienation is under way, the victims begin to grant their torturers entry into their souls and sometimes even side with their torturers without immediately realizing that they are doing so. Why and how can such things happen? In which special conditions are they *apparently* bound to happen?

THE distinguishing characteristics of an epoch can be discovered from the answers to the following questions: What conscious or unconscious fears, terrors, and anxieties predominated at the time? What did men then regard as happiness? What type of personality ideal did they set up for themselves?

These questions apply to groups as well as to individuals. In either case, the topic of happiness is quickly exhausted, while fear, anxiety and terror remain inexhaustible themes for both the individual and society as a whole.

In the light of these questions, it is worth trying to imagine how our great-grandchildren are likely to see the present age. Probably they will discover, with astonishment and perhaps also with admiration, that our epoch has transformed the traditional concepts of happiness, that it has added to them, and that it has displayed exceptional zest in the removal of obstacles barring the road to happiness. Our films will convey to our successors the image of men frantically busy enjoying themselves, moving incessantly along roads leading to distant places, engaged in joyful activities on the beaches and in the mountains; they show throngs of tens or even hundreds of thousands swearing eternal loyalty to their leaders, cheering soldiers leaving for the front or welcoming the return of victorious warriors, or they show them on their sports grounds, besides themselves with enthusiasm for the exploits of the latest champion. There is thus sufficient documentary evidence pointing to the conclusion that the people of our century have been far happier than their predecessors.

Yet there is just as much evidence demonstrating that our contemporaries were for years or decades compelled to live under wholly intolerable pressures, that they were almost always under some kind of threat, and that they had cause to fear the worst, whether as individuals or as members of certain religious, ethnic, social or political groups. This century has in fact managed to make every normal person's flesh creep.

EVERY human being knows fear, anxiety, terror. Nobody is able to evade these feelings and experiences for ever and completely. Anxiety, indeed, is more widespread than any other human feeling. Fear differs basically from anxiety. Fear reflects a more or less realistically assessed danger in an accurately perceived situation. Anxiety expresses an individual's character in a situation which need not neces-

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sarily be dangerous but which is being faultily perceived and tendentiously distorted. Fear is the product of experience. Anxiety, on the contrary, produces the confirmatory experience. Fear is limited by the number of probable dangers. Anxiety is unlimited—as unlimited as the number of possible errors. To be without fear would be unreasonable and possibly fatal. The child who does not know fear and its reality basis may lean too far out of the window and kill himself. Many people have less fear than they should have because they are lacking in realistic imagination. They resemble inferior chess players able to do no more than anticipate their opponent's next move.

There are several types of anxiety. In an essay, *Contributions to an Analysis of Tyranny*, which I published in Paris in 1938 (and which the Gestapo destroyed in 1940), I distinguished between two types of anxiety. One I called social-directed anxiety and the other aggressive anxiety. Social-directed anxiety expresses itself in obvious ways. It is the method by which the individual seeks compensation from the outside world. The state of anxiety in this case can be mitigated with outside help but never wholly overcome. The individual driven by social-directed anxiety searches for security and recognition. The individual driven by aggressive anxiety searches for power, that is to say total power. Power for him is either total or it turns into total impotence. He is thus incapable of love. He does not love his fellow-men, or his wife, or even himself. His capacity for affirmation exhausts itself in his affirmation of power, which derives its dynamism from the negation of impotence. Running amok in his quest for power, he never comes to a halt. No matter when death overtakes him, he is destined to die without ever reaching his goal.

Terror, which resembles a reflex action, is provoked by a sudden, altogether unexpected event, which momentarily creates the inescapable feeling of being threatened with imminent annihilation. The perilously confusing moment of terror, the state of paralysis, of speechlessness—all that is familiar. It is known, too, that nightmares have their strongest effect precisely because they begin or end with such terror effects.

Assuming this description of terror to be correct, how justified is it to use the expression 'terror regime?' Do the dictatorships really produce terror effects? Are they not rather creating unending fears? As it happens, fear very often begins dramatically, with an experience of terror. Such an experience leaves its traces even after the effect of surprise has subsided. But there is more to it. The matter is in fact far more complex. Obsessive fears would not become enduring and terror regimes could not maintain themselves for any length of time if man were not, above all, an anxious being. The psychological basis of the terror regime is *submission* to terror, and such submission, in turn, is produced and reproduced by anxiety. This can reach a point where the terrorized victims voluntarily do far more than the regime obliges them to do. To put it paradoxically—it is the anxiety of the ruled which shows the dictator the road to absolute power.

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The analysis of tyranny thus centres not on the tyrant and the oppressive apparatus of power, as one might be inclined to believe, but on the tyrant's frightened subjects, on anxious men who have already submitted and who, in a manner of speaking, entice the usurper into establishing his tyranny and render it increasingly totalitarian.

SOCIETIES wholly without authority have probably never existed. All the known civilizations had fairly complex and often sacral systems of hierarchical authority underpinned by an exactly graduated distribution of power and status. The system was all pervading. The established authority impinged on the life of the child from his birth and, with every new year of his life, its impact increased. Every aspect of social, family, and even the most intimate personal life was dominated by the hierarchical order. The most important consequence of the victory which every generation of parents thus won over their offspring was the desire which it stimulated in the new generation to emulate their parents or even fully to identify with them. In taking over the values of their elders, the young became the accomplices of the authority which oppressed them.

In varying forms and degrees of consciousness or unconsciousness, the individual internalizes the external authority by projecting it into his own being. The superiority of father and mother, the omnipotence of the gods, the evil power of the demons—all these settle, like victorious occupation armies, within the minds and souls of individuals brought up on authoritarian lines.

Every human being passes through several phases of more or less open and more or less violent resistance to authority and to everything else that appears as a threat to his own personality. There are at least two such phases in childhood and a more prolonged phase in the transitional stage of adolescence. The psychological and sociological significance of such resistance depends on the ultimate aim of the rebel. If he aims at achieving a position of superiority for himself, he is in fact seeking to acquire his inheritance prematurely—and that is an old, old story. If, on the contrary, he aims at eradicating superiority once and for all, he embarks on a venture of social and political significance. The abolition of authority is bound to pass beyond the realm of individual emancipation. Every overthrow of a potentate proves to the oppressed that rulers can be vanquished and that submission is not fatally inevitable.

The young or certain religious, ethnic, or social groups have on many occasions proclaimed that their own struggle against their oppressors was designed to achieve, not merely their own emancipation, but the establishment of universal freedom. They had no intention at all of usurping authority for themselves. Yet, when it came to the point, they hardly ever resisted the temptation for any length of time. Rebels in power are, as a rule, rather more authoritarian and, if conditions are favourable, far more despotic than the legitimate heirs of traditional

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authorities. Power as an institution often re-emerges only a short time after its defeat. All that changes are the rulers and, with them, their real or alleged objectives; they also modify retroactively the past so as to endow their pretensions with a semblance of legitimacy. In certain circumstances they even resort again to terror which, though its methods may change, retains its original function. The terrorized subjects, too, retain their old attitudes even though they may now include men who only recently exercised power themselves and who thus know all the secrets of terror.

This suggests the following conclusions:

(1) Every human being without exception has, from his early childhood onwards, personally experienced some form of terror and has submitted to it for shorter or longer periods. There is no human being who cannot be terrorized.

(2) All parents succeed effortlessly in imbuing their child with the firm conviction that they have both the ability and the right to exercise unlimited authority by means of command and prohibition. This explains why most people feel compelled to believe that the person in power is automatically superior and worthy of emulation and that it would thus be wrong, sinful, or criminal to oppose him. This very belief, however, also stimulates the desire in the oppressed to conquer power for themselves and so attain a position in which they can act arbitrarily without the risk of becoming sinful, guilty, or criminal.

(3) The inner contradictions in the relationship between the ruled and the rulers are most glaring in the conditions of a terrorist dictatorship. The dictator's constant threat or use of violence produces not only complete submission, but also secret doubts about his legitimacy. Side by side with the process of self-alienation, which drives the terrorized to disown themselves, they undergo an opposite process of self-segregation. Everyone creates within his innermost self a secret enclave, directed *against* the regime, in which he preserves the last hidden remnants of his personal freedom. This dual process turns man into a rebel without courage, forever plagued with a bad conscience, even though he submits unconditionally or indeed slavishly and does not lift a finger against the regime.

These contradictions in terms of individual psychology have their counterpart in similarly contradictory characteristics of the dictatorship.

(1) The totalitarian regime must proclaim over and over again that it enjoys the unanimous support of the entire people and that all its measures, all its commands and prohibitions, are expressions of the people's will. The regime, it is claimed, is the perfect, the ultimate, the only possible incarnation of the people, the nation, or the proletarian class; and the regime, in this context, means the monolithic party, which in turn means its—of course—unanimously elected leadership, which itself is identical with the infallible *Führer* or *vozhd*. This seemingly unbroken chain of identifications is supposed to prove that the entire

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party, the class, or the nation realizes its freedom, its dignity and its honour, through the exercise of the leader's totalitarian power.

(2) The regime itself is compelled to introduce exceptions into its doctrine of unanimity according to which the entire nation unhesitatingly and without pause or reservation, identifies itself with the leader. The regime itself deducts from the total two per cent said to be made up of inveterate opponents who secretly scheme in the service of the foreign enemy. Without the existence of secret opponents, continuing terror would lose its justification.

(3) The pitifully weak opponents must never be recognized as a political opposition. They must be exposed and annihilated as a gang of criminal traitors and murderers. It is also essential to present every new wave of purges and terror as the very last, giving promise of the imminent and final liquidation of the internal enemy. At the same time, and for the reasons mentioned above, the enemy must survive all his countless and allegedly final liquidations, thereby revealing a satanic penchant for resurrection. Sooner or later, every final campaign of repression turns out to have been merely the penultimate campaign.

HOW is it possible to uphold the paradoxical fiction that 98 per cent of the people, joined together by inviolable bonds of unity, are nevertheless in such mortal danger from the two per cent that only terror can save the nation from perdition? Even the most stupid and most cowardly would regard this proposition as ridiculous if it were not anchored in an axiom which no one dare question without becoming guilty of a capital crime.

This is the axiom which proclaims that truth is a Party matter. Only the regime, and that means the ruling party, determines who is a friend and who a foe. Objective facts are irrelevant. Objectivism is but a particularly vicious weapon in the hands of the enemy, a disguised form of treason. *Objectivity is the subjectivity of the traitor.*

Even the most incontrovertible facts and explanations prove nothing or, as the case may be, prove only what they are supposed to prove according to the Party truth of the moment. The GPU chief Yagoda is the sword of the revolution and its incorruptible defender, a model revolutionary since childhood. Then one day he ceases to be all these things. An enemy agent, he is the organizer of murder plots and treason, a man who throughout his life has systematically betrayed and harmed the Party. Or, to give another example, the ex-inmate of a fascist prison is, according to the arbitrary decision of the dictatorship, either the very model of an anti-fascist hero or, on the contrary, a man who has obviously had close contacts with the fascist police, the Gestapo for example, and who has always slavishly worked as its secret agent.

The tyranny achieves its strongest and most effective impact, more effective than that made by torture or the threat of death, by its manipulation of this central fiction, the constantly changing Party truth. The repeated changes and possibilities of further changes produce a

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state of *permanent anxiety,* which is, moreover, being nourished by well-founded fears and which is frequently, by means of organized violence, driven to its extreme, the total submission of the individual.

The basic factor here is anxiety which, unlike fear—as I pointed out above—is generated not by the realistically assessed danger of accurately perceived actions, but by a faulty and tendentiously distorted perception. Anxiety in these conditions—and this is what gives it its peculiar character—is being methodically engendered by a regime which forces everyone into a situation which *he is neither able nor allowed to perceive accurately.* The decisive accomplishment of the totalitarian dictatorship, in terms of individual psychology, is its creation of an all-pervading feeling of insecurity in every one of its subjects. Everything that a man knows of his wife, his father, his brother, his closest friend or his colleague, ceases to be true and turns into its opposite the moment the dictatorship, i.e. its police, says so. The incredible, indeed the impossible, is transformed into truth. The innocent confesses that his whole life has been one long charade, that his truth was a lie, his ay a nay, and that the house he built was a mere façade for his lifelong work of destruction.

Dr Knock, the rapacious comedy figure created by Jules Romains, defined the healthy man as one whom medical negligence or want of knowledge enables to ignore his illness. Healthy men, according to the mercenary Dr Knock, do not exist. By analogy, one might define the innocent man under a totalitarian regime as one whom the negligence or complicity of the police or the generosity of the dictator temporarily relieves of the necessity to realize his guilt, to confess it and atone for it.

Only the actual culprits, the active enemies of the regime, enjoy the advantages derived from the experience of fear. Fear enables them to take rational measures of precaution and to make use of either opportunist ruses or the illegal methods of camouflage. All others are condemned to live in a state of anxiety which they must moreover hide, because anxiety is as suspect as it is unavoidable.

It is important to understand that this anxiety is engendered, not by threats of imprisonment, of deportation or death, but by the *abdication* of the human personality which the regime enforces. In these conditions the individual is temporarily compelled to go on living without a sense of personal value. He loses this vital sense as soon as he resigns himself to the fact that his own observations, experiences and insights may suddenly lose their worth or even become dangerous errors if and when ' those above ' so decide. In such an event the wife will admit that her husband has always been a traitor, conspirator and wrecker, and she will accuse herself of lack of vigilance. This almost total loss of a sense of personal value is brought about, on the one hand, by the enforced predominance of the feeling of insecurity and, on the other, by the destruction of all normally secure and security-generating personal bonds. The regime compels its subjects to *demonstrate their loyalty by means of betrayal,* especially the betrayal of their nearest and dearest.

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> If you trust yourself, your eyes, your ears, your own experiences and the lessons learnt from them, if you trust your family and your friends rather than the state and its institutions, then you are—at least objectively—an enemy. If you deny that you are an enemy, your very denial reflects your disbelief in the state and thus your opposition and deadly hostility. You must confess this unreservedly so as to reveal your guilt and possibly also your penitence. A refusal to do so would amount to an act of sabotage and of open rebellion against the state order. Moreover, it will not suffice merely to admit your own guilt. You might do so for the sole purpose of shielding your fellow-conspirators. You must therefore also name your accomplices and denounce their crimes.

This passage illustrates another psychological effect which totalitarian terror can achieve and which in fact it did achieve during several years of Stalin's reign. It turned the great majority of this vast country's citizens into potential traitors and transformed their family relationships and bonds of friendship into conspiracies. Every one of them knew that if he were required to do so he would break or abuse or misrepresent every single trust.

It was this boundless humiliation, in conjunction with the use of brutal or refined forms of violence, which secured the regime its unlimited power over its subjects. Hardly anyone had committed the crimes to which he confessed, but none had remained innocent.

The essence of this strange drama is the encounter or, rather, the confluence of two vast anxieties—the dictator's aggressive anxiety, which becomes the more haunting the greater the number of real or alleged opponents he has liquidated, and the anxiety of the oppressed. In their joint effect, these two anxieties produce a feeling of boundless insecurity from which neither the rulers nor the ruled can escape.

AGGRESSIVE anxiety, which produces the will to power, drives its subject to develop a paranoic relationship to the outside world and to himself. He invariably betrays this in his attitude to his own ends, including, for instance, the measure of power already achieved. Compelled steadily to expand and perfect his power, he arrives eventually at a point where he can safeguard himself and his achievements only by the acquisition of *total* power. This compulsive urge is another factor which helps to explain the insoluble contradiction which, as we have seen, is one of the distinctive features of the totalitarian dictatorship. On the one hand, the regime claims to enjoy universal support, to stand as firm as a rock, destined to last a thousand years; on the other hand, it claims to be in mortal danger because a tiny minority or a single individual harbours doubts, because someone allegedly dared ask what might happen after the death of the leader, or because another one discovered, or conceivably might discover, certain facts about the dictator's past or that of his accomplices which do not tally fully with the authorized biographical legend. In short, the more

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all-embracing and oppressive dictatorial power grows, all the more sensitive does it become to even the most trifling matters which might throw the least doubt on its perfection.

This blatant contradiction is at the root of the attitudes which the Stalinists used to denounce as duplicity. Duplicity was the charge made against all those suspected of lacking in total loyalty or destined to be liquidated for any other reason. As it happens, duplicity was the only offence which, psychologically, was almost invariably justified. By imposing a feeling of ubiquitous insecurity, the totalitarian dictatorship compels each of its subjects to disguise himself and to play whatever role the tragic farce requires him to play. In order to protect himself, his family and his friends against an otherwise certain disaster, everyone avoids saying things which the regime might not find agreeable. It is thus in the nature of the dissembler or, let us say, it has become his second nature to think and speak on two different levels. He is a keen yes-man who listens attentively to the propagandists, for ever on the look out for a new slogan or another change of line and profoundly concerned to prevent his neighbours or wartime comrades from outdoing him in the promptness of their response to the latest call for displays of enthusiasm or of hatred. Yet he and all his fellow-subjects of the regime remain, at the same time, faithful to the secrets of their personal inner enclaves. They are thus incurable double-dealers, irresistibly infected by the prevailing atmosphere of *social deception*. Their enthusiasm for the regime resembles the passion grudgingly displayed by a frigid prostitute.

Whether they were arrested or deported, condemned by administrative procedure or selected for execution, all the victims had in fact become culpable long before they fell into the hands of the GPU or NKVD or stood trial in court. They had all been guilty of duplicity. Duplicity had for years fashioned their social and political life, and this was one of the reasons why so many of them were ready to confess to almost anything, often even before their power of resistance had been broken by mental and physical torture. This remains valid although the factual content of their confessions was almost invariably false, a stereotype piece of fiction which the GPU, for lack of imagination, produced over and over again and which it forced its victims to reproduce.

UNLESS he feels sure about his own nature, man neither acquires nor retains a sense of identity. The state of permanent anxiety and the ceaseless fears engendered by the totalitarian regime undermine his certainties about his own nature to the extent that their assault on his sense of personal value and his feeling of security is successful. Deprived of his certainty about his own nature, man threatens to sink into the bottomless abyss. He ceases to be responsible for himself and so becomes capable of the most horrible deeds.

To what extent could this be said to apply to the defendants in the

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Moscow trials? In *The Great Terror,* Robert Conquest gives a most valuable and revealing summary of the strange play of questions and answers in which the word-perfect defendants and the public prosecutor all recite their prescribed parts. Did the distinguished victims of these trials, did Zinovev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Radek, Bukharin, Rakovski, Rykov and the others behave like men who had lost every kind of certainty? Humiliated beyond endurance and deprived of their true identity, had they succumbed to the nostalgia for extinction? It seems more plausible to assume that each of them believed for a time that there were reasons for hoping that his own life might be spared. Even so, there can be no doubt that they had all lost the ground from underneath their feet before the trials started and probably even before their arrest and pre-trial interrogations. All their certainties had become negative. Year after year they had denied themselves and their deepest convictions. Repetitive capitulationists, they had devalued themselves in their own eyes until, in the end, they reached the ultimate nadir of duplicity. The rest was silence. Having spoken with the tongue of the enemy, all that remained to them was the stillness of the dead. The Moscow trials demonstrated *ad oculos auresque* that it is possible to deprive men of their innermost substance and to make them behave as if they had started out, right from the beginning, with a wholly different, monstrously vicious substance.

Still, even these spectacles produced their occasional surprises. The elaboration of the minutely specified fiction overreached itself. Instead of veiling, duplicity suddenly unveiled. It did so when Krestinski in open court first withdrew all his earlier confessions and then, at a subsequent session, again withdrew his denials; it did so when Rykov eagerly indicted himself for wholesale, all-embracing guilt, but persisted in denying the detailed charges; it did so, most patently of all, in the case of Bukharin. This erstwhile theoretician of Bolshevism managed to alter the part which he was forced to play and which as a whole he had accepted until it resembled the hero's role in one of Pirandello's tragi-comedies in which the public prosecutor, against his will, is driven to extemporize and here and there to give way, thereby exposing himself in all his ignominy.

Nobody in the valley of death, facing the immeasurable loss of being and meaning, has perhaps ever mustered as much courage as Bukharin displayed in seeing the game against an all-powerful gang of murderers right through to the end, even though he knew it to be a hopeless game, lost before it had begun.

The daily trial reports in the Soviet press left no room for doubt that Bukharin, in this game between the lamb and the wolves, exposed Stalin's gruesome comedy of justice to all who had ears to hear and eyes to see. Yet, conditioned as they were by the law of duplicity, the Soviet readers of these reports buried the truth, like a deadly secret, in their innermost selves and proceeded to join in the obligatory choruses, re-echoing in the streets, in factory meetings or wherever people were

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made to assemble: 'Hang them, kill them, death to the poisonous rabble!'

AND the readers of these trial reports, those who were beyond the reach of the GPU, how did they react? The verbatim protocols of the trials, it will be remembered, were translated into numerous languages and sold all over the world at a low price. What did people in the West think? Were they prepared to accept as gospel truth the confessions of men who never once tried to explain, let alone justify, their crimes? Did the public in the West believe the words of defendants who failed to establish any kind of connexion between their deeds and their lifelong records, defendants who never once uttered a single word of criticism against the regime?

There was nothing in the protocols to explain, for instance, why old Bolsheviks, most of them in leading positions and many of them Jews, should have organized conspiracies on the order of the Jew Leon Trotsky, with the aim of delivering the Soviet Union into the hands of Adolf Hitler and Rudolf Hess. Yet this delirious madness was accepted as credible, not only by faithful communists, but by countless bourgeois journalists, writers, philosophers, diplomats, ministers of religion of all denominations and numerous other contemporaries who repeatedly maintained that the Moscow trials had been held in pursuit of justice and had ended in doing justice.

In the light of everything said above on the terror regime, its ultimate success in moulding its subjects like clay becomes understandable. But while it explains why they are driven to do literally anything, even make suicidal confessions as soon as they fall into the hands of the totalitarian police, it fails to provide an explanation for the really disturbing phenomenon of this century, the reaction of the outside world. How was it possible for so many in the free world to accept, or even to support, this monstrous attack on human reason, this self-transformation of sense into non-sense?

There is no easy answer to this question. It seems to require more than one explanation. Hitler once uttered a really important truth when he said that the bigger the lie the greater its chances of being believed. An incredible assertion or news item is thus accepted as true, not in spite of, but *because of* its inherent absurdity. Common sense demands that a liar who wants to guard himself against immediate exposure must present his lies as plausibly as possible or, at any rate, avoid making altogether incredible statements. Yet the propaganda of the dictators has invariably followed Hitler's precept of swamping the world with lies which owe their success to their factual improbability and their psychological incredibility.

'What? A trial of the members of Lenin's Politbureau? Of the founder of the Red Army, of the architects of victory in the civil war? All of them charged with treason? With a conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet regime so as to deliver their country helplessly into the hands of

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the enemy? Surely only a madman would risk making such fantastic accusations and expect them to be believed if they were not actually true, all too horribly true and could not be proved in every detail!' Such was the reasoning of many who first hesitated but who later, despite lingering misgivings, decided to accept this accumulation of nightmarish absurdities as, first, not altogether impossible and, eventually, as probable. They did so because they thought it simply inconceivable that anyone would be capable of telling such lies in the hearing of the entire world and of turning his victims, before the eyes of witnesses, into criminals bent on their own destruction.

That is part of the explanation, but there were other factors which played a part in convincing many that the message from Moscow must after all be true. One of these factors was essentially antithetic in character. The dictators—first Mussolini and then Hitler and Stalin—succeeded in forcing many of their contemporaries into the strait-jacket of a false alternative. 'He who utters a single word of criticism against Stalin or the trials or against anything concerning the Soviet Union', it was said, 'is *objectively* siding with fascism; whether he wants it or not, he becomes an accomplice of Hitler and of the fascist thugs in the Spanish civil war.' Hitler and his supporters, of course, applied identical pressures for the identical purpose of silencing the critics of their crimes.

In the 1930s this political anaesthetic lulled not only communists and their sympathizers, but also many staunchly anti-fascist liberals. They deliberately shut their eyes to everything except the misdeeds of fascism because any diversion of attention from this focus could only have aided Hitler. This anaesthetic effect, produced in the name of an intransigent anti-fascism, tended to make people oddly cross-eyed. Liberals, for instance, rightly denounced the 'elections' in Hitler's Germany as a sorry farce, a vicious parody of democracy in which the people had no choice but to endorse the single candidate pre-selected by the nazis. Yet these same liberals accepted the identical parody staged in the Soviet Union, and praised it as an instance of true democracy. They inveighed against the censorship and the controlled press in the fascist countries, but believed and maintained readily that the exclusively Stalinist propaganda in the Soviet press reflected the true and unshakeable convictions of its editors and contributors—just as they believed that 98 per cent of the Soviet electorate were all burning to register their vote for the single pre-selected 'candidate'.

As recently as 1953 Jean-Paul Sartre explained in a Paris newspaper, after his first visit to Russia, that there *could* be no party in the Soviet Union other than the communists because no *reasonable* person in the USSR could possibly differ from the CPSU or *wish* to pursue different policies. Three years before the official start of destalinization, Sartre also confirmed of his own free will—he never carried a Party card—that all Soviet citizens supported Stalin's Party and leadership unanimously and from deepest conviction. No Soviet citizen—this critical philosopher added—could wish to criticize even a single Party

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measure for the simple reason that all the Party's measures were *invariably* right. The Party was *always* right. Sartre had formulated a philosophical justification of the Moscow trials and the Stalinist crimes in general even before the publication of this article. In the same spirit he sharply condemned the publication of all reports on the real state of affairs in the Soviet Union, for instance the concentration camps, and of every criticism of the Soviet regime. Such revelations, he then argued, were bound to mislead the proletariat in the capitalist countries and 'distress the workers of the Paris suburb Boulogne-Billancourt'.

Yet this renowned writer and philosopher who tends to treat political problems melodramatically and aggressively and at times foolishly is only one of many intellectuals who (rightly) insist on unrestricted freedom for themselves and for their work but who simultaneously act as the ardent propagandists of a dictatorship which deprives others—not, of course, themselves—of every freedom, including the freedom to say that they have been deprived of freedom.

This widespread and undoubtedly *over-determined* attitude has to be explained partly by the almost universal *lack of realistic imagination* and partly by the frightening impact of *indifference*. The inability to develop a realistic image of a situation in which one believes one will never find oneself, as well as the tendency to divert attention from matters which are not one's immediate concern but which could plague one's consciousness and one's conscience—both these phenomena appear to correspond to the requirements of common sense and of what is frequently described as healthy egoism. Yet in actual fact both are the products of *anticipatory* anxiety. Both are a form of cowardice which need not reveal itself as such because it happens to be favoured by certain socio-historical trends. It is easy enough to blind oneself to conditions which would make it a duty to fight against evil, so long as they have to be endured only by many of one's innocent contemporaries but not by oneself.

I ascribe such attitudes to *anticipatory* anxiety because the misinterpretation or ignoring of conditions in these cases merely hides the desire to protect oneself against the misfortune suffered by others. Behind it all there lurks an element of magical faith amounting to the belief that one will oneself escape misfortune just because others were caught up in it.

The dictatorships have always counted on this seemingly reasonable form of cowardice and have exploited it to the hilt. Every terrorist measure has been accompanied by assurances to those not immediately affected by it that they, the select band of the virtuous, need have no fear for their own future. Such assurances are the start of what the Hungarian dictator Rakosi was fond of describing as 'salami tactics'. The same idea was, however, expressed rather earlier in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, which advised those bent on the complete subjugation or annihilation of the defeated to proceed by stages. They should not demand too much in any one of these stages so as to prevent the victim

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from realizing that he has nothing further to lose and from being driven into rebellion out of despair.

Terrorization by carefully measured doses is the method employed by every dictatorship to achieve its subjects' silent complicity. The dictators always took care to leave sufficiently numerous groups of people in the belief that they would be able to save their own skins if they only, in a demonstrative manner, turned their backs on those who, at the given moment, were the chosen victims of the oppressor.

THERE remains the question whether these two factors—the lack of realistic imagination and the kind of indifference which, fed by anticipatory anxiety, encourages men's dissociation from their weak and imperilled fellow-men—provide a sufficient explanation for the long-lasting hibernation of conscience. Do these factors plausibly explain why the people of the free world, for many years on end, were prepared to swallow the most preposterous accusations made by the totalitarian powers for the purpose of ruining or murdering millions of innocent victims? Do these factors alone explain why the same credulous people dismissed as atrocity stories and vicious slanders all the truthful accounts of Hitler's concentration and death camps, of the nazis' insane hatred of the Jews and their Final Solution of genocide? Or why other equally credulous people refused to listen to the facts about the Moscow trials, about the mass deportations and starvation camps in the communist fatherland of the toilers of the world?

Countless people had the chance of choosing freely between the murderous lies of the tyrants and the cries of their victims or the evidence provided by the victims' small band of champions. Most of them chose the lies. Why? Because they were conformists? Because the gigantic propaganda apparatus of the dictatorships had the aura of exclusive legitimacy? Yes, because they were conformists and because of one or another reason discussed above. Yet although these explanations are often correct, they are not sufficient. There were still other motives at work 35 years ago, and they are still at work today—in those intellectuals from highly industrialized countries, for instance, who glorify Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh and their like. They do so because they believe that in this way alone can they champion the cause of freedom, human dignity and the welfare of the working people. And they go on believing it, despite the official revelations which, in the course of destalinization, formally confirmed the truth of everything that until 1956 had been repeatedly exposed by 'Trotskyite bandits', 'social fascists', and 'hyenas with typewriters in the service of Wall Street and the CIA'.

'When the war came'—a passage in *Dr Zhivago* reads—'its real terrors were . . . blessings compared to the inhuman power of the lie'. The urge to uphold the power of the lie by one means or another, either by concealing the tyrannical fiction or by defending or

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even glorifying it, stems in part at least from the desire to conform to the ' iron law of history ', to the requirements of the revolution and of a wholly new social order. This is a species of *futuristic conformism* even though it behaves as if it were an emanation of the Holy Ghost of history. This secular messianic faith cannot, moreover, sustain itself without a Messiah and without an apocalypse. The Messiah used to be called Stalin; nowadays he is called Mao or Che Guevara or Ho Chi Minh. As to the apocalypse—futuristic conformists not merely refuse to regard it as an argument against tyranny, they positively welcome it as evidence for the proposition that the use of violence in the service of tyranny fulfils its function as the ' midwife of history '.

The totalitarian terror regime of the twentieth century is as inexhaustible a theme as the variations of anxiety and of its forms of expression. It is the task of the historically-oriented psychologist to examine in particular all those phenomena which emerge from the interplay of individual motives, actions and reactions, on the one hand, and social conditions, social needs and compulsive social pressures, on the other. For this purpose the paradigmatic significance of the Moscow trials cannot be surpassed. They provide striking insights into the effects and counter-effects of anxieties, especially aggressive anxiety, and of all forms of compulsion. They illuminate the interaction between a fiction raised to the status of official dogma and a truth humbled to the point of self-denial. They illustrate the psychological law which compels men to give themselves away, particularly at moments when they try to hide the truth about themselves. For instance, the grotesquely false charges of the Moscow trials against leading communists were unmistakable pointers to the actual truth, albeit inversely projected truth. The accusations concerning the defendants' murder plots and their schemes to sabotage industry, agriculture, supplies and transport served to reveal the truth about the murders actually committed or about to be committed on Stalin's orders and about the disastrous failures and permanent crises in all branches of the economy which were the exclusive responsibility of the all-powerful regime. The trials thus unmasked the prosecutors while revealing little more about the defendants than the appalling misery of men who had been robbed of their past and who were to be exiled from the present into the void.

Inspired by a comparable psychological urge, Hitler's propaganda revealed from the very beginning that the nazis were determined to conquer the very world power which they ascribed to the secret designs of ' World Jewry '. The stereotype repetition of their charge that the Jews planned to subjugate, dishonour and, ultimately, annihilate all Aryans both veiled and unveiled the preparations which the exterminators were making for Auschwitz and Treblinka. But who wanted to know?

Freud's mechanism of repression is of trifling significance compared to man's faculty to remain unaware from the outset. Anxiety, more

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often egotism, and, most frequently, indifference induce men to remain deaf to ear-splitting cries, to remain blind to what catches the eye, and to remain impervious to what challenges their conscience. Without this special faculty, which is of the highest significance for individual as well as social psychology, it would be very much harder, if not altogether impossible, to set up dictatorships.

This conclusion, however, is neither new nor unknown. It has been men's experience since time immemorial that none is so deaf as he who does not want to hear.

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KOESTLER REVISITED

Otto Ulc

> *A remarkable novel exists, known all over the world except in our country, the novel* Darkness at Noon *by Arthur Koestler, which accurately describes the mechanism of Soviet trials in the second half of the thirties, the logic of the interrogators, the judges, the prosecutors and the accused who themselves become collaborators of the investigation and prosecution. . . . The most tragic thing is that a decade later these events repeated themselves with the force of a natural law.* (*Czech historian Jaroslav Opat,* Reporter, *Prague, no.* 15, 1968.)

WHAT were the techniques employed in transforming an innocent man into an automaton and a self-accuser before the Stalinist court? During its short interval of freedom Czechoslovakia was the only communist country to examine past malpractices with some candour. Recent new sources of relevant information range from the reminiscences of survivors to scholarly contributions in various fields.[1]

Before proceeding to the heart of the matter it will be useful to describe the generally applicable pattern of Stalinist witch-hunts, which the Czech historian Karel Kaplan has described as 'The Iron Logic of Trial'.[2] The Party, the security apparatus and the judiciary form an unholy trinity, though their respective powers of action and especially of initiative are not equal. One would rather liken the Party to a producer, the security apparatus to a director, and the judiciary to a supporting actor in the drama. The drama itself consists of three acts.

Act I: The leadership mounts a propaganda campaign against one of the various 'isms'—Trotskyism, revisionism, bourgeois nationalism and the like. At first the heresy is viewed as an international phenomenon, and dealt with in purely general terms. The drive against this still anonymous target is, however, sufficient to mobilize the public, to arouse its feelings and hostility in the matter and to alert the security forces. Gradually the campaign becomes more specific. Certain trends within the Party and society are singled out. This is followed by the identification of certain groups and, finally, by the disclosure of names. A named individual is expected to exercise self-criticism and confess appropriate errors. Once this has been done, an even greater degree of self-criticism is demanded. At the same time, organized pressure from

[1] Virtually all Czechoslovak newspapers touched on the subject. Among the journals the most important in this respect are *Literarni Listy*, published by the Writers' Union, and *Reporter*, published by the Journalists' Union. It should perhaps be added that this writer was a member of the Czechoslovak judiciary during the ill-famed fifties. As a civil law judge, however, his access to the 'political calendar' was both limited and totally unauthorized. Only once did he see torture chambers and that was in the cellar of the secret police building, where he had been invited to a table-tennis match.

[2] Karel Kaplan, *Zivot Strany*, no. 29, 27 November 1968.

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below, especially from the lower echelons of the Party, develops, reassuring the leadership of an unceasing fight against the 'ism' in question and insisting on the dismissal and trial of its protagonists.

With the transition from the general to the specific the curtain falls.

Act II: Erroneous political views are reinterpreted as illegal ones, and the comrades originally criticized for their ideological shortcomings are declared enemies of the people, traitors, spies and saboteurs. With this indictment the Party hands the torch over to the security apparatus for further action. Given the infallibility of the Party, it naturally follows that no person may be released or acquitted. Moreover, because condemnation preceded the collection of any—even false—evidence, it is left to the victim himself to prepare the first draft of the indictment. This he does by writing down his curriculum vitae. It should be added at this point that the security apparatus—the director—acquires a momentum of its own, the scale of which the Party—the producer—is unable to grasp or curb.

Act III: The pre-trial period ends when the security apparatus turns the processed file and the processed prisoner over to the court. The trial consists only of a recitation of the scenario which the defendant has learnt by heart. The more important the show, the more spectacular are the charges and self-accusations. The actors, insulted and humiliated by the court and deserted by their defence lawyers, adhere scrupulously to the script. Before the pronouncement of the verdict—decided beforehand by the Party—the focus of the drama gradually shifts back to the political arena. A nation-wide campaign is waged demanding the most severe punishment for the accused and, after this has been done, a demonstration of public gratitude follows. The trial is likely to contain the seed of other trials; the drama will then begin again at Act I. But, as Kaplan reminds us, the producers do not anticipate the consequences of the directors' zeal, which may, and occasionally did, bring the former on to the stage in the role of doomed actors before the theatrical season was over.

IT is not, and may never be, known how important Party discipline was in conditioning the submissive attitudes of the accused in the great purges in the USSR. The evidence available suggests that in the case of their counterparts in Czechoslovakia obedience to the Party command was certainly not the only, and perhaps not even the most important, reason for their docility before the court.

The mark left by lifelong identification with the Party was, of course, a considerable one. Professor Eduard Goldstücker, who was a victim of Stalinism in the fifties and who has been in exile in Great Britain since the August 1968 invasion, described the dilemma thus:

> He who has not lived through it cannot fully imagine the shock at the moment you realize that the highest authority in your life has committed you for trial as a criminal. Since you have placed all

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> your trust in this authority, even in matters you were unable to understand . . . , at the moment of your arrest you have to search your conscience to see whether in fact there might be some guilt in your past, even if, subjectively, you know that this is not the case. You subordinated your capacity for reasoning to the higher wisdom of the Party a long time ago, and you continue in this way even when dealt such a crushing blow. All this is a logical outcome of the substitution of faith for reason.[3]

Defiance meant not only an end to the glimmer of hope of saving one's life, but also a betrayal of the *raison d'être* of one's whole existence. All that remained was self-sacrifice. Artur London, one of the three defendants in the Slansky trial not to be executed, wrote:

> I am convinced that had I resisted it would have generated the same outcry and discussion about my name as was the case with Krestinski and Kostov, and it would have provoked the same comments in the world communist press about my criminal stand. This would have made me one of those who, up to the very last moment on the scaffold, spat at the Party, attempting to discredit it in the eyes of world public opinion. There was no way out other than to accept, in the same way that Lenin's old comrades and the accused in Budapest and Sofia had accepted . . . and to play one's part in the trial and to seal one's condemnation.[4]

It should be added, however, that London had resisted and had been tortured for a considerable length of time before he convinced himself of the inevitability of the above stand. A defendant who was willing to confess solely out of dedication to the Party and who died on the scaffold with words of praise for everything the Party had done was very rare indeed.[5]

Party representatives, including Politbureau members like Karol Bacilek, the Minister of Security, visited their comrades in prison and admonished them to play the role expected of them. The degree of this pressure varied from person to person and was not necessarily brought to bear through ideological persuasion. A rather crude command brought the victim face to face with a situation from which there was no escape: If you don't confess, but plead innocent, you will thereby be violating the commands of the Party, which in itself constitutes a crime sufficient to dispose of you. London quotes his interrogator:

> You cannot count on any help. You have been a member of the Party for a long time and so I implore you to help the Soviet Union and our Party. . . . Either make up your mind to confess fully, so that you can expiate yourself, or you'll hang as an obstinate enemy of the Soviet Union and of our Party.[6]

[3] Eduard Goldstücker, *Literarni Listy*, no. 14, 30 May 1968.
[4] Artur London, *Reporter*, no. 3, 23 January 1969; cf. also Artur London, *L'Aveu* (Paris, Gallimard, 1969).
[5] Anna Tuckova, *Reporter*, no. 22, 1968.
[6] London, *Reporter*, no. 3, 23 January 1969.

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The Czechoslovak comrades selected for the show trials did not appear to exhibit the self-abnegating docility characteristic of Rubashov, the main character in Koestler's novel. To them the infallibility of the Party was not an invincible premise, and personal integrity was not an obsolete bourgeois sentiment which could be renounced in the interests of the Party. Confession was not regarded as a means of expiating either the sins of the Party or the crimes actually committed by the individual though not introduced at the trial. Rudolf Slansky himself—a villain in his own right—resisted his interrogators courageously and chose suicide rather than public disgrace, and almost succeeded in the attempt.[7] According to Eugen Loebl, another of Slansky's partners in misfortune, the preservation of life had little meaning for defendants who were being tortured.[8] In the long run, however, their resistance was broken, and compliance replaced defiance to such a degree that Slansky, for example, did not dare to divulge during his farewell meeting with his wife that these were his last hours before execution.[9]

The promise of extenuating circumstances, which was rarely kept, was held out to the defendants in exchange for evidence which would incriminate their comrades. This approach was quite successful for at least two reasons: First, a person is more inclined to doubt the innocence of even his closest friend than he is to doubt his own. Second, because of the need for mutual accusations among the actors involved, the authors of the scenario used the tactic known as the 'theory of amalgam'. This called for the formation of a conspiratorial group by individuals known, or at least presumed, to be on not too cordial terms with each other. Thus, rivals and antagonists such as Vlado Clementis and Artur London in the Foreign Ministry and Karel Svab and Bedrich Reicin in the security apparatus were chosen.[10]

A person with a strong feeling of guilt (unrelated to the crimes for which he was charged—e.g. Clementis and his criticism of the nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939) offered less resistance to the interrogator, who attempted to magnify and universalize this guilt vis-à-vis society as a whole. By this means successful results were obtained, not only with communists but also, and perhaps more profoundly, with people who were deeply religious.[11]

Neither appeals to obey the Party nor the perversion of one's guilt were sufficient, however, and a variety of more harrowing methods were also employed. Both dedicated Bolsheviks and anti-communists underwent a sequence of similar torments before they were turned into the right kind of robots required by the scenario.

[7] Tuckova, op. cit.; cf. *Reporter*, no. 12, 1968.

[8] Eugen Loebl, *Svedectvo o procese* ('Report on a Trial'), (Bratislava, Vydavatelstvo politickej literatury, 1968), pp. 37 ff. Published in English under the title *Sentenced and Tried* (London, 1969).

[9] Josefa Slanska, *Literarni Noviny*, no. 13, 23 May 1968, cf. *Reporter*, no. 13, 1968.

[10] Stanislav Budin, *Reporter*, no. 15, 1968.

[11] Ivo Pondelicek, *Literarni Listy*, no. 20, 11 July 1968.

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THE Czechoslovak secret police (the STB) operated on the basis that the release of a prisoner was damaging to its reputation. Hence, everyone had to confess and, since most of the victims were innocent, the guilt had to be invented.[12] As one former STB interrogator has stated, 'Soviet advisers taught us that the detainee was our greatest asset [a rather odd paraphrase of Gorki's dictum about man being the greatest treasure]. . . . An ingenious enemy does not leave any incriminating evidence behind, and therefore he must be forced to confess.'[13]

The degree of the prisoners' resistance varied greatly of course. On the whole, highly intelligent and adaptable individuals were the most difficult to break, in contrast to those people who had been compromised in either their political or private life. If a victim were familiar with the Stalinist techniques used in the USSR in the thirties, then this would condition his responses. The knowledgeable, and military men in particular, refused to communicate with their captors even under torture, aware that every word they uttered would be used against them. On the other hand, people like Clementis and Josef Frank (another member of the Slansky 'conspiracy') tried hard to reason with their interrogators and to explain what appeared to them as nothing but a tragic misunderstanding.[14] After remarks such as 'I'll have you beaten up until blood spurts from every part of your body',[15] they eventually realized the futility of their efforts.

As stated earlier, because of the lack of evidence the victim was made to complete a detailed autobiography, with heavy emphasis on Bolshevik self-criticism if he were a Party member. The STB's task was then confined to supervising this work, making editorial changes and doing a great deal of rewriting until a final version of the indictment was arrived at which the victim would identify with, memorize and recite to the court.[16] Even with defendants who were fully co-operative, this was an arduous and time-consuming business. The drafts had to be submitted to Soviet advisers and often also to the Party leadership for comments. The manuscript passed back and forth and numerous changes were made until it fitted the basic scenario prepared by the Party and synchronized with the drafts of other conspirators. The material had to be translated into Russian for the advisers and their comments were then translated into Czech, and all this occasionally resulted in linguistic confusion. Meticulous supervision of the prisoner's progress in memorizing the final script and frequent last-minute editorial changes added to the length of the pre-trial period.

The majority of prisoners, however, were not sufficiently co-operative, prompting the STB to resort to other measures. As well as

[12] Karel Kaplan, *Nova Mysl*, no 7, July 1968, pp. 935–36.
[13] Tuckova, op. cit.
[14] *Svedectvi* (Paris), no 28, Spring 1966, p. 369; cf. Pondelicek, op. cit.
[15] Zdenek Eis, *Reporter*, no. 32, 1968.
[16] Lobel, op. cit., p. 33; Otomar Bocek, *Reporter*, no. 15, 1968; Tuckova, op. cit.

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more drastic methods, 'non-violent measures' were employed, like threatening the members of the prisoner's family, dismissing them from their jobs, evicting them from their homes (a standard practice anyway), or arresting them. It was not uncommon for a wife to be arrested and put in a cell next to her recalcitrant husband, who was then informed that his wife would be subjected to the same forms of torture as he.[17] The interrogators also offered to make 'deals', such as offering the prisoner his life or a reduced sentence in return for his implicating a third person. It will come as no surprise that the 'Bolshevik word of honour' was not always kept.[18]

Plain, brutal violence was neither the most frequent nor the most effective form of torture. For one thing the STB could not afford for a person destined for a show trial to die while in its custody. The more urgent the case the greater the beating, but this was not a fixed rule as the investigators were anxious to speed up all cases for prompt delivery to the court. The STB organized a 'socialist' competition for its officers, and a participant in such a contest with an eye on promotion and other benefits had no inhibitions about beating the prisoner more severely than was officially permitted.[19]

During the terror of the fifties the STB was allowed to keep 'personal prisoners', and their lot was particularly unpleasant. Seasoned inmates of nazi concentration camps have stated that the treatment they later received from the STB was far worse.[20] In addition to beatings, usually with a rubber truncheon—known as a 'woman's dream' in the lecherous language of the STB—the prisoners experienced tortures such as ice cold showers, crushing of genitals and having their head wrapped in a wet towel which, when it dried and shrank, caused considerable pain, etc.[21]

THESE methods, it will be readily agreed, lacked subtlety and were more effective in destroying the body than the mind. The destruction of a person's identity—like some Western psychologists, the Czechs call it menticide—was also attempted, aiming to make the victim lose all awareness of his environment and, subsequently, of himself. The victim became convinced of his guilt and felt as misplaced in the world as would a sane person among lunatics, who, incidentally, were often paired in the cells with healthy inmates.[22]

With disorientation as one of the main objectives, blindfolds were a *sine qua non* of STB paraphernalia. Bolshevik and ex-capitalist alike

[17] Jiri Masek, *Literarni Listy*, no. 25, 15 August 1968; London, op. cit.; Jan Benes, *Lidova Demokracie*, 31 March 1968.
[18] Frantisek Faltys, *Reporter*, no. 19, 1968; Vladimir Vesely, ibid.
[19] Tuckova, op. cit.; Vaclav Vrabec, *Reporter*, no. 3, 1968.
[20] *Svedectvi*, op. cit., p. 368.
[21] Loebl, op. cit., pp. 39 ff.; London, op. cit.; *Lidova Demokracie*, 30 April 1968; *Zemedelske Noviny*, 22 December 1968; Pondelicek, op. cit.; *Lidova Demokracie*, 29 December 1968.
[22] Vesely, op. cit.

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were blindfolded and, as if being kidnapped, were thrown into a car and driven along a mysterious route for several hours to confuse them as to their whereabouts. What might seem like a small Slovak town was in fact still the Prague suburb of Dejvice. Ignorant of his location, the captive would then experience disorientation in time. Meals would be brought to the windowless cell at irregular intervals, and soon the ability to judge time would deteriorate or would be lost completely.

Solitary confinement added isolation to disorientation. For what seemed like an eternity there was no contact with other human beings. The conditions were thus established for the development of a so-called 'detention neurosis'. According to the Czech psychologist Ivo Pondelicek [23] the prisoner passes through three stages. First, there is a short period of considerable energy. Under the impact of both fear and hope the prisoner sleeps little, refuses to eat and takes great trouble over both his personal appearance and the appearance of his cell. Then fatigue starts to build up, and after about three weeks he begins to realize the futility of what he is doing. Hyperactivity gradually melts into total withdrawal. The prisoner neglects himself, ignores table manners and develops hallucinations and fantasies. He craves only one thing: conversation, i.e. he wants to be interrogated.

Once this point is reached the STB hurriedly, before insanity sets in, arranges his first interrogation. The interrogator provides little comfort, however. Temporary contact with another human being is offset by the interrogator's efforts to increase the prisoner's feeling of helplessness. He confronts him with the incriminating evidence of his friends and the statements of disavowal made by his family. Betrayed by all, including the Party if he is a communist, the victim is assured that no hope remains; not even at his trial, where precautions have been taken to silence him should he depart from the prescribed text.[24] Yet, despite all the unpleasant features of the interrogation, once back in solitary confinement he longs for the next meeting.

At the same time other measures are applied to aggravate the victim's feeling of isolation. One of these is hunger. A case was reported of a man who lost nearly 90 lbs. in three and a half months. Slansky's brother, Richard, lost nearly 40 lbs. in his first month of imprisonment, prompting the interrogator to prick a sharp pencil into his forehead to check how much fat was left.[25]

The Czechoslovak Stalinists imitated the Siberian terror also in respect of the temperature. In winter months the jail was poorly heated, if heated at all, and to increase this hardship the victims had, in STB parlance, to be 'pre-cooked' in overheated interrogation rooms. Drastic changes in temperature during the interrogation itself ($-20°C$ in one room, $+40°C$ in another) did permanent damage to the victim's health.[26]

[23] Pondelicek, op. cit.
[24] London, op. cit.
[25] M. Toninger, *Svobodne Slovo*, 10 March 1968; *Mlada Fronta*, 30 March 1968.
[26] Faltys, op. cit.; *Svedectvi*, op. cit., p. 368.

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The prisoners were also deprived of sleep, a method of torture allegedly invented by the Holy Inquisition in Venice. The legal entitlement of four hours' sleep a night was not observed. Constant awakening, sometimes at 10-minute intervals, with the prisoner required to stand at attention and, depending on the jailer's whim, to do press-ups, quickly dissipated any energy or resistance that was left.[27]

It was also impossible to take a nap during the day. Although in Czech vernacular the term ' to be jailed ' is the same as ' to sit ', Stalinist reality meant just the opposite. According to the evidence available this simple trick of forcing a man to remain on his feet was *the* cruelest torment remembered by prisoners. Sometimes they were made to stand in their cell for 18 hours a day, unable to sit down to eat or to use the toilet. Standing for long hours damaged the circulation and made the feet swell. Because of the malfunctioning of the kidneys the prisoner felt a need to drink great quantities of water to quench an abnormal thirst, and this in turn only aggravated the swelling. Each step was agonizingly painful, and after several days he would fall prey to hallucinations; his anxiety would increase; and he would become disorientated.[28]

The prisoner—isolated, hungry, cold, suffering from lack of sleep and hours of standing—was then exposed to further humiliation. He would be treated literally like a dog, forced to eat his food while on his hands and knees and taken to his interrogator on a lead. He was forced to wear handcuffs when using the toilet. Being vulgar about the ablutions of female prisoners was the favourite STB pastime. The guards would look through the spy hole, which was directed at the lavatory pan, ' where the action is ', and comment upon what they saw with obscene hilarity.[29]

Czechoslovakia is also the country of Franz Kafka. One survivor has related how, after six months without a bath, he was taken to a shower which was of little use to him as the water was boiling. Or, in a similar case, prisoners would be ordered to a shower area and after they had soaped themselves would be chased away.[30] A person in solitary confinement had to report the number of inmates present. He was led into a cell and ordered to lie down on a non-existent bed, and when he asked what he was to use to cover himself, he was told ' nothing '. As soon as he fell asleep he was woken up and taken to his interrogator on some urgent business. The latter would simply ask his name and then dismiss him.[31] On another occasion a judge visited the prisoner to deliver the warrant for his arrest, with instructions concerning his right to appeal within 24 hours. By then the man had been an

[27] Loebl, op. cit., pp. 34–35; London, op. cit.; *Mlada Fronta*, 30 March 1968.
[28] Pondelicek, op. cit.; Loebl, op. cit., pp. 34 ff.; London, op. cit.; Josefa Slanska, *Literarni Listy*, no. 11, 9 May 1968; Faltys, op. cit.; Antonin Juppa, *Svobodne Slovo*, 14 July 1968; *Mlada Fronta*, 30 March 1968.
[29] London, op. cit.; Slanska, op. cit.
[30] Toninger, op. cit.; Juppa, op. cit.
[31] Slanska, op. cit.

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involuntary resident in the STB establishment for a full three years.[32] To pursue this matter further, a Czech intelligence officer was instructed to contact a Western intelligence agency. After he had fulfilled the order he was sentenced to death as a spy. Subsequently, his superior too was condemned to death for having asserted that the said officer was not a member of Czechoslovak intelligence.[33] Numerous examples of Kafkaesque absurdity can be cited.

The rational was thus transformed into the irrational. Even with the substitution of fantasy for reality, such as in the case of simulated executions, the victim was still not a product ready for delivery. Act II had not yet lost its momentum.

TOTALITARIANISM has learnt from many ages, and its STB functionaries combined the brutality of cave-men, the perfidy of the disciples of the Holy Inquisition and twentieth-century know-how. Modern science contributed drugs, introduced into Czechoslovakia by Soviet advisers and administered to prisoners either directly by syringe or through their food (preferably soup or coffee) by local doctors attached to the security apparatus.

This treatment affected the very substance of the victim's personality, leaving symptoms of permanent disorientation once the drugs had worn off.[34] Eugen Loebl has described his own experience thus:

> After I had resisted all pressure for several months I was given drugs. I learnt about this only later. All of a sudden I felt as if someone was trying to push his hand into my head. It was a sensation similar to anaesthesia—a rather pleasant sensation. I don't know how long it lasted each time—perhaps only a few seconds, perhaps several minutes. Then when the hand seemed to have been removed from my head, I felt completely normal. If I happened to be holding something in my hand I would drop it; if I happened to be walking, I would stop. The sensation itself was not unpleasant, but it made me fear I was going insane.[35]

It should be noted that the administration of drugs was not limited to prominent defendants in the show trials of the fifties. For example, one Jiri Ondracek, a minor official sentenced as late as 1962 in what was not staged as a public spectacle, was also given a bad Stalinist 'trip'. According to his testimony[36] in 1968, before the trial he was turned over to a special team of doctors. Their treatment induced in him a state of apathy and depression, and a willingness to repeat preposterous charges and to confess to non-existent crimes. All he desired was to be left in peace. When the court passed sentence, he had no strength left

[32] Loebl, op. cit., p. 73.
[33] Otomar and Bocek, *Reporter*, no. 15, 1968; *Lidova Demokracie*, 30 April 1968.
[34] Pondelicek, op. cit.
[35] Loebl, op. cit., p. 36.
[36] Jiri Ondracek, *Kulturni Noviny*, no. 13, 29 March 1968.

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to launch an appeal. Not surprisingly, once the deadline for appeal had passed, Ondracek did not see the doctors with their wonder drugs again.

Little has been revealed about the doctors who took part in these events. Dr Josef Sommer, chief physician of the Ministry of the Interior and the man in charge of the use of drugs, was the only one to be identified by the survivors, but he committed suicide before making a statement.[37] His colleagues still remain anonymous. So far only one person with a medical background and direct knowledge of the affair, a certain Dr Radim Rayman, once a physician with the Ministry of the Interior, and later a political prisoner himself, has touched on the issue. 'I know which drug was given to Rudolf Slansky', Dr Rayman wrote.

According to his statement,[38] in the case of prisoners with an especially strong will the STB resorted to a technique of splitting the mind. The defendant had to stand facing a brightly lit wall, and the interrogators, working in teams, made him answer rapidly all sorts of questions until his replies became confused. After about 10 hours the prisoner began to lose his balance, and he was then given coffee containing mescaline. After a short break the STB began the second stage of the process, making a variety of combinations out of the prisoner's own words and forcing him to repeat these partly nonsensical sentences. The final stage, called 'depersonalization', followed when the victim had started to recite statements fully to the liking of the STB. He was then given a drug called actebron which was used to fix messages into his subconscious. This method, known as 'artificial error', was repeated, and the statements which had been planted were linked together until the complete version and the prisoner himself were ready for the court.

It should perhaps be added that Dr Rayman has tried to persuade psychiatrists to experiment with the treatment in reverse. If it succeeded in destroying a healthy mind, he suggested, it might well cure a sick mind. Apparently he has not so far been successful in converting this Stalinist innovation to a worthwhile purpose.

THE STB officials were not only the executors of these methods but they themselves were the final trump card in Act II. Using a technique described as 'false projection',[39] they suddenly revealed their human face and posed as understanding fellows interested in the prisoner's plight and family and anxious to bring the case to an end.

For the isolated, tormented and humiliated victim this became an almost irresistible temptation. He craved for any sign of compassion, and his gratitude was so great that he began to view the torturer as a friend, a comrade who had no choice but to play his role, and to believe that both men were victims of the system. The prisoner

[37] Petr Chudozilov and Oldrich Unger (*Literarni Listy*, no. 11, 2 May 1968) implicate the STB in what appears to be a provoked suicide.
[38] *Rude Pravo*, 7 June 1968.
[39] Pondelicek, op. cit.

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persuaded himself to 'understand' the difficult position of his 'partner', and would eventually confess his guilt to the judge only out of concern not to embarrass, in fact betray, the STB man—the only friend he had left.

Testimonies of survivors attest to this perverted system of values. In the closing scenes of Act II the interrogator is his charge's tutor, and in Act III—the trial—his coach. According to Loebl,[40] during each court recess the defendants were put in special boxes in the antechamber where the interrogators awaited them. Their 'friends' were full of praise for the faultless performance before the bench, and gave them cigarettes and fostered hope. Reminiscent of the back-stage of a village theatre, the STB men also argued with each other over whose personal actor had stolen the show.

This Stalinist surrealism lasted until the end of the trial. The aftermath and the heightened despair of the defendants is described by London: 'The *referenti* (a Czech term denoting a kind of "personal interrogator") were the only human beings with whom we were in contact, our last source of hope and the sole representatives of our Party.' With the verdicts pronounced, the victims were met in the antechamber by strangers who had replaced the *referenti.* Again, London:

> And I read despair in the eyes of all my comrades that they cannot find their *referenti* any more, that they are not close to their known guardians. For months and years the victims and their executioners lived in daily contact and so certain ties which are hard to explain were established. . . .[41]

To proceed in this incredible vein, the *referenti,* too, became 'emotionally involved'. At least, they say so. Bohumil Doubek, the foremost interrogator of the fifties, confessed, *inter alia,* his pain when attending the execution of his victims who, after all, were not strangers to him.[42]

Under conditions of what one may call abnormal normalcy, phenomena incomprehensible to an outsider take place. For example, in Auschwitz a team of SS men played soccer against a team of the Sonderkommando of the doomed in front of excited fans of both sides. Similarly, communists thrown into Stalinist dungeons, stripped of their human dignity, felt particularly apprehensive at being also stripped of their membership of the Party which had arranged their sorry lot. Mrs Josefa Slansky, for instance, felt very bitter when addressed by her interrogator as 'Madam' and not 'Comrade'. This, in her words, 'caused pain'.[43]

Yet even in her case, as in so many others, the residual group identity of the jailer and the victim survived, and was further cemented

[40] Loebl, op. cit., p. 76.
[41] London, op. cit.
[42] *Lidova Demokracie,* 20 June 1968.
[43] Josefa Slanska, *Literarni Listy,* no. 10, 2 May 1968.

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by 'comradely brutality'. Their relationship was conducted through Marxist verbiage, doctrinal disputes, in short, through esoteric communication of the initiated. They were traitors rather than infidels, and this too distinguished them from non-communist prisoners.

The victim's 'identification with his aggressor', to use Goldstücker's phrase, did not improve his case with the system, but it certainly worsened the conditions in jail. The communists who were not sentenced to death wound up in prisons where anti-regime sentiment was dominant. There the inmates soothed their frustrations by taking revenge on the rejected representatives of the Party, placing them, according to Goldstücker, 'in constant danger of lynching'.[44] The STB was, of course, aware of this supplementary hardship and took good care to pair ex-comrades with simple-minded anti-communist brutes, with preferential treatment reserved for the latter.

Once sentenced, the convicts were lumped together, whereas before the trial the practice of a certain degree of departmentalization was maintained. As a case in point, there was Kolodeje castle, a former summer retreat of President Gottwald, which catered solely for high-ranking communists. In contrast, the Prague fortress of Ruzyne, called the 'mass production factory of lies', and now the symbol of Czechoslovak Stalinism, tended to accommodate victims of all types.

A system able to hypnotize an innocent man into believing in his guilt appears in retrospect and at a comfortable distance to be one of diabolic ingenuity and perfection. Its functionaries, however, do not convey such an impression. How many of them would fit the image of Koestler's investigator Gletkin is impossible to assess. The most likely embodiments of this fictional figure were the Soviet advisers, old NKVD hands attached to the Czechoslovak security apparatus, but they seldom participated in interrogation, preferring the role of back-stage manipulators and supervisors.

Stalinist trials took place in Czechoslovakia shortly after the seizure of power in 1948, and so there was little time to mould a generation of homogeneous brutes. Instead, the STB comprised individuals from a variety of backgrounds, and with differing motivations and vices. True, some were Bolsheviks, with a long record of Party discipline, but others were left-overs from the bourgeois police apparatus, including Gestapo officials, while the absolute majority were green working-class recruits. Bankrupt attorneys-at-law, university dropouts, shoe salesmen, barely literate proletarians insisting on being addressed as 'Doctor', the outstanding common denominator with most of them was the lack of training and professional competence.[45] Josef Cech, for instance, a STB colonel and chief of Novotny's bodyguard until 1968, attained his rank in spite of having only an elementary education and possessing no police

[44] Goldstücker, op. cit.

[45] *Reporter*, no. 15, 1968; Jiri Dlouhy, *Literarni Listy*, no. 15, 6 June 1968; Jan Susta, *Reporter*, no. 13, 1968; Juppa, op. cit.; Jiri Radotinsky and Rudolf Toman, *Svobodne Slovo*, 2 June 1968.

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experience whatsoever. This man, who was later put on trial along with six others for murders committed in his official capacity during the fifties, reflects the quality of the organization when he states that the only authority recognized was the Party order and the only law obeyed was 'the law of the class struggle'.[46]

Primitivism and malice above anything else characterized the executioners in the formative years of totalitarian rule. There were exceptions, of course, even in the early period. One such man, Major Josef Ledl, a type more characteristic of the more mature period of the Stalinist inquisition, was described by his former 'client' in the following terms:

> He possessed an almost religious conviction that everybody without exception was essentially a heretic and a traitor and that all that was needed was to squeeze him to confess. When on the occasions that he elaborated on this theme he appeared to divide his fellow citizens into two groups: those who have already been broken by his organization and those who were yet to be arrested. He radiated a philosophical outlook that the world was dominated by policemen, and that the purpose of investigation was to unveil the increasingly unbelievable plots, which would provide the security apparatus with a justification for their continued existence and him personally with a higher rank, decorations and a career.[47]

Against this incarnation of the apocalyptic future stood the 'little Czech man' of the present, whose STB vocation did not extinguish his enjoyment of mundane pleasures. Thus, rather typically, the torturers would call for a recess in order not to miss the ice-hockey match in which their favourite team was playing. When the game was over the fans then returned to resume their mediaeval practices.

The STB recruits from among the industrial workers in particular would not fit into the Koestlerian landscape. In violation of the rules of blind obedience these men were known to protest to the Minister, though not about the treatment of prisoners but about the violation of the eight-hour working day. An interrogator of this type was reported to lock up his captive (Josef Smrkovsky, Speaker of the Parliament in 1968) in a cooler periodically so as to make sure of an undisturbed weekend with the family.[48] This was then not only the country of Stalin and Kafka but also of Schweik. The Schweikian imprint has gained in recent years, adding to the tragedies of the fifties and the comedies of the sixties.[49]

[46] *Listy*, no. 4, 30 January 1969; *Obrana Lidu*, 4 January 1969; *Zemedelske Noviny*, 19 December 1968.

[47] Vesely, op. cit.

[48] Tuckova, op. cit.

[49] For example the rather hilarious story by Vladimir Skutina, 'The President's Personal Prisoner', *Reporter*, no. 16, 1968. The writer, a well-known television personality, was accused of publicly slandering President Novotny in 1962. After being arrested and convicted the Supreme Court opined that 'calling President Novotny an idiot in public could not be considered a cultural activity'.

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FROM the countries which have experienced the grip of Stalinism little has been revealed about the de-humanization of prisoners, and the Czechoslovak unveiling of the taboo in 1968 was incomplete. For instance, the testimonies of communist survivors far outweighed those of the non-communists who, after all, were the prime victims of the regime. The tanks of August have slowed down, at least for the time being, the appearance of further evidence on the matter.

This much can be said though: Stalinist methods, tested and perfected in the USSR, were applied on alien ground. Czechoslovak pupils emulated the Siberian model, but for all their diligence they could not succeed completely in an environment lacking the tradition of despotism and of the veneration of Tsars and dogmas. The system could relegate Masaryk to a memory hole but could not fill the vacancy with Ivan the Terrible. A new generation of political prisoners was born and so too was a new generation of torturers, but these were rather poor imitations of the Gletkins of Koestler's imagination and of Russia's painful experience. The same can be said about the Rubashovs. When André Simone, the alleged accomplice of Slansky (and once a personal friend of Koestler), addressed the bench and recited Rubashov's confession speech—all, the judges, the Party and the world missed this superb irony. He who posed as Rubashov was not a genuine Rubashov. Mere impersonators could not embody this tragic figure. A surrealistic melodrama followed a surrealistic drama.

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GEORG LUKACS

Neil McInnes

THE reason for taking Georg Lukacs as a representative of communist culture is not that he is typical. His range and ability are too great to be typical. Rather, it is that his work over 60 years (Lukacs is 84) expresses the gamut of intellectual attitudes sympathetic to communism, better, committed to communism. His intellectual and political career is the path that few others have followed from start to finish, but which all communist intellectuals have travelled for some part of the way.

The stages of that journey are these: a youthful, romantic longing for an anti-capitalist cultural revolution and for a life more heroic than that of the bourgeois; a sympathy with syndicalism, based on the hope that the working class, as the enemy of the bourgeois, will become the vehicle of that revolution, the bearer of the new heroic culture; an adherence to Marxism as the rational or even scientific version of that hope; this is immediately followed, however, by a Hegelizing of Marxism, so as to distinguish it, as a cultural theory, as the programme for a cultural rebirth, from the 'vulgar Marxism' and materialism of the Second International; then comes the reception of the Leninist theory of the communist party as the Machiavellian prince that will manage the cultural revolution because the working class is not doing so spontaneously; the Leninization of Marxism having produced Stalinism, there follows a rearguard action against 'sectarianism'; that rearguard action having failed, there ensues a complete capitulation to Stalinism, as preferable to Hitlerism, even though this requires putting aside most of the original cultural interests; then, as Stalinist terror is relaxed, comes the admission that the experience has been culturally null and profitless—the phase of disenchantment; finally, the renewed quest, made known perhaps only obliquely, for another vehicle for the cultural revolution. The snake of Stalinism having brought us back to square one, we set out again, full of hope at 84 years, looking for the ladder that must lead us up to the fully human society—looking for the troops or the prince that will force upon the world the cultural renaissance that the sensitive intellectual feels is necessary. At this stage, of course, it is the search for a life more heroic and worth while not only than that of the bourgeois world, but than that of European (Russian) communism as it exists.

These stages are not of equal importance in the career of every communist intellectual. Lukacs's own most striking contributions were made at the phase of Hegelizing Marx and then in the reception of Leninism in the West. Yet (and this is what I mean by saying his range and power are beyond the ordinary) he also gave memorable expression to other parts of the journey, to the longing for cultural

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rebirth, to the opposition to Stalinist dogmatism, and then, ironically, to the abject surrender to Stalinism, as well as to the ultimate disenchantment with communist culture. Up to this point of time, Lukacs's expression of the last phase, the search for a new alternative, has not been as sensationalist as that of Herbert Marcuse or of the pro-Chinese communists, but local political conditions might account for that. It is easier to say what you mean in San Diego than in Budapest, at least if what you mean is that communism has failed as a culture. As Lukacs has admitted years later to having so often disguised his real meaning, told tactical lies, and made insincere recantations, one is entitled to read between the lines of his statements in this last phase.

BEFORE depicting each of these phases (which, if I were able enough, I would make you see as a series of pictures in a gallery, portraits of the communist intellectual at this point and at that), I should indicate briefly the main dates in Lukacs's biography. He was born in 1885 in Budapest, the son of a Jewish banker, director of Hungary's biggest bank and bearer of a title. (Georg himself signed his first publications 'von Lukacs'.) The German bourgeois and the Jews of Hungary were all city folk, barely assimilated into the feudal agricultural society that persisted there well into this century, and unloved both by the small urban proletariat and by the landed gentry and peasants. So it was normal that after preliminary studies in Budapest, Lukacs should receive essentially a German education in Berlin and Heidelberg and that much of his work thereafter should be published in German. That work has been mainly literary scholarship. From 1908 Lukacs was publishing on aesthetic theory, where his ideas showed the influence of the neo-Kantianism he had imbibed in Germany; there his two most influential teachers were Simmel and Max Weber. Political interests appeared early, however, at first via the influence of Hungarian syndicalists and hence of Sorel, then by way of study of Marx. This meant that right from that point Lukacs began to see works of art in a relativist way, as reflections of a society at a given time.

More important, it led him into the Hungarian Communist Party at the end of 1918. The apparent suddenness of this conversion surprised some of his associates in a semi-religious talking club called 'Spirit' (*Szellenkek*), which included Karl Mannheim, Arnold Hauser, Bela Bartok, Zoltan Kodaly, Revai and Fogarasi. More surprising was Lukacs's meteoric rise to the top of the Party within two months—at least this would surprise those who did not know that the communist movement had no base in Hungary at that time and that, even when it was supposedly in power, there were no soviets in the land, only one ruling soviet which consisted of Bela Kun's friends. When the revolution came, Lukacs was the communist regime's spokesman on matters of education and culture, from March to August 1919. Many of his friends from the Spirit club, notably Mannheim and Hauser, received

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university posts while he was in office. Lukacs issued decrees about classics for the masses, fairy tales for children, and prefects in schools, and he inaugurated the Institute for Research in Historical Materialism in Budapest. None of this had any effect on the brief history of the Bela Kun adventure, and when it was swept away by the reaction and followed by the Horthy dictatorship and anti-semitic pogroms (Jews were heavily represented among the communists), Lukacs went underground and then fled to Vienna.

In exile he played a role in the faction fight that rent the illegal Party, siding with the moderate Landler faction against the dominant, Moscow-backed Bela Kun leadership. This struggle went on from 1921 to 1928, with varying fortunes for each side. Lukacs weakened his position by publishing in 1920 an article against parliamentarism [1] which incurred a rebuke from Lenin, in 1923 *History and Class Consciousness*,[2] solemnly condemned the next year by Zinovev, and in 1928 a series of recommendations on political action inside Hungary [3] which was equally solemnly denounced as anti-Leninist and opportunist by the Comintern. Thereupon Lukacs quit active politics for 15 years. He worked in the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow in 1930–31, in Berlin as a Party activist among literary men in 1931–33, and fled to Russia when Hitler came to power. From 1933 to 1944 he worked in the Philosophy Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow and helped edit Party publications. Returning to Hungary after the Red Army, Lukacs became a member of parliament, a notable in other Party bodies and in the World Peace Council, and held the chair of Aesthetics and Culture Philosophy at Budapest University. He played a prominent and generally disgraceful part in the Cold War and yet, when Stalinism was in its last paroxysms in Hungary after 1949, Lukacs himself was recurrently attacked for right-wing deviations and was obliged to withdraw from public life in 1951. As the post-Stalin thaw began, Lukacs re-emerged as a sympathizer with the Nagy opposition and the Petöfi circle, venturing his first public criticisms of Stalin. When the 1956 Hungarian revolution broke out, he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Education Minister in the Nagy government. Deported to Rumania, he survived and was freed, whereas some of his colleagues were shot or jailed. Back in Budapest, he lived in retirement, while still denounced periodically by the Party of which he was no longer a member, and worked on a *magnum opus* on aesthetics. As the Kadar regime has relaxed its grip over Hungary,

[1] 'Zur Frage des Parlamentarismus', in *Kommunismus* I, 1920, pp. 161–72. Reprinted in Georg Lukacs, *Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik* (Neuwied and Berlin, Luchterhand, 1967), hereafter referred to as *Schriften*. The *Schriften* include extensive biographical and bibliographical information prepared by their editor, Peter Ludz. See also the present writer's article 'Lukacs' in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York, 1967).

[2] *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (Berlin, 1923). Translations exist in French (Paris, 1960) and Italian (Milan, 1967).

[3] The so-called Blum theses. Reprinted in *Schriften*, pp. 290–322.

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Lukacs's position has become more comfortable, though his work remains banned in some other communist countries. He was readmitted to the Party in 1968. He is understood to have protested against the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Hungary and her allies, though he did so privately, through correct Party channels. Since the Kadar government was not happy about the Czech affair, the protest did Lukacs no harm; on the contrary, when a former admirer, Josef Szigeti, accused him of being a leader of an anti-Party revisionist group, it was Szigeti who was reproved and sacked from his job. Then in March 1969, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bela Kun dictatorship (the first that Hungary could celebrate officially, Kun having been executed by Stalin), Lukacs was decorated with the Order of the Red Flag and was allowed to express his opinions freely in numerous interviews.

LUKACS'S communist career begins in a mood of ethical idealism and cultural romanticism. He had previously been a neo-Kantian practising the most arbitrary *Verstehende* analysis and exemplifying a pathetic, asocial outlook since identified as existentialist. When in his thirties he turned to social affairs, his first thought was for a revolt of the masses against the debased ethical and aesthetic values of the bourgeois. David Kettler, who has reported on what Lukacs and Karl Mannheim were thinking during the First World War, calls this line of thought the 'revolutionary culture movement', and traces its lineage from the German romantics down to Marcuse.[4] These are the people who want to be rid of capitalism because they say its getting and spending have sullied spiritual life. The aim of revolution for them would be not so much to put an end to suffering and exploitation and to liberate productive forces obstructed by capitalism, as to install a higher culture. Lukacs himself summarized this attitude in an ordinance he issued while Commissar for Education in the Bela Kun dictatorship: 'Politics is simply the means; the end is culture.' Before that, the Spirit Society in which Lukacs was a leader had declared in its manifesto that it was against capitalism and positivism, against materialism, and for a new idealism, a revivified spirituality and a fresh European culture.

The adepts of the cultural revolution usually are élitist, explicitly so when they are on the right (for of course there is a tradition of criticism of ugly money-grubbing mass-welfare industrialism from the right, one of whose best exponents in our time was Ortega y Gasset), but often implicitly so when they are on the left too, since their defence of the higher values usually entails rejection of bourgeois and democratic standards along with 'mass society' and industrial civilization. At first, however, there was little of that in Lukacs's version of the faith;

[4] David Kettler, *Marxismus und Kultur: Mannheim und Lukacs in den ungarischen Revolutionen, 1918–19* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1967), translated from an unidentified American original.

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it was the mass of working people who were going to overthrow a corrupt and tasteless capitalism and display a native love of the higher values, a sterner morality, and a surer artistic taste. Let me stress what is Platonist in this culture-communism; I mean by that the timeless argument against money-making that is set out in *The Republic*. Economics, the productive process itself, has debased morality and culture, complain both Plato and Lukacs, and the way to make culture and the ethical life free and pure again is to separate them from economics. Since there must be some economic activity to support cultural life at an acceptable level, it must be communized, i.e. limited, made into nobody's business and organized frugally and jointly. Culture must rule the economy and not vice versa. That vice versa—the economy determining culture—is what the Marxists called historical materialism, which they took to be a universal truth. Lukacs said it was a temporary and scandalous degeneration produced by capitalism. The task of the revolution was to make historical materialism no longer true. The revolution will be against the predominance of production and technology; cultural uplift or renewal will be the very content of socialism. All this is explicit in Lukacs at a time when he was already an official of the Hungarian soviet regime. There is no need to point out how far this cultural communism is from the proletarian socialism of Marx and Lenin, a movement concerned with the liberation of productive forces and which seeks to put economic activities not outside public life but at its very centre.

This is the source of many of Lukacs's recurrent difficulties with that movement, because its leaders could see that his Platonist, philosophical communism was at least as opposed to the socialist version of industrialism they were seeking to build as it was to bourgeois capitalist society. It is evident too that it would be quite uncongenial to working men, though in Lukacs's version they were to be the bearers of the new and purer civilization.

Lukacs chose the left of the culture movement, whereas others chose the right. It sometimes seems to be a toss-up which way the cultural uplifters go, and there is nothing irrevocable about their choice: if one chosen vehicle disappoints them, they will start casting about for a new clientele. This is the phase I suggest we see in Marcuse and, less patently, in Lukacs today. In 1918–22, however, his faith was with the working class, and he took it to its syndicalist extreme: the agent of the revolution was to be the workers' councils spontaneously set up by the masses as the direct, non-representative instrument of their power. Exactly like Korsch and Gramsci at that time, Lukacs saw revolution as an organic, independent activity of a class, much as Sorel and Rosa Luxemburg did. Indeed, his first reaction to the Bolshevik Revolution was hostile because it seemed to him undemocratic and it was led by a minority ready to split the proletariat's unity. He wrote in that sense in 1919 a paper that today is hard to find, but his reservations about a party-led dictatorship willing to terrorize part of the working class are

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evident for some time after that. Lenin reprimanded him in 1920 for these ultra-left views when Lukacs wrote that once the workers could set up soviets, workers' councils, they should forget about parliaments and representative parties. And one of the deviations in the *History and Class Consciousness* book was that it reproduced, unseasonably in 1923, Lukacs's essays of 1920 insisting on the priority of workers' councils over the communist party. This enthusiastic sovietism was still evident in his 1924 book on Lenin,[5] quite incongruously, since the point of the book was to acclimatize the Leninist conception of the communist party in the West. Thus it contained an unresolved tension between the workers' councils and the Party, between the former's direct rule and the latter's Party dictatorship, i.e. between the dissolution of the state and its immense reinforcement. How to graft the voluntarist, élitist idea of the minority party on to the traditional Western idea of the revolutionary mass was to be one of Lukacs's preoccupations in the next phase, the Hegelizing of Marx. Though he solved this problem on paper (as Gramsci did), it was to return to haunt him in practice in 1956, when the government in which he was minister was confronted by the workers' councils that sprang up spontaneously across Hungary. If the Russians had not liquidated them for him, his government would no doubt have had to do the job itself, as Gomulka did when the workers' councils appeared in Warsaw factories.

IN 1919 Lukacs began to see how heretical were the two notions we have mentioned: the primacy of culture over economics and of spontaneous workers' councils over the Party; these two notions were utterly incompatible with orthodox Russian Marxism. Instead of simply abandoning these ideas, he chose to rethink them at the same time as he rethought Marxism. Significantly, the first essay in *History and Class Consciousness* is called 'What is Orthodox Marxism?', a question to which he gives an answer quite unfamiliar to the Russians as well as to the Second International. It is as though, having seen that his cultural preoccupations and his syndicalism were out of tune with communism, he decided that its orthodoxy would have to be revised as much as his own ideas. That rethinking of Marxism was to be Hegelian. It was set out, in quite poor German and in atrocious Hegelian jargon, in a book that can be understood—the proof is that it has had wide and persistent influence—and yet which cannot easily be paraphrased or summarized.

Writing in 1919–22, Lukacs did not have at his disposal the works of the young Marx, which were made known only after 1927, so he read off Marx's Hegelianism from the later work, particularly from *Das Kapital*. Since he was obliged to disown his book soon after, he could not claim credit for his achievement when the young Marx's papers

[5] *Lenin* (Berlin and Vienna, 1924). An unauthorized French translation appeared in Paris in 1965.

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were published. But the fact that he could find, unaided, the Hegelian, existentialist Marx in *Das Kapital* is relevant to the debate about whether there are two people called Karl Marx or just one.

What he found, and what made his book the bible of Western Marxism and the secret doctrine of communist intellectuals from Berlin in 1930 to Prague in 1969, was the dialectic of totality. There are two ways of deriving this notion, one Marxist, drawing on the economic writings of the mature Marx, the other Hegelian (which nowadays can rely on the papers of the young Marx). The first is simpler and we shall follow it first, before restating the issue in Hegelian language. By running the two together one discerns Lukacs's peculiar achievement.

Marx said that behind each social form there was the action of a dominant class. It moulded society the way it wanted, by force, fraud and education, and then sought to pass off that form as natural, as eternal. Force alone would not suffice to impose its way of living on others who suffered from it; there must be a formal science to make it seem normal, inevitable and unchangeable. Such fraud is not conscious; the dominant class comes to believe its own lie. Thus its theory and its practice conflict: its theory says, 'This is natural, science says so'; but its practice says, 'This is how we want it and this is how it is going to be'. The capitalists were the first to enforce a completely man-made, non-natural society, pushing back the boundaries of nature so that our whole environment becomes artificial, and yet they also produced, in economics, the most perfect science to disguise this force-engendered social form as a natural product. The proletariat being the worst and eventually the sole victim of this dispensation can, with Marx's help, come to see that capitalism (and hence all its clumsier predecessors) is not natural, and that its science, economics, is just a formal account of a temporary, arbitrary, though objective, situation. Thereupon the proletariat will have realized that all social forms are man-made, and it can propose to institute a new one on that basis, openly recognizing that it is artificial because the workers, being the vast majority, do not have to oppress anyone and hence need not fool anyone. Thus their theory and their practice will coincide: their theory will be revolutionary in that it assumes that at any point man (exactly: a class) can make his own history, can change the social arrangements and no formal science of natural laws can stop him. The workers' theory will say, 'Society can be revolutionized by a mass of men', and their practice will consist in doing just that.

To make this theory plausible one must take a unitary view of society, envisaging a change in the whole social dispensation more or less simultaneously. If any social domain (say the birth-rate or the source of technological inventions) remains outside the all-embracing range of the class that is moulding society, then that domain would become a natural obstacle subject to its own scientific laws. The class seeking hegemony might wish to arrange matters in such and such a

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fashion, but there might be too many babies and too few inventions because demography and discovery had their own laws men could not change. If man is to make his own history, he must be able to make the whole lot and there can be no separate science of parts of society, no economics, no demography, no history of law, no aesthetics, but just one science, history, the story of the global transformations of that concrete totality, society. Lukacs does not simply assert totality; he cites scraps of evidence for the claim that in social affairs everything depends on everything else, or, to put it another way, that there is a whole that determines all the parts. These scraps come from Marx and seem to me to refer only to economics; Marx was anticipating equilibrium theory of the Walras-Pareto variety. But Lukacs builds his vast superstructure on this narrow base.

The important point is to grasp the notion of a moving totality, a whole social process within which everything is fluid, nothing is fixed or hard, nothing obeys set laws of its own, everything depends on and affects everything else, and the whole lot consists of human activities and relationships between men. If you can hold that vision in your mind, you will see how all social science is the enemy of this dialectic of totality, for a science amounts to saying that some part at least has its own laws, not liable to change when a class moulds the whole anew. To treat society or part of it as natural, says Lukacs, is a weapon of bourgeois ideology, in that it sets limits to total change. Since each stage of the moving totality that is history is the product of one dominant class, that class is all the time trying to pass off bits of its arbitrary arrangements as natural. It wants no one, least of all its victims, to see the whole, to take in the vision of the dialectic of totality (for that is a revolutionary view, recalling the arbitrariness and impermanence of social forms); instead they are to see only the separate sciences, each one embodying the assertion: 'Here's a part of the system that was not forced on us by the ruling class and which we cannot change, because it has laws which apply to many periods and many societies.' Such natural solidified things no longer look to be human activities and relations between men; they become obstacles to revolutionary change. The most successful attempt to convert activities and relations into things is economics, which even manages to take parts of my personality, of my self-expression, that is of my work, and to convert them into goods subject to impersonal laws. This is reification, *Verdinglichung*, the turning of human activity into frozen objects, economic commodities—all the time with the purpose of subtracting them from the totality that men, organized as a class, can change. If the proletariat accepts that point of view, it condemns itself to continue to exist as mere merchandise governed by inhuman laws; so it must, for its own liberation from reification, take the dialectical, total view: repudiate every so-called fact and thing in favour of the whole that a class can revolutionize.

If the argument is beginning to seem too abstract, imagine what a communist trade union leader would say if you told him his men must

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accept a pay cut for the sake of Britain's balance of payments. His answer might be a faint echo of the case Lukacs is stating here. His opening remark, 'To hell with the balance of payments' would then not be unpatriotic but philosophical, being a rejection of a supposed external fact to which he and others must bow, and he would, if he were revolutionary, go on to talk not about such parts but of the whole set of human activities, which he proposed to change. If, however, he went on to say the balance of payments was the boss's problem and his was only his men's pay, he would not be a Marxist or a revolutionary, because of his falling far short of the dialectic of totality.

Now all this can be got from Marx's later work if you look for it, and in fact most of it was so got by Arturo Labriola [6] (not Antonio) some years before Lukacs. What is less evident and therefore more to the taste of intellectuals who want to be communist for superior reasons, is the Hegelian restatement of it. The moving totality of interlocking, conflicting and interdependent (i.e. dialectically related) activities that makes up history may be called human praxis. Its dominant form, which determines the whole and the parts, more or less, at each stage of history, and determines them quite completely at the capitalist stage, is the practice of a powerful ruling class. In history to date such classes have exercised power unconsciously, that is, without seeing clearly that the social dispensation they brought about merely by going after their short-term interests, by generalizing their style of living and seeing to it that society was made safe for their sort of activity, was their own creation. They had to pretend, and pretended even to themselves, that it happened naturally. Thus man was making his own history (there was nothing external to it, and nothing in it but human activities dominated by one ruling class; no natural objects or scientific laws), yet he did not know he was making his own history. However, if the proletariat, the mass of the people and the victims of the system, are to institute their sort of man-made social dispensation, they would have to be conscious of what they were doing. They could not merely generalize their practice, force their way of living on others, because that way of life was determined inside capitalism and was subhuman: they lived as mere merchandise. They would have to destroy themselves as proletariat, disregard their apparent and short-term interests, reach out consciously for their long-term interests, which are to return to human, non-reified stature, and then knowingly create a fresh, artificial arrangement in which no one had to be fooled and victimized by supposed natural laws. For the first time, man would be making his history and know he was doing so; man would be both the subject and the object of history; the subject, the self-conscious moulder of social arrangements; and the object, since men *are* those social activities. You might say that history at last had come to consciousness in a self-conditioned subject-object; this is a fair description of the situation

[6] Arturo Labriola, *Karl Marx* (Paris, 1909).

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Marx imagined and it is couched in the terminology of a great philosophical tradition, that of German idealism. Marx came from that school of thought and—according to Lukacs—remained in it.

Translating the issue into Hegelian terms, we may recall that the goal of idealism (not just of German idealism) has always been to find the absolutely unconditioned or self-conditioned whole on which everything else depends, the whole that is the truth. In classic German philosophy this was narrowed down to the quest for a certain activity, the self-creation of reality, where the subject and object are one, and that in turn was narrowed down, from Hegel on, to the search for a certain historical activity which comes to self-consciousness. Find that and you will have located 'that subject of the "action" of which the concrete totality of reality can be understood as the product', and if we can then participate in that historical activity 'we pose the world as thought, as a concrete meaningful system "produced" by us and arrived in us to consciousness of itself'. Hegel thought he found it in the spirits of nations unfolding themselves in history, but Lukacs pointed out that in Hegel's theory the World Spirit worked *through* nations, so Hegel's moving totality, universal history, did not have a subject that was both immanent and free (nations are immanent to history but not free; the world spirit is free but transcendent). Lukacs considered that Marx had found the free subject-object in the notion of society, social history, as one total act, the act of a class. Such social praxis has been unconscious till now, but at the moment when *it* sets out to make history, the proletariat will know what it is doing. Some class or other has always been the unconscious subject, the real agent of history, but now for the first time a class realizes that history is made by a class and sets out to do the job in its own way, seeing through all that seems to be contingent, external, transcendent, inevitable, reified in history and taking complete mastery of the whole process.

MUCH more space would be required to make this a little clearer (it can never be made perfectly clear), but enough has been said to show that Lukacs had set Marxism in a 'systematic framework quite different from and incompatible with that in which Engels had set it in the Anti-Dühring',[7] till then the philosophy book of the Marxists. One of Lukacs's worst sins, no doubt, was to make no bones about Engels's comical dialectic; in the communist movement, as we know, one may ignore Marx, but one must never say a word against Friedrich Engels. In place of the dialectic of nature Lukacs set the dialectic of (social) totality, which is the common theme of the *Critical Theory of Society*[8] from Horkheimer and Adorno to Marcuse. It asserts the permanent possibility of total revolution, the fluidity and arbitrariness

[7] Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Marxist Mask and Romantic Face: Lukacs on Thomas Mann', *Encounter*, April 1965, pp. 64–72.

[8] G. E. Rusconi, *La Teoria critica della società* (Bologna, 1968) covers all the 'critical school', from Lukacs and Korsch to Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse.

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of even the most general categories of social thought, and it dismisses any scientific objection to revolutionism as reification and ideology.

Lukacs's direct experience of the failure of the Hungarian and German revolutions brought him to see a first weak point in this philosophical construction—and here we pass to the next phase, the reception of Leninism in the West. The weak point was that the working class did not become aware that it could, and in its long-term interests must, revolutionize society. It seemed to prefer to chase short-term apparent interests—like the trade unionist I mentioned earlier who, as Lukacs would say, is content to leave the worker mere merchandise but wants a higher price tag put on the commodity. That is a normal difficulty, said Lukacs, because whereas earlier classes just did what they wanted and thus unconsciously moulded history to suit themselves, the workers have to destroy the working class in order consciously to make history human. Lukacs handles the difficulty by drawing on the ideal types of his teacher Max Weber. An ideal type refers to behaviour that maybe no actual person exhibits but which all members of a class would exhibit if they went to the end of their ideas, lived completely consistently according to their lights. Thus the ideal type of capitalist is always rational and calculating, whereas it is notorious that real capitalists often are irrational, sentimental, patriotic. But social theory, says Lukacs, is not about what men actually think and feel but what they would have thought and felt if they had perfectly grasped their situation and the interests it implied. The workers' class consciousness is an ideal type. It is the awareness of the duty or mission of the class as outlined in the Hegelian-Marxist theory according to which the dialectic totality will come to consciousness in that class, even though many or most actual workers are not clear about this. It is not difficult to see where this specious theory is leading: if the workers will not see their duty, someone must see it for them and lead them to it—the Party. *History and Class Consciousness* is a series of essays written between 1919 and 1922 and one can trace the evolution from the spontaneity theory of Sorel and Rosa Luxemburg to the frankly élitist, voluntarist theory of Lenin, exactly as one can in Gramsci's work a little later. This is the famous, because ultimately insoluble, problem of the relations between working class and communist party, to which the only 'solution' is that the Party must be accepted as a 'mystery of reason' (Merleau-Ponty). Gramsci's wrestling with this problem is finally, and necessarily, indecisive, but superior to Lukacs's on this vital point: Gramsci sees that between class and Party must come the bureaucracy and so the whole upshot of the Party's effort to educate the class into its historical vocation will depend on how educated the bureaucracy is, on whether, Gramsci says, it is Roman-Anglo-Saxon or Byzantine-Bonapartist.[9]

Lukacs, in contrast, reacts away from romantic, spontaneous mass

[9] Antonio Gramsci, *Passato e Presente* (Turin, 4th ed. 1954), p. 66.

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revolutionism to the equally romantic notion of a tiny band of élite heroes who will impinge on the masses directly without the intermediary of a paralysing bureaucracy. He was perhaps the first, and certainly the first outside Russia, to take all the elements of the Leninist theory of the communist party and lay them end to end with a ruthless logic and a complacent delectation. I sometimes wonder whether this was not one of the unstated charges against him in 1924; whether his cold, brutal frankness about the superior minority that will manipulate the workers did not make even some communists feel uncomfortable. Certainly that was the source of the morbid fascination Lukacs's book exercised over certain intellectuals in Vienna in the 1920s and in Berlin in the 1930s. As Borkenau says,[10] Lukacs stated what was implicit in Lenin and carried the theory of the almighty central committee, against which Rosa Luxemburg had forewarned Marxists in 1904, to the last extreme. This full-blown and cynical Leninism can be found in Lukacs's book *Lenin* and in the last chapter of *History and Class Consciousness*. The working class is ideologically null and must be led to its real interests by a conscious active element, composed of strictly, indeed rigorously disciplined intellectuals who have deciphered history's meaning and who recognize no good or bad, only the expedient; who are ready for any zig-zag, any action legal or illegal. Their tasks are to manipulate the proletariat's changing allies; to fight the non-revolutionary workers' leaders; to oppose the whole working class when it fails to see its duty. The organizational problem is central, because the revolution no longer has anything to do with a class and its ethic but is all a matter of tactics over a constantly changing front, on which Kemal Pasha can become a revolutionary whereas a great Western working-class party is declared reactionary. The unprincipled band is dedicated to installing the ' reign of liberty ', but this is not the individual liberty that those corrupted by capitalism aspire to, but ' true ' liberty which begins with the renunciation of individual liberty and conscious submission to the communist party. Discipline in the Party is the only way to authentic freedom. That Party is distinct and separate from the working class; it is autonomous; it cannot grow out of the class but always arises as the self-conscious act of a revolutionary vanguard. These are all quotations from Lukacs, who freely admits that his theory had stuck in the throats of Western socialists and who consciously sets out to spread the Leninist idea in the West.

Lukacs himself was the first to fall victim to this monstrous creation. His book was condemned by Zinovev on behalf of the Comintern in 1924, whereupon Lukacs disavowed it, refused to let it be reprinted for over 40 years, and performed a long series of self-criticisms and recantations. Why was he condemned? He was denounced by Zinovev, along with Graziadei and Karl Korsch, for the minor offence of reprinting earlier opinions he admitted to having given up, e.g., attachment to

10 Franz Borkenau, *World Communism* (new ed., Ann Arbor, 1962), pp. 171–74.

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Rosa Luxemburg's ideas. For Zinovev, it was a scandal for a communist to admit ever having had non-Leninist opinions. A rather more serious offence was that in 1923–24, just when the Comintern was drawing the moral of the failure of the German revolution, Lukacs displayed a quite unseasonable revolutionism, writing as though world-wide revolution was both imminent and necessary. More serious even than that tactical error was another, more fundamental: One of the conclusions Moscow drew from the failure of the German revolution was that Soviet Russia must take over complete control of the world communist movement, and from 1924 begins the Bolshevization of the national sections. It would have been extremely dangerous then for the belief to gain ground that there was a crude Russian Marxism and a cleverer, more philosophical Western Marxism, exemplified in the books of Karl Korsch and Lukacs; it was intolerable that a Western communist should attack Lenin's crude representationist theory of knowledge or mock the naïve dialectic of nature accepted in Russia as the ABC of communist philosophy. If Russia's writ were to run at the political level, it must have the right philosophy too—for had not Lukacs shown that a communist party's basic justification is that it has deciphered the philosophy of history which the short-sighted workers cannot read? So Western Marxism was condemned with a rare ferocity as a deviation from, not a development of, Marxism.

LUKACS has written one book, *Der junge Marx,* and another, *Der junge Hegel.* Some day someone will write a book, *Der junge Lukacs.* We at least are finished with him now, for Lukacs buried him in 1924 at the age of 39. The survivor, while bowing to the will of the Party he himself had made the repository of truth, undertook the long struggle against the rising sectarianism that was to culminate in Stalinism. This is the period down to 1928–29 and concerns mainly the conflicting tendencies among the Hungarian exiles in Moscow, Vienna and Berlin. It is extremely intricate and its climax was the condemnation of the Blum theses in 1929 by the Comintern (Blum was the name Lukacs had in the underground). In 1928 he submitted inside the illegal Party an analysis of the failure of the Bela Kun dictatorship, his version of the development of Hungary under Admiral Horthy and finally his recommendations on what the Party should do. Unfortunately he made the mistake of anticipating the Popular Front line of 1935: that is, he drew the conclusion from the strength of fascism in Hungary that the workers alone—and even less the communists alone while denouncing other workers' leaders as social fascists—could not hope to overthrow fascism and install a proletarian dictatorship. Rather they must fight fascism first in the name of democracy and in alliance with, at least, the whole of the working class, under the slogan 'Class against Class'. The Party must pose as *the* democratic party, seek a mass basis outside the working class and propose a 'democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants'. To that end it must criticize itself for the mistake of the Kun

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regime in refusing to give the peasants land. It must now promise land to the peasants and silence those communists who argued that land division was not socialism. In general, the Blum theses are dogmatic communist stuff, and the democratic pose in particular is patently tactical. Still, they did take into account conditions inside Hungary and the needs of the anti-fascist struggle. They were condemned in the name of an abstract Stalinism which took account of neither.[11]

The Comintern replied that the Blum theses were the work of a rightist, an anti-Leninist, a half-social-democrat, a liquidator of the Hungarian Communist Party. Blum could not see that the social democrats had become social fascists, nor that the wave of the third period was swelling and so this was the time for Bolsheviks to fight against democratic illusions. It was the moment for pure proletarian socialist revolution, and there could be no talk of the republic or democracy, even as a stage towards proletarian dictatorship. Not only could there be no proletarian alliance with the bourgeois; even an alliance with the peasants was impossible unless one category within the peasantry, the rich peasants, the kulaks, were excluded. The slogan 'land for the peasants' was not specifically condemned but seems to have been set aside, which was in line with the policy Stalin was preparing in Russia itself. In short, Moscow was on a fanatically ultra-left tack, but it may well be that it was angry too because Lukacs's positing of a careful and generally sensible analysis of the Hungarian situation as the base for Hungarian Party policy implied resistance to Moscow's domination, in the name of a national communism. Certainly, it was that aspect of the Blum theses that was uppermost when they were revived—indeed made available publicly for the first time—in 1956. Lukacs's ideas of 1928 were discussed in Budapest in 1956, as representing part of a tendency towards a more democratic national way to communism. But in 1929 he disavowed them after the blast from Moscow, performing a thorough act of self-criticism. He recanted that recantation in 1956, saying that Moscow had threatened that unless he withdrew his theses the entire Hungarian Communist Party would be expelled from the Comintern.

THIS was not the last nor the most humble of Lukacs's self-criticisms, for he entered now on the road to his long career as the complete Stalinist. When he took refuge in Moscow after leaving Berlin in 1933, he performed, according to Morris Watnick,[12] 'one of the most abject acts of self-degradation on record' before the philosophical section of the Academy of Sciences. Watnick suggests that Lukacs was reacting in horror from the shock he got in Berlin in 1933 when he saw some of

11 'Offener Brief des Exekutivkomitees der Kommunistischen Internationale an die Mitgleider der Kommunistischen Partei Ungarns' (1928), reproduced in *Schriften*, pp. 727–52.

12 Morris Watnick, 'Relativism and Class Consciousness: Georg Lukacs', in L. Labedz, ed., *Revisionism* (London, 1962).

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his former fellow-students at German universities go over to Hitler, so that he now saw his youthful idealist philosophy as the seedbed of fascism. Lukacs himself says that in those days you could not criticize Stalin without aiding Hitler and that he did carry on a sort of guerrilla war against Stalinism, getting books published by making fulsome references to Stalin but nevertheless holding to opposition views on Hegel. One is not of course concerned here to pass judgment. Suffice it to say that if this period were all there were of Lukacs's work, he would scarcely be worth talking about, for this is the type of communist intellectual most familiar to people of the pre-war generation. Its features are, fawning adulation of Stalin, acceptance of Lenin's amateurish philosophy (though Lukacs had specifically disproved the representationist theory of knowledge in his earlier work and could not possibly believe what he said about it later), and endorsement of the 'dialectic of nature'. To his credit, I do not know of his ever applying the 'dialectic of nature'; he just says it exists (he had earlier proved the contrary), but that took no more than half a line and Lukacs left it there. Finally, there was the customary defence of the Moscow trials and scurrilous abuse of Western socialists. Philosophical discussion for Lukacs in this period was just boasting: our philosophy is better than theirs, Lenin was a genius who foresaw all.

This was bad enough but it got worse during the Cold War, when Lukacs was back in Budapest. He then descended, in the words of Rusconi, to 'cultural terrorism'. His 1954 book, *The Destruction of Reason,*[13] could well be preserved as a monument to the debasement of communist intellectuals in the six years before that date. It has even been attacked as excessive in Moscow. Admittedly nothing was said against it in Moscow at the time, but after Lukacs had been expelled from the Party for his activities in 1956, *Voprosy Filosofii* remembered that *The Destruction of Reason* had been a disgraceful racialist attack on the Germans. It did not recall that after each anti-German outburst in the book came the assertion that the Americans were no better, that General Ridgway and Senator McCarthy were a new Goering and a new Hitler, and so forth.

Already, underneath this strident Stalinist propaganda, one could see Lukacs's disenchantment with communist culture, which was to find expression only after Stalin's death. The Stalinists were not fooled; they noticed that in the mass of literary criticism that Lukacs published in those years there was hardly a reference to Soviet literature, which Lukacs virtually ignored while he wrote about bourgeois writers like Thomas Mann. For this sin of omission, an attack on Lukacs was mounted in 1949 which became the aesthetic aspect of the Rajk affair. Lukacs duly made several self-criticisms, which only enraged the Stalinists further because they were obviously insincere and incomplete.

[13] *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* (Berlin, 1954). In French as *La Destruction de la Raison* (Paris, 1958).

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These attacks came from the highest level, from the government, and eventually, in 1951, Lukacs lost his public offices and retreated to semi-retirement. The charge sheet against him said that he admired only Western bourgeois culture and had nothing to say for socialist realism. True, he said nothing against it but the Stalinists suspected the worst, correctly as Lukacs later admitted. They complained that he hid behind quotations from Marx and Engels in praise of the bourgeois classics; but Marx and Engels had had no socialist art at their disposal, whereas Lukacs had and scorned it. Lukacs was challenged to come out into the open and say Soviet art was bad, instead of hiding behind the officially tolerated doctrine of 'uneven development', which conceded that a society more advanced economically need not have, right away, a superior art, philosophy, or literature. The Stalinists at that time ruled that the superior economy must be superior in art and science. A saying of Lukacs's on that subject circulated in Budapest and was held against him: 'Marxism-Leninism is the Himalaya among ideologies but a rabbit that lives in the mountains is not bigger than an elephant that lives in the plains.'

Lukacs now says he could not state his real views on the nullity of Soviet art because for the literary critic opposition was physically impossible. That was no doubt true, but it was even more true for the artists themselves. So Lukacs was in an untenable situation: as a Stalinist propagandist he was defending, without being too particular in his choice of weapons, a regime that had made him a high priest of aesthetics although he had no freedom to express the opinion that this society had produced no art and left its artists no liberty. His open statements on the vacuity of Soviet culture,[14] when at last they came, after 1956, were devastating. One remembers that Lukacs had begun his career as a communist official a generation earlier with the motto, 'Politics is simply the means; the end is culture'. From 1956 on he repeatedly said things like 'We still do not have a Marxist psychology, ethics, aesthetics or logic'; 'today there still exists no Marxist pedagogy, psychology or ethics'; 'philosophy, economics and historiography have been stagnant for decades'; though problems of culture could decide the capitalist-communist rivalry in the age of leisure, communism has nothing to propose, no socialist way out for men left spiritually hungry by capitalism, and there is no socialist model for a better culture. The central problem of socialist ideology he now saw to consist in a *Bewältigung der Vergangenheit*, in explaining how Stalinism was possible. As for socialist realism, all examples of it to date were dismissed as Party propaganda, didactic naturalism, 'literature as illustration' and trite revolutionary romanticism.

Lukacs had taken a long time to discover and longer still to admit what Gramsci foresaw: that the working people of their day lacked

14 See the essays, lectures and interviews collected in Lukacs, *Marxismo e politica culturale* (Turin, 1968) and in *Schriften*, pp. 593–706.

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cultivation, almost by definition, and so their spontaneous culture would be crude, simple-minded and tasteless. For after all what was Soviet art but what pleased the traditional conservatism of the Russian masses, the uneducated taste of the most ignorant and oppressed people in Europe—a taste that came to be consecrated by an outdated aesthetics, a century behind the times, and then was officially proclaimed doctrine of state and its respect enforced by the police? Thus the prudishness, narrow-mindedness and neurotic reaction to any new form of expression which had distinguished Victorian philistines, came to be passed off as revolutionary thought. Lukacs's own conservative aesthetics has lent theoretical support to these attitudes, but whenever it came to actual works of art he has always preferred classic culture to works produced according to his politico-aesthetic recipes. For this he has been periodically denounced (for example, in 1960 in very violent terms) as bourgeois, aristocratic, élitist, idealist, anti-proletarian and counter-revolutionary.

This is plainly an unsatisfactory outcome for a revolution entered upon for culture's sake. Yet it has done nothing to reconcile Lukacs to Western culture. The Stalinists' attacks on his preoccupation with bourgeois writers might suggest this, but in fact Lukacs dates the decadence of Western culture from the successors of Balzac, Stendhal, Dickens and Tolstoi. With partial exceptions like Thomas Mann, he sees everything that has happened in Western art since 1848 as pathological symptoms of imperialism, Hitlerism and American preparations for atomic war. Lukacs has rejected, with what Fernandez-Santos has called '**heroic incomprehension**',[15] everything modern, experimental, formalist, and surrealist in Western art. He has vilified Kafka, Joyce and Schönberg in terms close to those used, regarding those same artists, by the Stalinists and Nazis. Typical is his pronouncement on Kafka: 'no work of art based on *Angst* (anxiety) can avoid, objectively speaking, guilt by association with Hitlerism and the preparations for atomic war'.[16] The rest of Western culture is 'op art, pop art and mini-skirts', i.e. fads, foibles and fashions.

LUKACS's aesthetics deserves separate treatment and is mentioned here only to make one point: since he sees the product of 50 years of communist art as a desert and since he rejects almost all modern Western art as a wasteland of imperialist decadence, this professor of aesthetics is still waiting for the cultural revolution. This brings us to the last chapter: the old man disappointed with the working class as a *machine de guerre* against capitalist culture and casting about for a new vehicle for the inevitable cultural revolution. In some communist intellectuals this leads to attachment to the Chinese communist cause; not so with Lukacs.

15 Francisco Fernandez-Santos, *Historia y Filosofia* (Barcelona, 1966), p. 226.
16 Lukacs, *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism* (trans. J. and N. Mander, London, 1963), p. 81.

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What are his opinions today? [17] He considers that a new capitalist era has begun and that socialism consequently is going through a second childhood. It is back again where it was at the start of the nineteenth century, unarmed with any sound theory. This means that Marxism-Leninism is irrelevant to our present situation. 'We need a new theory.' Such a theory will be a protest against capitalist exploitation and oppression, which today are not what Marx knew but assume the form of manipulation of leisure time. The economic groundwork now exists for a free human life such as Marx envisaged in his 1844 manuscripts, and yet we are alienated in the industrial society because capitalism is stunting our cultural growth, limiting it to manipulated free time and to mere consumption. Marxism is helpless and has no solution to offer. The proletariat is not class conscious but democratic, and yet, because it is the mass, it could still provide a combat vehicle to turn on the manipulators, provided a revolutionary theory were brought to it from outside. The mass always needed outsiders to fire its revolutionary discontent; that is even truer now than in Lenin's time. The discontent, the emptiness are there; the question is to exploit them. 'We need a new Lenin.'

We must set out to turn dumb discontent into open rebellion by convincing people they are not happy even when they think they are. To do that we must form a nucleus that will be in the nature of a political party in that it will have a structured organization, but it must not be dominated by East European style Party secretaries. Rather than run the risk of a new Stalin or Rakosi it should be managed by a Kennedy-style brains trust. Its task will be to locate the issue that will get the masses moving till they can be brought to see their real interests. We do not yet know what the magic word will be that will cause the popular explosion and we must sift dozens of likely issues till we find it—our Dreyfus case. It need not be a socialist slogan that we find and need not even be directly related to our objectives; after all, Lenin got the leadership of the Russian masses at the crucial moment with non-socialist slogans like peace, land for the peasants and independence for the nationalities. Meantime, we must resist the temptation of *Praktizismus*, activism, like that of the angry young pro-Chinese ultra-leftists who dash off to Bolivia or Somalia to fight imperialism. Lukacs has no sympathy with Régis Debray or Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a type he compares to the fascists, because he envisages a more durable rebellion against the industrial society than the brief outbreaks they can spark off.

The 'industrial society', not just capitalism. Speaking in Budapest,

[17] On them, see: T. Pinkus, ed., *Gespräche mit Georg Lukacs* (Hamburg, 1967); an interview in the Hungarian literary periodical *Kortars*, May 1968, translated in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, January 1969, pp. 148–59; other interviews with Lukacs in *Kulturni Noviny*, no. 12, 22 March 1968, in the *New Hungarian Quarterly*, no. 29, 1968, in *Film Kultura* (Budapest), July 1968 (summarized in *l'Unità*, 31 July 1968), in *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), March 1969 (summarized in *l'Unità*, 9 April 1969) and finally in *Neues Forum*, May 1969.

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Lukacs is not free to say that this effort will be directed against communism as much as capitalism. Yet it is clear that his strictures on manipulation and reification apply to the system now ruling there too, which he denies is Marxist socialism (and which he is said to have called ' Stalinism without the camps '). Lukacs's Marxism implies opposition to any sort of rationally organized, specializing social arrangement in which economic, productive considerations dominate. In protest against the manipulation such a system is held to entail, the unrepentant intellectual adventurer still seeks to arouse the assorted malcontents of both worlds. This Marcuse-like search for a clientele for philosophers who hate everything about the modern world is at a considerably lower level than the *History and Class Consciousness* theory. There, the subject of history, the social force whose ideology was to mould the whole of society, could only be a social class, a concrete universal, a totality, a collective Machiavellian prince. Today that role is to be assumed by a few old academics and young firebrands plaintively scolding the masses for settling for less than the cultural millenium. It is in these sands that one of the streams of communism peters out. Yet that does not mean the original source is of no interest. Enduring regimes, and the communist states seem to be of that sort, long look back to their founding illusions, to the sources of inspiration long since run dry. Lukacs, *der junge Lukacs*, just because he was too extreme, too logical, too intellectualist in overstating the faith, is assured of a claim on the memory of the communist movement.

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KRUPSKAYA PURGES THE PEOPLE'S LIBRARIES

Bertram D. Wolfe

What happened to us? How could we have given in? What was the chief thing that got us down? Fear? The idols of the market place? The idols of the theatre? All right, I'm a 'little man', but what about Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya? Didn't she understand, didn't she realize what was happening? Why didn't she raise her voice?

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Cancer Ward*

ON 8 November 1923 Maxim Gorky wrote from Sorrento to his editorial assistant, the poet Vladislav Khodasevich, then in England:

> For news that stuns the mind . . . in Russia Nadezhda Krupskaya and a certain M. Speranski have forbidden the reading of: Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer, Vl[adimir] Solovev, Taine, Ruskin, Nietzsche, L[ev] Tolstoi, Leskov . . . and many similar heretics. And it is further decreed: 'The section on religion must contain only anti-religious books.' All this, supposedly . . . is printed in a booklet entitled *A Guide to the Removal of Anti-Artistic and Counter-revolutionary Literature from Libraries Serving the Mass Reader.* . . . I have written in 'supposedly' above the line, since I still cannot make myself believe in this intellectual vampirism, and I will not believe it until I see the *Guide.*
>
> My first impression was so strong that I started writing to Moscow to announce my repudiation of Russian citizenship. What else can I do if this atrocity turns out to be true? [1]

The letter is curious and complicated, showing Gorky's ability to stage little dramas within his own spirit, for, while he was writing to Khodasevich that Krupskaya's circular 'supposedly' existed, he had actually had a copy in his hands two months earlier. Moreover, this was not Krupskaya's first but her second sweeping order for the purging of the libraries intended for the popular masses, for her circular begins with this introduction:

> Already in 1920 the Political-Education Section of the People's Commissariat of Education sent instructions to the various local bodies on the re-examination of their catalogues in order to purge the public libraries of obsolescent literature.
>
> However, up to now [spring 1923], with rare exceptions, the Political Education Committees have completely neglected the task

[1] For Gorky's letter to Khodasevich and Khodasevich's notes thereon see 'The Letters of Maksim Gorky to V. F. Xodasevic, 1922–1925. With Notes by V. F. Xodasevic and an Introduction by Sergius Yakobson, translated and edited by Hugh McLean', *Harvard Slavic Studies*, vol. I, 1953, pp. 306–7, and *The Bridge and the Abyss* (New York and London, 1967), pp. 143–45.

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of re-examining and eliminating books from the libraries, and in some provinces it required the intervention of the GPU to get the task of removing books started.

The Krupskaya circular Gorky referred to was one of three sent out by her. The first of late 1920 I have not been able to secure, which is unfortunate since it was drawn up while Lenin was still in full possession of his powers and trying to check up on everything being done in the name of the proletarian dictatorship, and when Krupskaya, as was her wont, could consult him on any puzzling aspect of the purge of books.[2] But I do have a photostat of the second circular, sent out in the spring of 1923: an article by Krupskaya in *Pravda* of 9 April 1924, in which she attempts to answer the storm of criticism 'abroad' (and surely not only abroad, for men like Lunacharski, her hierarchical superior as Commissar of Education, must have had their reservations and made them known to her [3]); and a photostat of the third circular signed by her and published in *Krasny Bibliotekar* (no. 1 of 1924).[4]

[2] In 1929 Krupskaya took a backward glance at the library situation at the end of the civil war in a little book entitled *Chto pisal i govoril Lenin o bibliotekakh* ('What Lenin Wrote and Said About Libraries'). In her introduction she pictures Lenin as personally turning his attention to the rebuilding of the libraries, proposing the organization of volunteers (*subbotniki*) to catalogue a million or so uncatalogued books in the Rumyantsev (today the Lenin) Library; ordering the restoration of the library of the Academy of Sciences, etc. 'If his intervention was necessary to clear the premises of the Academy of Sciences [it had been turned into a field hospital], one can imagine the state of ordinary libraries. Libraries had to be purged of narrow-minded and religious books, and in the process the shelves of old-established libraries were almost denuded. . . . There was no lack of good intentions [locally], but little common sense.' He worried about 'Soviet bureaucrats who grab books and newspapers' and proposed to requisition them for the libraries, he worked out decrees on the requisitioning of books, the 'punishment for concealing collections of books and other printed matter', the conditions and places in which 'White Guard Literature' should be available for public use, the organization of bibliographies, the preservation of newspapers in reading rooms so that they would last longer, and countless other details, with his usual meticulous precision. In 1936 Krupskaya told an All-Union Conference on Library Work: 'In our library section of the cultural front things are made significantly easier by the fact that we have the sufficiently detailed directions of Vladimir Ilich, who always paid the most thorough attention to the work of the libraries.' As far as temperament and memory permitted, she tried to follow his indications when he was no longer there to be consulted. On this see her booklet on *What Lenin Wrote and Said About Libraries*, and the subsequent compendium, *Lenin o bibliotechnom dele* ('Lenin on Library Work'), Moscow, 1960, an anthology of some 180 pages.

[3] The *Pravda* article is entitled '"Ogrekhi" Glavpolitprosveta' ('"Defects" of the Bureau of Political Education'—*Ogrekh* is an archaic word referring to a slip made by a plough when trying to plough a straight furrow). The article is reprinted in N. Krupskaya, *Pedagogicheskie Sochineniya*, vol. VIII, Moscow, 1960, pp. 78–80.

[4] That issue of *Krasny Bibliotekar* is in the Slavonic Division of the New York Public Library. I owe my copy to the kindness of Anna M. Bourguina who had a photostat made for a study of Soviet cultural controls on which she was engaged. To her also as Curator of the Boris I. Nicolaevsky Collection in the Hoover Institution, I owe the opportunity to photograph the hard-to-come-by original of Krupskaya's Second Circular, the one referred to by Maxim Gorky in his letter cited above. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the Nicolaevsky Collection contains the only copy now extant outside of secret archives in Russia. S. G. Sumski-Kaplun showed the circular to Gorky, used it for an article (unsigned), in *Sotsialisticheski Vestnik* of 27 November 1923, and then may have given the same copy to Boris Nicolaevsky.

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Krupskaya did not answer her critics until the following year, in her signed article on the 'defects' of the Bureau of Political Education in *Pravda* (9 April 1924). There had been two such alleged 'defects' in the past year, she said. One was from the pen of her highly esteemed non-Party assistant for library matters, A. A. Pokrovski, who had written:

> Religion that is fully free from superstition concerning the intervention of higher powers in the affairs of our world, that puts no obstacles nor snares in the path of science, that recognizes in principle that the entire real world as cognizable, if 'not to the end' at least 'up to the infinite'—such a religion . . . is really not an enemy for us, and the struggle against it is not a task for our libraries.

'In this', Krupskaya says, 'A. A. Pokrovski is terribly mistaken. Such a religion is not less dangerous. . . . It does a better job of throwing dust into our eyes . . . which renders it still more dangerous.' Here we get an echo of the view which Lenin had dictated to her in his famous letter to Gorky of mid-November 1913, where he expressed his preference for the gross priest 'who seduces little girls' as easier to expose than the priest without a crude religion, and accuses Gorky with his 'god-building' of 'ideological copulation with a corpse'.[5]

The other 'defect' Krupskaya treated in more ambiguous fashion. The libraries for popular use, she said, contained many 'unnecessary and harmful books'. These included 'moralizing talks, books about God of an arch-Black Hundred character [the use of *arkhi*—arch—to express a superlative was one of the pecularities of Lenin's personal style], monarchist rubbish . . . patriotic literature of the period of the war, agitation and literature written on the current issues of the year 1917—in favour of a Constituent Assembly, etc. . . . literature containing explanations of decrees and laws that have long outlived their time'. Yes, her circular had spoken of the need to remove this literature from the libraries serving the mass reader. 'This is a simple protection of their interest.'

> In the circular there was no 'defect', yet a 'defect' there was all the same. To the circular was affixed a thoroughly unfortunate list of books, a list compiled by the Commission for the Re-examination of Books, attached to the circular I had signed, without my knowledge. As soon as I saw this list I cancelled it.
>
> Why was the list unfortunate? In the first place because it was beside the mark. In it, it was said that it was necessary to remove

[5] The letter is cited and discussed in *The Bridge and the Abyss*, pp. 50–51; the Russian text is in *Lenin*, vol. XXXV, pp. 89–91. (Except where otherwise indicated, all references in this article are to the fourth Russian edition of Lenin's Works.) A corrupt and bowdlerized English translation of the fourth edition is available. A good example of the bowdlerization is to be found in this very letter where 'seducing little girls' becomes 'corrupting' them and where *trupolozhstvo* (copulation with a corpse) becomes necrophily (*sic*!)

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Всем Губ. и Уполитпросветам, Партко-мам, Облитам, Публитам и Отделам ГПУ.

Инструкция о пересмотре книжного состава библиотек к изъятию контр-революционной и антихудожественной литературы.

Еще в 1920 году Политико-Просветительным Отделом Наркомпроса разослана была на места инструкция о пересмотре каталогов к изъятию устаревшей литературы из общественных библиотек.

Однако, до сих пор доклады Политпросветов, за редкими исключениями, совершенно не упоминали о работе по просмотру и изъятию книг из библиотек, и в некоторых губерниях потребовалось вмешательство ГПУ, чтобы работа по изъятию началась. Повидимому, Политпросветы недостаточно уяснили всей необходимости и важности указанной меры. Между тем она имеет безусловно громадное политическое

The first page of Krupskaya's ' second circular '.

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Примерные списки книг к инструкции по изъятию устаревшей литературы из библиотек.

I. По отделу философии, психологии и этики.

а) Книги, подлежащие удалению из библиотек, обслуживающих массового читателя:

1. Аллан Кардек. Книга медиумов.
2. Битнер. Верить или не верить.
3. Волков. Френология.
4. Габбе. Как надо жить, чтобы счастливым быть (по Смайльсу)
5. Дебэ. Мир чудесного.
6. Друммонд. Высшее благо и др.
7. Жаколио. Спиритизм в Индии.
8. Кальмет. О явлении духов.
9. Кораблев. О нравственности (с приложением к практической жизни и рассмотрением революционных движений).

10. Ленорман. Истолкователь снов.
11. Мантегацца. Счастье, труд и др.
12. Меньшиков. Думы о счастье и др.
13. Смайльс. Долг, характер, самостоятельность и др.
14. Соколов. О долге. Солдатская беседа о долге повиновения властям.
15. Ф. Страхов. Дух и материя (против материализма).
16. Фламмарион: Люмен (о бессмертии души).
17. Штейнер. Мистика.

б) Книги по отделу философии, подлежащие удалению из небольших библиотек, но оставляемые в библиотеках крупных:

1. Грота.
2. Ланге. История материализма.
3. Лопатина.
4. Лосского.
5. Вл. Соловьева.
6. Челпанова книги по философии и психологии.

Биографии и сочинения:

1. Декарта.
2. Канта.
3. Маха.
4. Платона.
5. Спенсера.
6. Шопенгауэра.

The first two pages of the attached list of books which were to be removed from Soviet libraries.

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> from the mass libraries Plato, Kant, Mach—in general, idealists. That idealist philosophers are harmful people is beyond question. But their presence in a library for peasants or the worker masses is not harmful at all, it is senseless: a man of the masses (*massovik*) will not read Kant. Hence the 'list' actually did not alter matters in any way. Much worse was the fact that the list of books to be removed in the field of 'religion' was extremely limited.

AS I set down these words of Krupskaya, a woman possessing great power in the field of popular education, ideas crowded in upon my mind. I thought of Lomonosov, born in a little fishing village, son of a fisherman who went to sea with his father to fish in northern waters, who early learned to read, reading everything he could lay his hands on, developed an encyclopedic mind, exhibited genius in science, philosophy, and other fields, becoming a literary and intellectual model for ensuing generations. I thought of Chekhov whose grandfather was a serf, of Kluev, the poet, whose paternal ancestry leads to a tribal Eskimo tent of a Christianized Old Believer on the coast of the White Sea, the poet Klychkov, born to peasants in the village of Dubrovskaya in the Province of Tver, of Oreshin who sang of the Volga region in which he was born, of Esenin, born to peasants in the village of Konstantinovo, who became the greatest peasant poet of all until the very species was crushed by the harsh epithet, *kulak*. I thought of Shevchenko, a liberated serf who became the founder of Ukrainian literature and of a sense of Ukrainian nationhood. I thought, too, of Gray's *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard* with its 'village Hampdens', its 'mute inglorious Miltons', and its generous thought that the lowliest and poorest hut in the humblest village may contain a genius if only access to 'knowledge, rich with the spoils of time', is not denied to him. The *Elegy* reminded me of Lomonosov again, and of his lines:

> *Perhaps to our own Platos*
> *Our Newtons swift of thought*
> *Our Russian land may well give birth*

In my mind arose the image of the throng of *raznochintsy*, who came from the lower depths and margins outside the recognized society of estates, sons of serfs, sons of poor priests, sons of wandering pilgrims, poor traders, and Old Believers, to lay impetuous hands upon the treasures hitherto the monopoly of an intelligentsia sprung from the nobility. I thought of the humble beginnings of the Russian theatre in the performances of serfs to entertain their masters, and of N. S. Shchepkin, a serf until he was 33, who became an actor in the Maly Theatre and one of the greatest actors in the history of the Russian stage. I thought of Sytin, a great publishing magnate who rose from poverty and sought to bring cheap books to the people, all of whose books for children were to be eliminated from the libraries by this self-same list where he is dismissed as 'a publisher not deserving of trust'. And I thought

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of his friend and collaborator, Maxim Gorky, who himself rose from the lower depths of vagrants and tramps, who formed his style on Old Church Slavonic and the Gospels, the vivid campfire talk of down and outers, and the folk tales of his illiterate grandmother, who became an omnivorous reader and a great writer, and then, in a compact with Lenin, made himself the custodian of Russian culture and the saviour of the lives and dignity of starving and freezing intellectuals for whom Lenin's war communism had found no place. I thought, too, of a younger Krupskaya, devoutly religious until the age of 20, eager teacher of reading circles for the illiterate until Lenin made fun of her zeal to bring letters and books to the people, and who doubtless venerated such philosophers as Plato, until Lenin taught her that 'idealist philosophers are beyond question harmful people'.[6]

Nor could I fail to think of my own personal fate, born into a poor family in a Brooklyn slum, none of whose members before me, neither mother nor father nor older brother and sister had had more than an elementary school education. Had it not been for Andrew Carnegie's generosity in endowing a public library in each of the slums in which we lived successively, and the broad criterion of the librarians who did not exclude Plato or Aristotle or Herbert Spencer or any of the other difficult writers I struggled with as a little boy who had no one to guide his reading, I should neither have developed any command of English style nor received a higher education at all. Fortunately, neither the people of my city who taxed themselves to maintain these free libraries, nor Andrew Carnegie whose bounty set them up, nor the branch librarians who selected the books, shared Krupskaya's feeling that it was 'senseless' to make such works accessible to the children of the poor.

THERE were other 'unfortunate' features in this list which Krupskaya so ambiguously criticized and cancelled. One of its defects was that most of the authors to be purged from the shelves were listed only by their last names, without first names or patronymics, and without the title of their offending books. Since many of these family names belonged to more than one writer, what chaos such a list might cause among librarians anxious not to be behind in revolutionary zeal, playing safe by throwing out every work by a writer bearing the listed last name! Yet there were cases where actual titles of books were listed, as in the case of Lange's *History of Materialism*, and the proscribed list included the great Russian moral and religious philosopher, Solovev, the philosophers Lossky, Descartes, Spencer, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, William James, a list that suggests that Lenin's simple division of philosophers into 'idealistic' and 'materialistic' does not exhaust the possible categories.

[6] On this see N. Krupskaya, *Izbrannie Pedagogicheskie Sochineniya*, Moscow, 1958, pp. 248–49, and Krupskaya, *Memories of Lenin* (New York, 1930), vol. I, p. 3.

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Also listed under one head or another were Taine, Maeterlinck, Nordau, Gessen (with the title *O neprikosvennosti lichnosti*—'On the Inviolability of the Person'); Lev Tolstoi, and Kropotkin. Only on these last two names did Krupskaya have anything to say, and once more what she said proved ambiguous. She wrote in her *Pravda* article:

> It was impermissible to prohibit some of the works of Tolstoi and Kropotkin. Of course the *Weltanschauung* of L. Tolstoi with his belief in God, belief in providence, etc. does not belong to those [views] that should be disseminated. Exclusive concern with one's self, concentration of all efforts on self-perfection, non-resistance to evil, the call not to combat it—all this is diametrically opposed to that to which the communists summon the masses. And these appeals of L. Tolstoi are especially harmful precisely because of his highly exceptional talent. However, the contemporary mass reader is already sufficiently imbued with a collective psychology, has fought too much, and for that reason the preachings of L. Tolstoi are not dangerous, they will only stimulate thought. Nor are the anarchist tendencies of Kropotkin dangerous. Life teaches at every turn what a mighty force organization is. . . .

We must leave it to the reader to decide whether this is a repudiation or a left-handed justification of the inclusion of Tolstoi and Kropotkin on the ouster list, and whether libraries should be cleansed with especial zeal of books you do not like if they are written with talent by great artists.

However, since Krupskaya expressly 'cancelled' the list attached by her subordinates to her second circular, let us turn our attention to the third library purge circular, signed: *Chairman of the Bureau of Political Education, N. Krupskaya; Chief of the Literary Censorship, P. Lebedev-Polyanski; Chairman of the Central Library Commission, M. Smushkova.* It refers specifically to three supplementary 'Model Lists of Books and Instructions for the Purge of Libraries'. Both the circular and the three 'model lists' were published in the 'Official Section' of *Krasny Bibliotekar* (no. 1, 1924, pp. 135–41), followed by two more supplements giving a model 'Report Form for the Removal of Books in Accordance with the Instructions of the Central Library Commission for Submission to the Central Library Commission for Approval', and a 'Form for a List of Books Marked for Removal, Sent for Approval to the Central Library Commission'. The lists published in the three appendixes are not as ample as those attached to the second circular, for they are limited to 55 writers in the field of belles-lettres, 118 writers of tales for children, and 51 writers in the fields of history and historical fiction. But there is a footnote explaining that 'Supplementary lists of books for the above and other sections will be printed in the following numbers of the journal'. And this time the lists are more precisely drawn up, with the first initials of each author and the title or titles of his works to be removed. And, since the lists are referred to directly in

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the text of the circular, this time there is no doubt of their official character, or of Krupskaya's approval.

The circular itself has a tone of even greater urgency than the previous one. It is now almost four years, it said, since the first instructions went out in 1920 on purging the popular libraries, and still, with 'rare exceptions', not a thing has been done except where the secret police have intervened. The local political education councils, aided by special *ad hoc* committees, must get busy at once with this all important task if the popular libraries are to 'free themselves from counter-revolutionary and harmful literature' and fulfil their 'great political education task among the masses'. Clearly, without such protective tutelage, the masses would be led astray.

Yet, along with this new tone of urgency, there is noticeable a new series of qualifications and warnings against too zealous misunderstandings. The circular warns that 'books published by Soviet, Party, and communist publishing houses are in general not subject to removal'. If there is doubt about their accessibility to the masses, 'they should be sent to big or special purpose libraries'. Books on philosophy, the history of philosophy, introductions to philosophy, philosophical monographs and the works of individual philosophers, it is taken for granted, should not be in libraries for the mass reader, but, 'even where they are non-Marxist, they should not be removed from the larger libraries'. The section on religious books repeats the sweeping language of the earlier circular, but then softens it to leave on the shelves the great basic classics of each creed.

In this one senses the influence of Lunacharski, who understood that the Old and New Testaments were themselves great literature, and that many passages in the classics of the literature of Russia would be unintelligible to those who did not know the Bible. The amended proscription reads:

> The section on religion in libraries that are not large should contain only anti-religious and anti-ecclesiastical literature. It is permissible to leave [in such small libraries] only basic books of doctrine: the Gospels, the Bible, the Koran. . . .

This, too, is followed by an unconsciously funny warning against excessive and ill-informed zeal: 'Books on the religious question are not subject to removal if they have been published by Soviet publishing institutions.'

Books published for the people by institutions that existed under the Tsar are to be removed, including those intended to spread literacy among the people, for they are all tainted by their origin. The same applies to books and pamphlets published by the other socialist parties against the Bolshevik stand on the war and the seizure of power in 1917. Also destined to disappear are legal reference works, collections of laws, and interpretations of laws no longer in force, whether they came from the Tsar's legislation or that of the Provisional Government, or decrees

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issued by the Soviet before it became a Bolshevik transmission belt. Textbooks, too, should go if they tend to educate people in 'the spirit of religiousness, monarchism, nationalist patriotism, militarism, respect for nobility and wealth'. More interesting is the attempt to obliterate from the popular mind the memory of the earlier period of rule by Lenin, and the utopian promises and expectations of the first years in power.

> In the section of the social sciences should be removed . . . obsolescent agitational and reference literature of the Soviet organs (1918, 1919, 1920) on those questions which at a given time the Soviet power has decided differently (the land question, the tax system, the question of free trade, the policy of food distribution, etc.).

Thus, so far as the popular masses were concerned, the whole period of war communism was to disappear without a trace into Orwell's 'memory hole'.

IN orderly fashion the types of books to be purged were subdivided into six numbered, or rather lettered, classes, namely:

a. Philosophy, psychology and ethics;
b. Religion;
c. Social Sciences;
d. Natural Sciences;
e. History of literature, history of geography;
f. Belles-lettres and children's books.

We have already considered some of these general instructions, but it is instructive to examine some of the other categories. In the natural sciences two types of works were to be removed: manuals that were published in the decades from the fifties through the seventies, and therefore are presumed to be obsolete; and 'those mixing science with religious fictions and discourses on the wisdom of the Creator, and the immorality of Darwinism and materialism'. To be sure some of the great classics were published during those decades, like Mendeleyev's *Principles of Chemistry* and Darwin's *Origin of Species*, and there is no warning against uncomprehending zeal in their possible removal. But if Krupskaya were reproached she might argue that they were not 'manuals', or perhaps that these did not belong in the small libraries accessible to the masses anyhow.

The final category includes belles-lettres and children's books, and ends with a warning against excessive zeal that reads: 'Classics of belles-lettres are not subject to removal.'

This is followed by directions on how to set up an apparatus for the purging of libraries. 'It should include representatives of the Department of Education, of the Communist Party, the communist youth, the trade unions, the local censorship, and where these do not exist, representatives of the GPU [secret police], and other interested organizations.'

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Then come 12 instructions for the functioning of this purge committee and its subcommittees, with a deadline of 1 October 1924 for the completion of the entire task. The last two instructions are in bold type, and read:

> 11. Not more than two examples of each book removed as harmful and counter-revolutionary must be put in the central library. Such books must be kept in special locked cases and be given out exclusively for scientific and literary studies. For these books a special catalogue must be set up which is to be made available in necessary cases.
>
> 12. The remaining books indicated for removal from the libraries must be kept apart until confirmation by the Central Library Commission and not put into circulation until the approved list is received along with directions on how to proceed with the books that have been removed.

AFTER completing my examination of this circular with its three appended lists and its two report forms, I turned hopefully to *Krasny Bibliotekar* for the promised supplementary lists in other fields, but they were not there! Had the criticism of others prevented the continuance of the lists? Or had some other means like direct mail or courier service replaced publication in the magazine? Although a deadline had been set for completing the purge of libraries by 1 October 1924, I had friends examine the subsequent issues of the journal not only for 1924 but also for 1925 and 1926. No such lists appeared, yet there was evidence that somehow such lists had reached the librarians and *ad hoc* purge committees, as will appear.[7]

What happened further is a matter of conjecture, but this much is sure: the removal of books continued and the purge of both popular and learned libraries grew in scope and intensity until, under Joseph Stalin, it became a veritable torrent sweeping all before it, clearing the way for new versions, and still newer versions of the past, the present and the future.[8] The havoc created by Krupskaya's third circular and its continuations made itself felt in notes of alarm in *Krasny Bibliotekar*, in *Kommunisticheskoe Prosveshchenie*, and even in *Izvestia*, the official journal of the Soviet government.[9]

[7] Part of this search had to be undertaken with the help of a long-distance phone call to New York where the only set of *Krasny Bibliotekar* for those years is to be found in the Slavonic Division of the New York Public Library. I want here to express my thanks to Avrahm Yarmolinsky, who for many years directed and built up the remarkable collection of Slavonica in that library, and one of his assistants, now also retired, whose name Mr Yarmolinsky did not forward to me, for their prompt and generous help in searching through the issues of the magazine. From Anna M. Bourguina, I got some of the evidence that appears below, showing that somehow the lists did indeed reach their destination.

[8] For the evidence, see 'Part V., The Conditioning of Culture', in my forthcoming *An Ideology in Power: Reflections on the Russian Revolution* (New York, Stein & Day, Autumn 1969), particularly Chapters I and III.

[9] In a totalitarian single-Party regime where the Party uses the state as its major transmission belt, the separation between government and Party is a fiction to bemuse

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Thus *Krasny Bibliotekar* (no. 3, 1926) contained the following unsigned item:

> *The removal of books.* The library section of the Council of Political Education has completed its re-examination, undertaken in 1925, of the list of books removed from the libraries as obsolescent. The inspection showed that in some localities the approach to this work was incorrect, and in some libraries downright impermissible. Books were subjected to removal that should not have been removed from the libraries at all (in some places even the works of Marx, Engels, etc., were removed). As a result of this examination, the library section of the Council of Political Education has made up a list of books that *should not* be removed from libraries.

One wonders which of the two lists was longer and harder to compile.

APPROXIMATELY a month later, Madame Smushkova, who had signed the last circular in her capacity as Chairman of the Central Library Commission, wrote an article of almost 1,000 words 'On the Problem of the Removal of Literature'.[10] Here are some passages from her article:

> In the list of books subject to removal should go (1) all books which are removed in accordance with the instructions for removal of 1924; (2) and those which according to new instructions should be placed in central district libraries; (3) and also those books which are not being read in the rural libraries. . . .
>
> Practice in these removals has shown that the localities have gone about this without sufficient seriousness. The Central Bureau of Political Education has reviewed up to 2,000 pages of lists in which shocking errors have been found. If books had been immediately reduced to pulp according to these lists, our libraries would have been deprived of no small quantity of most valuable publications. In some places they even removed the works of *Marx* and *Lenin* (under his pseudonyms of Tulin and Ilin), not to speak of *Belinski, Herzen, Dobrolyubov, Pushkin, Tolstoi, Gogol* and so on and so on.
>
> All districts, without exception, committed some or other of these errors, with such mistakes, and such intentions, as do not even permit of any classification into types. . . . Among the books removed we find publications of 1918 and 1919. Evidently it was reckoned that all works published before the NEP had become out of date, yet among these were books republished by the State Publishing House (GIZ) in later years. Non-Marxist works are removed, but alongside them the works of our Marxist economists are removed also. In some cases these errors are of a quite harmless character—books are removed that would scarcely find their

the governments and public opinion of other countries, but the fiction makes *Izvestia* the official journal of the state, and *Pravda* the official journal of the Party. The purge of libraries was thus treated as a state matter rather than a Party matter for, as far as I could find, *Pravda* had nothing to say on truth in libraries.

10 In *Kommunisticheskoe Prosveshchenie*, no. 4, 1926, pp. 161–63.

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readers in the given case of a not too large library of a district capital, for example the works of idealistic philosophers, a few books on the history of religion, and so on; no great harm will come of such removals. But what is most essential is what is done with this literature. If when they removed these books they would send them to the central library of the province, that would be one thing, but quite another if they sold them for waste paper. In that case they would be committing a serious error.

But in the majority of cases the removals showed much grosser errors—they removed necessary, useful books. Thus in the Mtsensk District . . . were removed: Dikshtein, *Who Lives by What*; Bebel, *Christianity and Socialism*; Labriola, *The Situation of the Working Class in Italy*; Koropchevski, *The Men of Antiquity*; Konkol, *The Commune of 1871*. From the field of belles-lettres, they removed Dickens, Tolstoi, Hugo, Maupassant, the tales of Elpatevski, Veresaev, Hauptmann, etc. Or in the Makarevski District . . . a special 'banishment' was suffered by literature of the children's section and the section of belles-lettres. Thus from the children's section were removed Jules Verne, Mayne Reid, Cooper, Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Kipling, *Captains Courageous*, Pakhomov, *The First Artist*.[11]

No less sweeping was the purge of the sections of science and geography. A whole series of materials for regional studies was removed. . . . In the Orlovski province they removed Baturin's *Outlines of the History of Russian Social Democracy*, Kerzhentsev's *How to Run a Meeting*, Gorky's *Song of the Stormy Petrel*.[12]

In some places they even removed Marx. Thus in the Buzulukski District was removed *Wage-labour and Capital*. In a number of places they removed the works of Lenin, Ryazanov, Trotsky, Kritsman [who wrote on planning], Lukin's *The Paris Commune*, etc. In some places the classics suffered particular persecution . . . Pushkin, *History of the Pugachev Uprising*, Aksakov, *Works*, Gogol *Complete Collected Works*, Zhukovski, *Works*, Krylov, *Complete Collected Works*, Griboedov, *Woe from Wit*, Tolstoi, *Works*, Turgenev, Nekrasov, *Poems*, Nikitin, *Diary of a Seminarist*, Uspenski, *Works*, Shevchenko, *The Minstrel*, Shakespeare, Schiller, etc. . . . In the field of science they removed Wagner, *Tales about the Air*, the same author's *Volcanoes and Earthquakes*, Kostychev's *On the Life of Plants*, etc. (Incidentally, these books were published by the State Publishing House.)

Such examples could be cited endlessly. What does that

11 Dikshtein is Szymon Diksztein, a Polish socialist who popularized Karl Marx and whose *Who Lives by What* was regarded as a socialist classic. Antonio Labriola was a leading Italian Marxist theoretician of the early twentieth century. Dmitri Andreyevich Koropchevski, editor of *Znanie* and *Slovo*, was a popularizer of anthropology; under the pseudonym G. Taranski he also wrote in the field of fiction. Marek Konkol's work dealt with the Paris Commune.

12 Both Baturin and Kerzhentsev were Leninists, the former being an editor of *Pravda* and *Zvezda*, and the latter a future biographer of Lenin and an agitprop director under Stalin. Gorky's *Song of the Stormy Petrel*, of which he himself got tired of hearing the praises, was regarded by revolutionaries as a remarkable prophecy in verse of the coming revolution.

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signify? That the campaign for removing books was carried on lightmindedly to the highest degree, and everything was removed that seemed for any reason suspicious to any member of the commission. And this although the commissions were composed for the most part of very authoritative comrades. This confirms our conclusions that the commissions went about the removal with insufficient seriousness, at best sanctioning a list that someone had composed.

THIS campaign against the 'lightmindedness' of the library cleansing commissions reached its climax when the official daily journal of the Soviet government, *Izvestia*, was enlisted for an ironical feuilleton, by G. Ryklin, with the resonant one-word title, 'AMOK'. The reader unfamiliar with this borrowed word from a foreign tongue was first given a solemn explanation. He learned that it was a sudden tropical ailment which occurred under a blazing sun, when the bamboo forests and even the missionaries were still, and all was 'as still and boring as in the League of Nations'. Then suddenly some Malaysian would suffer a strange tropical seizure, be possessed by a violent uncontrollable frenzy to kill and brandishing his dagger run amok. 'But with us, glory be to God, there are no tropics. Heat is not especially noticeable. On the contrary, we have really remarkable frosts. And not a single Malaysian. . . . Yet of people sick with the illness of running amok in our time we have enough. . . . And when we see one, our civic duty is to cry the warning, Amok! Amok!' At this point our feuilletonist settles down to his subject: officials running amok as they purge the libraries.

> In one library they catch a book of I. I. Stepanov-Skvortsov, *Essays on Religious Faiths*. The book is out. Motive, 'ideological'. Religion is the opium of the people, and there's no use embroidering on it. Amok!
>
> They grab *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* by Plekhanov, *Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History*, by Kautsky. Lock 'em up! 'The resolution is short, but says a lot—mixed up in conciliationism.'
>
> They discover *The Erfurt Programme*. Now that's just what they were looking for! Put it out of circulation! Why? 'The author is not indicated on the cover, an anonymous work.' Amok, comrades!
>
> After long effort the commission unearthed a book by Bebel, *Charles Fourier and his Teachings*. The inspector of the district education commission justified his order for the removal of this book with full clarity: 'No teachings except those of the district education school are permitted on the territory of this district.'
>
> Amok! Let each man watch out for himself!
>
> Then this same inspector arrested a book by Pokrovski.
>
> But enough is enough! And more than enough! Do you think its fun to write about people who are going out of their minds? We are fulfilling a sad but a necessary obligation. We

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are sounding the alarm: 'Amok! Look out, he's running! Block the road!'

One last remark: there in the tropics, when a man is caught by the frenzy and runs amok, he runs without thinking about anything. But with us he thinks. He thinks that he is doing his task. He thinks that he is being useful. He thinks. . . .

By special decree all such people should be forbidden to think. Without thoughts they will be a hundred times less dangerous. . . . With thoughts—amok!

WITH these three reproofs to the local librarians who were trying to carry out the instructions in Krupskaya's circulars, our story comes to a close, because the purging of libraries was taken over by far more powerful and resolute hands than Krupskaya's: those of Joseph Stalin. Thereafter the purge of libraries, including the purge of books by communist authors who became unpersons and of Party histories by communist historians that became unhistories, developed into a major operation, Party histories, each for a moment true and official, succeeding each other as if they were being consumed by a giant chain-smoker who lights the first volume of the new work with the last of the old.

When we hear the nostalgic cry for a 'return to Leninist norms', when the officially-inspired ancestor-worship is soon to culminate in the celebration of the Hundredth Anniversary of Lenin's birth, we cannot help but think of that first circular of 1920 which librarians were so remiss or reluctant to enforce that it was 'completely neglected with rare exceptions' or was started only in those provinces where there was the direct 'intervention of the GPU'. This strange tree of unknowledge was planted by Krupskaya under Lenin, with his direction and advice. After his death, it was nurtured and tended by her in what she took to be Lenin's spirit. Stalin and his lieutenants have not let it die, but have tended it with zeal. It flourishes to this day in the very centre of the Garden of Eden. The fruit is not forbidden, but, being mutable, it is alike hazardous to eat thereof, and hazardous to fail to eat. . . .

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

THE UNHOLY FAMILY

Maurice Cranston

IN his latest book * Raymond Aron examines two attempts that have been made to acclimatize Marx to France—Sartre's attempt to bring Marxism into line with existentialism, and Louis Althusser's attempt to restate Marxism as a form of structuralism. Aron gives good grounds for regarding both as unsuccessful. Neither theory passes the test of internal coherence, and both involve departures from Marx's own arguments that are far too extensive to be considered revisions or reformulations.

Of the two, Sartre's is perhaps the more sensational. Yet Sartre begins, as Aron reminds us, by making the most modest claims for existentialism and the most extravagant claims for Marxism. Marxism, says Sartre, is one of the great philosophies of world history, one of the dominant systems by which all human thought within a given period is shaped. He thus puts Marx in the same class as Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel; and at the same time he claims for existentialism nothing more than the status of a 'mere ideology', i.e. a little system which lives parasitically on the edge of a big system, and only awaits the moment when it can be assimilated. But despite all this belittling of existentialism by Sartre, it soon becomes clear, as Aron shows, that in Sartre's 'modernized Marxism', it is not existentialism which adapts itself to the demands of Marxism, but Marxism which is radically transformed to meet the demands of existentialism. What emerges at the end of the *Critique de la raison dialectique* is not a refurbished Marxism, but a remarkably unaltered 'Sartrism'.

As between Sartre's earlier existentialist and his later so-called Marxist writings, there is assuredly a change of interest away from metaphysics and psychology and in the direction of sociology and economics. But even this does not take him any nearer to Marx. Rather it leads, as Aron among others notices, to the 'restitution of Thomas Hobbe's vision of man—the *homo homini lupus*'. There is no affinity whatever between Hobbes and Marx, but there is a distinct affinity between Hobbes and the author of *Being and Nothingness*. That early work of Sartre developed the theme that 'hell is other people'. All human relationships were said there to tend either towards the sadistic or the masochistic. There was no possible community between men, because each was in competition against others to retain his own metaphysical freedom. One had either to dominate or be dominated.

When Sartre turns from metaphysics to sociology, he certainly does

* Raymond Aron, *D'une sainte famille à l'autre* (Paris, Gallimard).

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not accept Marx's doctrine of the essential social character of man or of the essential unity of the human interest. Sartre says what he has always said, that all men are enemies. He simply gives a new reason for their antagonism, and that is scarcity. It is because Nature is niggardly and because there is not enough to go round that man has grown up in circumstances which have made every man the enemy of his neighbour, and produced man as we know him—man who, in a characteristic phrase, Sartre calls 'the anti-man' or '*le contre-homme*', who is Hobbesian man brought to life again unaltered.

The kind of political life which it is possible for the *contre-homme* to experience is, not surprisingly, both circumscribed and unattractive. The only way he can live peacefully together with other men (whom he sees as rivals and enemies) is to have a system of terror ruling over him and them. Like Hobbes, Sartre sees the system of terror as resting on the consent of the ruled, as incorporating their freedom. This enables Sartre to say that terror is both freedom and fraternity. It is freedom because the terror is authorized to act by the free choice of the members of society; and it is fraternity because it enables men to live as brothers by threatening the severest penalties against anyone who acts in an 'unbrotherly' way.

The devices which Sartre employs to dress up this neo-Hobbesian theory as a neo-Marxist one are derived from Hegel, and it is to the Marx of the early writings that he makes his occasional reference in defending the view that Marx himself—as opposed to orthodox or 'lazy' Marxists—need have no quarrel with existentialism. The French public, however, has always been notoriously unresponsive to Hegelian categories of arguments, and although Sartre has evidently rearranged Marxism to his own satisfaction, he has not won much of a following among French readers for what he has done. His Marxism has an air of being somewhat eccentric.

LOUIS Althusser, the second theorist that Aron studies, is altogether younger and more modish. Only Aron leads one to feel that this modishness is one of Althusser's big defects. For the generation of bright Paris intellectuals under forty, the currently fashionable philosophy is not existentialism but structuralism, the leading prophet not Sartre but Claude Lévi-Strauss. And what Althusser tries to do is rewrite Marxism as a form of structuralism. In this endeavour he concentrates not on the Hegelian Marx of the early writings, but on the positivist Marx of *Das Kapital*, a book to which Althusser, very sensibly, assigns central importance.

The chief characteristic of Althusser's method, as Aron points out, is that he gives 'the sychronic' priority over 'the diachronic' in Marxism, and 'the theory of history' priority over history. This remark needs some explanation. Claude Lévi-Strauss, like earlier 'structuralists' in the field of anthropology, directed attention away from the history—or time sequence—of primitive societies towards their frame-

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work or system of order; the 'sychronic', being those things which exist at the same time, interested him more than the things which follow one after another, the 'diachronic'. Lévi-Strauss has argued not only that all societies do have certain structures, but that such is the demand of the human mind for order that all societies *must* have certain structures.

Althusser has taken these suggestions of Lévi-Strauss and applied them to certain features of the Marxist analysis—understandably to Marx's doctrine of an economic 'infrastructure' which governs the cultural 'superstructure', but rather less understandably to Marx's notions of surplus-value and class-conflict and revolution. Aron's book ends with the suggestion that Althusser's 'structuralist Marx' is as much a figment of the imagination as is Sartre's 'existentialist Marx', but one cannot fail to be struck by the more modest and cautious *tone* of Althusser's approach, compared to the arrogant manner of Sartre. This is perhaps because Althusser is trying to reconcile two masters, Marx and Lévi-Strauss, whereas Sartre is trying to make a synthesis of his own theory and Marx's, a synthesis which involves the minimum modification of his own theory and the maximum modification of Marx's.

It is a pity that neither Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique* nor Althusser's *Pour Marx* has yet been translated into English. They are a good deal livelier than most recent British and American essayists on neo-Marxist philosophy. The Anglo-Saxon reader could doubtless approach both Sartre and Althusser with more detachment and impartiality than can the average French reader. But if we had these two books, we should need Aron in English as well. For his book is a marvellously lucid commentary, which combines in a way which is no longer as usual in France as it used to be, brilliance of wit with a robust common sense in judgment.

IT COULDN'T HAPPEN AGAIN . . .

Daniel Weissbort

THIS account * of the camp life of a political prisoner between 1961–66 is in every way a remarkable work. One cannot say 'outstanding' because there is *nothing else* (with regard to Soviet conditions) to which it can be really compared. (Ivan Denisovich, in my opinion, while artistically of course more sophisticated makes less of an impact.) From beginning to end it is packed with the most detailed, fascinating and horrifying information. If it were nothing more than a kind of phantasmagoric, Gogolesque invention it would be a wonderful description of the pathology of incarceration. But as an authentic documentation of

* Anatoli Marchenko, *Moi pokazaniya* ('My Testimony'), Pall Mall Press, 1969.

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existing camp conditions, the poignancy is at times almost unbearable, particularly as Marchenko—though without a trace of self pity—never as it were allows the reader to stand back from the action. This book is an extended close-up.

At the same time, here is Russia in all its grotesque horror. One can learn more from this book about how the Soviet machine works than from any number of learned studies by Sovietologists. The camp is the Soviet Union in miniature, stripped of the embellishments that sometimes partially disguise the reality outside. The sheer helplessness of the individual in the grip of the colossus leads normal people to such extremes as suicide and self-mutilation. Rarely has the disease of totalitarianism been so devastatingly, so convincingly described. All man can do is make gestures of defiance—and the variety of these desperate gestures—at times attaining a kind of nobility—are documented in detail. And withal, this is not the antiseptic world of Zamyatin's *We*. The squalor, brutality and obscenity of camp life recalls tsarist Russia, though the machinery of repression has been infinitely perfected by Lenin's successors.

Marchenko, a proletarian from an illiterate Siberian family, writes with great power, great psychological insight. The account is perhaps somewhat formless, but this faithfully reflects the monotony of camp life itself. He packs in any number of thumbnail sketches of inmates and camp authorities. Almost an entire cross section of Soviet society is represented here, of people who have, for various reasons, often by mistake, got caught up in and mangled by the machine. Indeed, one is struck how, in Soviet conditions, the camps must present such a cross section, as to fall foul of the regime requires a relatively small transgression.

MARCHENKO'S objective is to describe post-Stalinist prison camps, to show up the hollowness of Khrushchev's boast that there are no longer any political prisoners in Russia. He wants to do for contemporary camps what Solzhenitsyn and others partially did for the Stalinist camps. Nothing has changed. If anything conditions are now worse. Sentenced in 1960 by mistake to a camp term for getting embroiled in a fight with some Chechen youths on a site where he was working as a boring engineer, Marchenko tried to escape over the Iranian frontier, was caught and in March 1961 was sentenced in a closed session to six years for high treason. Many people end up in camps for trying to cross the frontiers—a poignantly symbolic act! He describes the farce of the trial and then the horrors of his stage-by-stage journey to Potma—prisoners being packed in sealed compartments, nearly suffocating, 'like fishes on the sand'.

In May 1961 he arrives at Potma (South-West Mordovia). There he and three others defiantly plan to escape by digging a tunnel. His main companion is from an ex-kulak family, and Marchenko gives us his story in the first extensive account of a fellow prisoner. The multitude of

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biographical sketches scattered through the book build up into a kind of expressionistic history of the Soviet period. It turns out the camp is built on water. Wherever they dig they reach water. Finally the escapees are caught. They are hunted down like animals with pointed stakes, beaten nearly to death, flung into punishment cells and finally sentenced to three years in jail.

Marchenko describes the various prison regimes, ordinary, strict and special, also the punishment cells, officially supposed to be for very dangerous criminals—and then the prison, the final indignity and torture —in Vladimir. Here under the stress of the most appalling conditions, prisoners are driven to self-mutilation on an even greater scale than in the camps themselves. One prisoner, for example, cuts off an ear and wraps it up as a present to the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Other prisoners tattoo insults against Party leaders on their bodies. Marchenko keeps on recalling the past, how Herzen used to talk of the Vladimir prison. Now, no one talks of it. Politicals are sentenced in closed sessions, whereas common criminals go before an open court. It is hoped that the assumption will be that the camp inmates are all common criminals. Politicals are transported in closed carriages; their communications with the outside world are drastically reduced; the soldiers who guard them come from remote non-Russian speaking parts of the Union, to reduce contact even further; foreign spies are kept in special camps or under special conditions (viz. Powers). In short, everything is done to hide the truth. The absolute cynicism of the authorities, the hollow sham of the trials, with their puppet people's assessors, create the atmosphere of a horrific nightmare. There is even a legend, based on the existence of special camps for alien spies, that leads ordinary criminals to try to get themselves reclassified as politicals, this being easily accomplished!

Marchenko's description of the hunger, cold and inhumanity of the warders is hair-raising. Prisoners (*zeks*) are not humans, everything imaginable is done to humiliate them. Indeed, for sheer documentation of man's possible inhumanity to man, this account must be almost unexampled. Prisoners are driven by hunger even to cannibalism: a group of prisoners cut off bits of their flesh and try to make a stew of them; another prisoner drinks the blood of a fellow convict who has severed his veins.

In the summer of 1963 Marchenko returns to Potma. The *zeks* look after him, try to ease his re-entry into camp life. One is struck by the extraordinary (under the circumstances) kindness of the political prisoners to each other. This is contrasted with the low morale among ordinary criminals. At the other end of the scale is the patience of those sentenced for religious activities. Marchenko describes in detail the diet and conditions in the camp which steadily deteriorated from 1961. However, here, as outside, the black market keeps prisoners going. Bribery is rife as it was in tsarist Russia and as it is in the Soviet Union—it seems to be a *sine qua non* of totalitarianism. Camp organization also reflects

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the outside world. There is a presidium and a soviet of prisoners, of course a mere tool of the camp administration, just as the soviets outside are mere tools of the Politbureau. Prisoners serving on the soviet are mostly former policemen who collaborated with the Nazis! There are also political meetings etc., which are hilariously described. A particularly striking episode is of a visit by a speaker from a Baltic republic who is presented with a bouquet of barbed wire by a fellow countryman, a camp inmate—a magnificent, heroic gesture this.

In the autumn of 1964 Khrushchev falls and there is a wonderfully grotesque account of the panicky attempt by the camp authorities to have all his pictures, etc. removed. People sentenced for criticizing Khrushchev ask to be released, but very few are. Once again the whole hollow meaninglessness of these various permutations at the top is shown up.

Marchenko suffers from chronic inflammation of both ears (he is now almost deaf) and spends a term in hospital. Here he comes into contact with women patients. He gives a moving description of 'paper' love affairs between male and a female *zeks*, running the whole gamut of the game of love, though with barely any physical contact. The power of the imagination is exemplified. He also deals with the serious question of camp homosexuality.

In February 1966 he returns to the camp from the hospital zone for his final eight months. News of the Sinyavski-Daniel trial breaks. At first the *zeks* are suspicious. Who ever heard of an open political trial? This must be a show trial for foreign and internal consumption—a propaganda exercise. There is besides the general suspicion of writers who for the most part are simply tools of the machine. Finally, it transpires that the Sinyavski-Daniel affair represents a striking miscalculation on the part of the KGB. Daniel comes to the camp and Marchenko strikes up a friendship with him (Daniel also suffers from deafness!). There is a long section on Daniel and also a poem. The writer behaves with great dignity and the *zeks* band together to help him as far as they are able. Finally Marchenko is released in November 1966. His parting with his friends is very moving.

A last word. This book is unique, dealing as it does with every aspect of camp life. Though a comparatively uneducated man, Marchenko expresses himself with great power. The dramatic impact is considerable. It is one of those rare cases where a non-writer writing under great pressure produces almost a masterpiece. It has everything—insight, political acumen and above all humour and humanity.

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DOCUMENT: SOVIET UNION

We publish below an article which appeared in the journal Za Kommunism, *published by the Soviet Institute of Nuclear Research in Dubna on 22 November 1968, giving details about a lecture on the general theory of relativity by the young Soviet physicist, R. K. Kadiyev. It was his trial and that of other leaders of the Crimean Tartars in Tashkent (where they were tried under Article 191/4 of the Criminal Code of the Uzbek Republic) which prompted General P. G. Grigorenko to go there to attend it, only to be promptly arrested on the spot. Kadiyev was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in August 1969.*

THE NEGATIVE PARALLAX

G. Kopylov

IN physics the general theory of relativity is the greatest intellectual achievement of the twentieth century. By logical deductions alone, Albert Einstein, the propounder of this theory, established that the distribution of matter in the universe determines the curvature of space, the flow of time and the path of rays of light. It is very difficult to verify this theory experimentally, and in the 50 years of its existence only three of its implications have been verified: the slight shift of the orbit of the planet Mercury, the bending of rays of light near the surface of the sun and the change of colour of rays that reach us from distant systems of stars. Many prominent scientists have tried to find other aspects of Einstein's theory accessible to verification, but as a rule without success.

At the Fifth World Conference on Problems of the Theory of Relativity and Gravitation, held recently at Tbilisi, a noteworthy report was made by two young physicists from Central Asia, R. K. Kadiyev and L. Ya. Arifov. They have discovered a new implication of the general theory of relativity that can be verified. It concerns the so-called 'negative parallax'. What exactly have they discovered?

Let us assume that we have seen some star which is not within the plane of the earth's orbit. Suppose we look at it again some six months later. In the interim the earth revolving round the sun will have travelled 300 million kilometres from its former position. So the same star will appear to be slightly to the side (simply because together with the earth, we ourselves have moved slightly to the side). The angular amount of the apparent displacement is what is known as a parallax. This angle is very small; it can only be measured by the most precise astronomical instruments and even so, only in the case of the nearest stars.

According to the general theory of relativity the rays of stars are deflected from their path owing to the attraction of the sun. We therefore see stars in the sky not where they actually are, but a little farther

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away from the sun. This shift is very small: according to the calculations of R. K. Kadiyev and L. Ya. Arifov its angular measurement is approximately two thousandths of a second. This shift likewise affects the parallax, i.e. the apparent displacement of the stars in the sky due to the movement of the earth.

Seeing that the parallax decreases, the two scientists have deduced that the parallax of the most distant stars is negative. To put it more simply: after the earth has completed half of its annual course round the sun, the star will be displayed not to the opposite side, but to the same side as the earth itself. The displacement is very small—about four thousandths of a second (angular measurement).

This is a very unusual phenomenon. Imagine yourself looking out of a train window at trees speeding past you. They rush away in the opposite direction to the movement of your train. Suddenly you see some trees travelling in the same direction as your train. Our young scientists lead us to expect a similar movement, not of trees, but of stars.

It is important to note that negative parallaxes have been known to astronomy for a long time. In the table of parallaxes certain stars are actually shown with a negative parallax. But astronomers have always thought that this was due to faulty measurement. They explained the displacement of stars 'in the wrong direction' by the imperfection of astronomical instruments. The young scientists Kadiyev and Arifov assert that this is not merely a case of inaccurate measurement but that the explanation is to be found in Einstein's theory. They claim that the negative parallax in the tables is very close to the figure at which they have arrived (four thousandths of a second).

The bending of the rays of light owing to the attraction of the sun has likewise been measured long ago, but only in the case of stars whose rays skim the surface of the sun (during eclipses). No one, however, thought this attraction might be observed in rays passing hundreds of millions of kilometres away from the sun. Now this possibility is opened to us by the new discovery.

The achievement of the Soviet scientists is extremely interesting. Further analysis and study are now needed. There can be no doubt that subsequent research will help us to gain a deeper insight into this interesting problem.

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DOCUMENTS: USA

(*We publish below an extract from* How Harvard Rules, *' a total critique of Harvard University', published by the Africa Research Group and* The Old Mole *in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the speech made on* 11 *April* 1969 *by Professor Alexander Gerschenkron to the Harvard faculty.*)

HOW HARVARD RULES

IT was not, as many 'moderates' felt, the police who disrupted the normal processes of life at Harvard, but the students they were called in to remove from University Hall. The police were employed to restore the university to its normal mode of operation. The strike, which was the response of thousands of students to the administration's action, was implicitly a protest against the return to normalcy, despite the vehemency with which the 'moderates' insisted they were striving for a transformation or retransformation of the university into a 'community' through 'restructuring', or instituting faculty and (more urgently) student participation with the administration in decision-making.

It is only the university's function in society that gives the idea of restructuring any importance—yet it is precisely this function that makes nonsense of the idea of a university 'community' of students, faculty, and administrators which is at the same time a corporation run within and serving the interests of corporate capitalist society. 'Participation', under circumstances in which power remains undistributed (here, in the hands of the corporation) is merely a means to drown the real issues in a sea of committees and hide the continued powerlessness of the 'participants'. Any meaningful restructuring would have to be a transfer of power, not participation but *control.* And even student/faculty control of the university, so long as it meant maintenance of the university in its present form and social role, would be an insufficient answer to the problems brought into the open by the sit-in and strike.

The full development in capitalism of the destructive potential of private control of social production (of which the war in Vietnam and the housing problems of Roxbury and Cambridge are only examples) has made it obvious that the responsibility for running any social institution should rest with those who do its work.

In an advanced industrial society, in which practically all production is for the use of society in general, the extension of this principle to the level of social life as a whole dictates that this responsibility must be shared with all the members of society, whose lives the institutions affect.

Students act to disrupt normal functions of the university (as high schoolers their schools, soldiers the army, and workers their places

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of work) because it is through the normal functioning of the university that the crisis of American society presents itself to students. The relation of the struggle on the campus to the struggle throughout society is sometimes obscured for students because of their position in society. As non-producers, or rather, as their own products, students are not economically exploited but only in training for places on the pecking order. Not yet at work, they tend to see the goal of 'student power' as satisfied by some measure of control over the training for work, as if that could be independent of the nature of the jobs awaiting them. And yet, as at Harvard, the essential questions come up: the role of the 'knowledge factory', the question of power. These questions must be clearly posed and dealt with; in combination they are the essence of the most serious problem, for thought and action, of the student movement, the relation of the struggle on the campus to that waged throughout America and the world for the liberation of mankind.

The demand for student/staff control is a demand not for control over an institution supervising one's insertion into the world of exploitation but for an end to exploitation. It therefore inevitably pushes the issue far beyond the confines of the campus. The idea of a university which serves not the class that continues to dominate society, but those who are at present dominated, implies a thorough restructuring of society as a condition for a meaningful restructuring of the university. The limits of restructuring reveal the outlines of a new society.

THE MOST UNBELIEVABLE THING

Alexander Gerschenkron

MR PRESIDENT, I am afraid that you are now condemned to hear a third exotic interpretation of the Harvard accent, but this cannot be helped. For the rest, I do not mean to be humorous, because I do not feel humorous at all.

I have been away from Harvard this year, but I have followed the developments closely. I have accumulated thoughts and feelings, and I must discharge them now. I must speak and speak out candidly, and I am not going to mince my words. I think that this is a critical hour as far as this University is concerned—and this no doubt the most critical meeting which I have attended in the 20 years since I have joined this faculty.

I feel that what has happened with the invasion of privacy, the occupation of a building, the manhandling, however gentle, of the deans, the rifling of files, the theft of papers and documents—I think this is legally criminal and morally outrageous. And I think the action to punish it was perfectly correct. Force and crime must be met by force; that was done, and I think it was well done. Let me say that we all

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in this room should understand that this business must be stopped. This business must not be allowed to go on, because if it is allowed to go on, then we will face the same experience as the officers of University Hall faced. Anyone then can be dragged out, carried like a sack of potatoes out of his lecture room and dropped over the stairs of Emerson Hall or Sever, or whatever it be—unless he submits meekly to demands and is willing to allow himself to be raped, symbolically, as happened two weeks ago when a member of this faculty had a banana put into his mouth. I think this is outrageous, and particularly outrageous, if you think what the issues are, how preposterous, how irrelevant the issues are about which we are talking here.

The Dean just said that the abolition of the ROTC had been the main demand of the intruders. I cannot regard the ROTC as a serious issue, and I believe the faculty committed a grave error when it agreed to discuss the ROTC under duress and pressure instead of studying the problem in a quiet and dignified way. I hear all this talk about the imperialist war machine, but any man in possession of his reasoning powers knows that this is nonsense. However unfortunate the war in Vietnam, it is the American war machine that protects the freedom of Western Europe. It is the American war machine that protects the freedom of India. When the former ambassador to India, who happens to be a member of this faculty, returned from his term of office, he reported that his finest hour, his proudest moment, had been when he was able to get American bombers to fly over New Delhi in order to ward off the Chinese invasion of the country. The pilots flying those planes may well have undergone their original training in ROTC camps.

I think we must all be made to understand that in emergencies, in critical times, this faculty is not the proper guardian of academic freedom. This is true for a number of reasons and proved by historical experience. Remember, and many of you are old enough to remember, that 16 or 17 years ago, when academic freedom was threatened brutally and viciously, not from within but from without, it was not the faculty that stood up against the threat. The faculty was subdued and scared. If at that time a conservative member of the faculty had proposed dismissal of certain professors who had appeared before congressional committees, a frightened faculty would have voted for dismissal. Fortunately, the decision was not up to the faculty. It was first Provost Buck and then President Pusey and the much maligned governing boards who stood up against the threat. I remember well how way back in 1952 or 1953 President Pusey, a much younger President Pusey, came for the first time to Eliot House and a student asked him: 'Oh, why should we bother about McCarthy? Here is Harvard with her 300-odd years of history and here is that junior senator from Wisconsin.' President Pusey pounded the table and said: 'This is evil, and when I see evil I fight it.' He did it then and he did it now, this week.

Now also this week let us take for once a candid look at ourselves and see why this faculty is really inept at protecting academic freedom

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and must leave it at critical times to the administration. Look at all the decisions that have been made so far. Look at the hesitance, look at the uncertainty, look at the vacillation. Why? There are many reasons for that. Some of them are at least respectable, others are not.

There are a number of people no doubt so preoccupied with their research work, with their scholarly work, that they will have nothing to do with administrative affairs and with the management of the University, no matter how important. But there are also other people at this University and other tendencies and motivations, and let us not close our eyes to them. There are the middle-aged popularity kids who have done considerable damage to this University. In addition to the popularity seekers, there are also the fearers of unpopularity, and they may well fear in the situation of terror and tension that is being created—fear of boycotts, fear of the reduction in the election of their courses. There are still other people, people between 45 and 55, and as likely as not they have children of college age. They have lousy parent-child relationships and they do not want to louse them up some more. . . .

I am not Pollyanna. I know quite well that there are things that are horribly wrong with the United States, but I also know that there are many things that are wonderfully right with the United States. And amongst those things are the great universities, among them is Harvard. There is nothing comparable, there is no counterpart to it anywhere in the world. And to try to destroy, to disrupt, to attack this University is criminal. They attack the University simply because it is in their proximity, just as a criminal steals something just because it is lying there. And in attacking the University they attack the finest flower of American culture.

YOUR trouble is that you have not studied the literature of the subject. I am not going to give you a long reading list, but I must summarize for you one single item on that reading list. This is a fairy tale by Hans Christian Andersen, a fairy tale which, in the dark days of the nazi occupation, the Danes used so subtly and so effectively. That fairy tale is called 'The Most Unbelievable Thing'. There was a kingdom, and in the kingdom there was a king, and he had a princess, and he was interested in the progress of arts. And at a certain point he announced that he would give the princess in marriage to the man who would accomplish the most unbelievable thing.

And there was great excitement and tremendous competition in the land. Finally, the great day came when all those prepared works had to be presented for judgment. There were many marvellous things, but towering high above them was a truly wonderful thing. It was a clock, a clock produced by a handsome young man. It had a most wonderful mechanism, showing the calendar back and forth into the past and into the future, showing the time, and around the clock were sculptured all the great spiritual and intellectual figures in the history of mankind.

And whenever the clock struck, those figures exercised most graceful

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movements. And everybody, the people and the judges said that yes, to accomplish a thing like that was most unbelievable. And the princess looked at the clock and then looked at the handsome young man, and she liked them both very much. And the judges were just about to pronounce their formal judgment, when a new competitor appeared, a low-brow fellow. He, too, carried something in his hand, but it was not a work of art, it was a sledgehammer. He walked up to the clock and he swung out and with three blows he smashed up the clock and everybody said, why, to smash up such a clock, this is surely the most unbelievable thing, and that was how the judges had to adjudge.

And this is relevant to the present situation at Harvard, and unless you do something about it this is all of the story that will remain relevant. But Andersen also has a happy end to his story, which, I am afraid, may not be relevant for us. What happened in the story was that the king, of course, had to remain true to his word. There was the wedding day and the church bells, and the low-brow fellow stood at the altar, and the princess was marching down the aisle. And then, at that moment the spirits of all those great spiritual and intellectual figures in the history of mankind, they suddenly arose. The spirits of all those smashed up figures invaded the church and they went at the low-brow guy, they smothered him, and in the end the princess got the handsome young man.

And I can only hope that the spirits of this faculty will rise and will smash up all the criminal nonsense that is going around the campuses of the country.

It is now 100 years since President Eliot started converting what after all was an ancient but rather obscure college into a great university, the greatest university in the land. What has taken 100 years to create can be destroyed in as many weeks. This University, like the clock in the story, like all great works of art, is a frail and fragile creation, however beautiful, and unless you do something about it, and unless you let the administration do something about it, this wonderful work of art will be destroyed, and the guilt will be yours.

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